No Demolition Without Hearing: Rajasthan HC Orders Committee to Examine Title Claims of Sriganganagar Residents Facing Road-Widening Drive

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand directed the Urban Improvement Trust, Sriganganagar to constitute a committee of senior officials within fifteen days to examine residents' title documents and hear objections before any demolition proceeds under the city's 1981–2001 Master Plan road-widening scheme.

Thirteen residents of Chawla Colony and adjoining localities along Jassa Singh Marg, Sriganganagar, challenged demolition notices issued by the Urban Improvement Trust, Sriganganagar (UIT) that sought to clear structures standing in the path of an 80-foot-wide public road earmarked in the city's Master Plan for 1981–2001. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, sitting singly at the Jodhpur seat of the Rajasthan High Court, disposed of the batch of twelve connected civil writ petitions on 19 August 2026, holding that the State cannot dispossess citizens from their properties without following due process of law, and that those who hold documents suggesting valid title are entitled to a hearing and, if dispossession is warranted, to compensation. The court stopped short of examining individual title disputes — a question of fact beyond writ jurisdiction — and instead created a structured administrative mechanism to resolve them.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The lead petitioner, Ram Prasad, and twelve others — including Kulchander, Premjit Gujral, Satish Kumar Arora, Bhupendra Singh, Nand Lal, Sunita Rani Arora, Preet Singh, Kishna Devi, Shankar Lal, Tara Rani, and Ravindra Singh — all resided or held property along Jassa Singh Marg and Chawla Colony in Sri Ganganagar. Their cases were filed separately between 2016 and 2021, but raised common questions of law and fact, prompting the court to hear them together and dispose of them by a single common order.

Each petitioner claimed that the land in question originally stood recorded in the revenue records in the names of erstwhile owners, and that possession had passed through successive transactions, ultimately reaching the petitioners by way of agreements to sell and allied documents. When the UIT began work on widening Jassa Singh Marg, it found structures over the proposed road corridor, issued notices for removal of alleged encroachments, and signalled its intent to demolish the residential premises. The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring the demolition action illegal and violative of Articles 14, 21 and 300-A of the Constitution, and asked the court to restrain the authorities from acting without following due process and without paying compensation.

The prayer in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9961/2016, taken as representative for convenience, specifically challenged a notice dated 22 August 2016 issued by the UIT and sought a declaration that the petitioner held rightful possession with no encroachment on the land in question.

Rival Positions on Title and the Master Plan

The petitioners' counsel, Senior Advocate Manoj Bhandari assisted by Shreyansh Bhandari and Saloni Jain, argued that the land could only be taken for road construction after following the prescribed legal process and paying adequate compensation. He placed reliance on the Supreme Court's decision in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2020) 2 SCC 569, in support of the proposition that forcible dispossession without compensation is impermissible.

The State's counsel, Additional Advocate General Rajesh Panwar, assisted by Monal Chugh and Pratyksha Rajpurohit, countered that the land belonged to the UIT, Sriganganagar by virtue of proceedings initiated under Section 90-B(1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. He argued that an agreement to sell does not confer any right, title or interest in property, and that the original allotment of the subject land was recorded as agricultural in nature in the name of erstwhile Khatedars. The land had since been subdivided and used for residential purposes without completing the required conversion procedure. The respondents pointed out that as per the Master Plan for 1981–2001, the subject land is recorded as a proposed public road 80 feet wide, that construction of the road was substantially complete, and that only a stretch of roughly 250 metres remained unfinished — blocked solely by the interim order operating in these proceedings. The State relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia & Ors., reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 1208, in support of its position that no judicial interference was warranted.

The Court's Reasoning on Due Process and Property Rights

Justice Dhand began his analysis by tracing the statutory framework. The Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 (the Act of 1959) was enacted to promote and facilitate the improvement and expansion of urban areas in Rajasthan by creating Urban Improvement Trusts and local bodies entrusted with town improvement and expansion schemes. Sections 5 and 6 of the Act empower UITs to prepare Master Plans. The 1981–2001 Master Plan for Sri Ganganagar was prepared under those provisions and designated the subject corridor as a proposed 80-foot public road.

The court readily accepted that the Master Plan had to be implemented. Drawing on the Division Bench decision in Gulab Kothari v. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2017 (1) WLC (Raj.) 562, Justice Dhand held that a Master Plan is a policy document for guiding planned development of a city and “cannot be permitted to be set at naught at the whim and fancy of the authority concerned just to serve the interest of individuals.” The court quoted paragraphs 87 and 205(iv) of that judgment to emphasise that once a Master Development Plan is brought into being, vigilant implementation is the rule and any deviation an exception.

At the same time, the court drew a sharp distinction between the legitimacy of the road project and the manner in which the authorities had proceeded against individual occupants. The petitioners' core grievance, the court found, was not that a road was being built, but that they had received no genuine opportunity of hearing before demolition notices were issued and before the question of their title or entitlement to compensation was addressed.

On that point, Justice Dhand was unambiguous. Article 21 of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597), demands that the procedure by which a person is deprived of life or liberty must be “fair”, “just” and “reasonable”. The court noted that the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 itself requires notice before adverse action is taken for encroachments on public roads and footpaths, and that the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana v. Inderjeet Singh, (2008) 13 SCC 506, had held that statutory notice requirements must be strictly complied with before any authority proceeds with adverse action against an occupant.

The court also invoked Article 300-A of the Constitution and the Supreme Court's ruling in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar & Ors., (2011) 10 SCC 404, to the effect that the right to property is a human right encompassing the right to shelter, and that forcible dispossession without due process violates Article 300-A. Justice Dhand traced the conceptual lineage of the rule of law from Article 39 of Magna Carta 1215 through to the constitutional guarantee in Article 21, before noting that the same Supreme Court, in Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC 396, had directed all State Governments to prepare schemes for speedy eviction of illegal occupants of public land — but with a show cause notice and a brief hearing as mandatory preconditions.

The court then noted the limits of writ jurisdiction. It found it impractical to examine each petitioner's title individually under Article 226 of the Constitution, as that would involve adjudicating disputed questions of fact. Instead, it crafted a structured administrative remedy: a high-level committee to examine each case, hear objections, and determine whether any petitioner holds a valid title before any demolition takes place.

The Tree-Planting Condition

Justice Dhand added a condition that was not sought by any party. He directed that if, in the course of road construction or expansion, any trees or plants need to be removed, the respondents must first count and document them. Against every single removed tree or plant, ten shady plants must be planted in nearby public areas close to the city, and a compliance report submitted to the court. The judgment records the court's view that “thriving trees, whether for decades or centuries, provide continuous and silent benefits to the city and its surrounding community” and that future generations will benefit from a cleaner, fresher environment as a result.

Order

Justice Dhand disposed of all twelve writ petitions with seven specific directions.

The respondents must constitute a committee of senior officials of the department within fifteen days of the order. All petitioners must submit their representations and objections regarding title and rights over the premises to that committee within fifteen days of its constitution.

The committee must provide an opportunity of hearing to each petitioner and decide representations by reasoned, speaking orders in each individual case, strictly in accordance with law.

Where the committee concludes that a petitioner holds a valid title and the premises are still required for the road, adequate compensation must be awarded at the appropriate level in accordance with prevailing DLC rates, or alternatively, a piece of land may be allotted under any applicable government scheme.

Where no objections are received from a particular petitioner, the respondents are free to proceed in accordance with law in those cases.

Any person aggrieved by the committee's decision retains liberty to approach the appropriate forum for redressal.

The tree inventory and ten-fold replanting direction applies throughout the road construction exercise, with a compliance report to be submitted to the court.

After all representations and objections have been decided, the respondents are free to proceed with road construction as per the 1981–2001 Master Plan, provided a minimum of fifteen days has elapsed since the respective orders on the petitioners' representations were issued.