Rajasthan HC: Civil Court Must Ensure Its Own Orders Are Enforced, Cannot Relegate Litigant to Punitive Contempt Route Alone
The Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur quashed a trial court order refusing police assistance for temple renovation, holding that courts carry an obligation to enforce their own injunctions and cannot redirect a successful litigant solely to punitive contempt proceedings.
Justice Farjand Ali, sitting singly at the Jodhpur bench of the Rajasthan High Court, on 10 July 2026 allowed a writ petition filed by a registered society managing a temple at Soor Sagar, Jodhpur, and quashed the order of the Additional Civil Judge No. 1, Jodhpur Metropolitan, which had refused to grant police assistance for implementing a subsisting ad interim injunction. The High Court directed the trial court to forthwith issue directions to the Superintendent of Police and the concerned Station House Officer to provide adequate police protection so that renovation work at the Temple of Lord Mahadeva could proceed without obstruction. The judgment draws a clear line between punitive contempt proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and a court's inherent obligation to give effect to its own judicial orders.
The Dispute Before the High Court
The petitioner, Shri Mahadev Ji Kaluram Ji Ki Bawdi, Through Soorsagar Mali (Sainik Shatriya) Sansthan — a registered society with its office at Soor Sagar, Jodhpur, represented by its President Shri Ranveer Singh Parihar — is the plaintiff in a civil suit for permanent injunction, being Civil Misc. Case No. 70/2025, before the trial court. Along with the suit, the society had filed an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking a temporary injunction, pleading that renovation of the Temple of Lord Mahadeva situated at the suit property was required.
The trial court found a prima facie case and, on 3 July 2025, granted an ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from causing any interference in the peaceful use and occupation of the suit property by the petitioner.
The petitioner's case was that when it attempted to undertake the renovation work in the temple premises pursuant to that order, respondents Shri Milap Singh and others obstructed the work, interfered with the petitioner's peaceful possession and created an atmosphere that compelled the society to discontinue renovation activities entirely. Faced with this obstruction, the petitioner moved an application under Section 151 CPC before the trial court, praying for police assistance to implement the ad interim order in its true letter and spirit.
The trial court rejected that application on 13 June 2026, holding that the petitioner ought to invoke Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC to deal with alleged disobedience, and that police protection could be directed only in cases of grave emergency. That rejection was challenged before the High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14175/2026.
The Legal Question
Two distinct legal propositions arose from the trial court's refusal. First, whether a party holding a subsisting injunction order who faces obstruction in its implementation is confined to the punitive remedy under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC, or whether the court can, in the exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, direct police assistance for enforcement. Second, whether the standard of “grave emergency” is the correct threshold for granting such assistance.
The petitioner's counsel, Senior Advocate Mr. Anand Purohit assisted by Mr. Kshitij Vyas and Mr. Sukhdev Patel, argued that the trial court had committed a manifest error on both counts. The object of the Section 151 application, they contended, was not to punish the respondents but to ensure effective implementation of a subsisting judicial order.
How the Bench Reasoned
Justice Farjand Ali began with the procedural question of whether notice to the opposite party was required before passing an order on a Section 151 application seeking police assistance for an existing injunction. The Court held that no vested right of the opposite party is affected by such a direction so as to necessitate issuance of notice. The rationale offered was that before an injunction is granted, natural justice is necessary because civil rights remain unadjudicated. Once an injunction has already been granted after due judicial consideration, requiring the court to again seek the opposite party's opinion on whether its own order should be implemented would, in effect, permit the alleged violator to decide whether the order deserves compliance — a course the High Court described as wholly impermissible.
The Court then turned to the distinction between Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC and a prayer for police assistance. It held that proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A are punitive in nature, designed to deal with deliberate and wilful disobedience of an injunction by punishing the contemnor. Such proceedings are neither intended nor designed to secure immediate enforcement of the injunction or to facilitate its smooth implementation. A prayer for police assistance, by contrast, is directed solely at facilitating implementation, not at punishing anyone.
The High Court stated that once a court has exercised its judicial discretion and passed an ad interim injunction, it carries an obligation to ensure that its order is not reduced to a mere paper decree. If credible material is placed before it indicating obstruction, the court would fail in its duty by remaining a silent spectator and relegating the successful litigant merely to punitive proceedings. The Court observed that <“the majesty of law does not lie merely in passing judicial orders; it equally lies in ensuring that such orders are respected, honoured and effectively implemented.”
On the second issue, the Court rejected the trial court's invocation of the “grave emergency” standard as a near-absolute threshold. It held that deliberate obstruction in enforcement of a subsisting judicial order itself strikes at the root of the rule of law and constitutes an emergent circumstance warranting immediate intervention. The expression “grave emergency” cannot be read so narrowly as to exclude situations where the implementation of a judicial order is itself being blocked.
The Court then addressed the particular character of the property in question. It noted that the matter pertains to renovation of the Temple of Lord Mahadeva and that matters concerning places of worship demand a greater degree of sensitivity, promptitude and vigilance. Injury to the religious sentiments of devotees, when coupled with wilful obstruction of a judicial order, was held to constitute an emergent circumstance justifying police assistance. The judgment added that preventive justice is always preferable to remedial justice, and that the court is not expected to wait for an unfortunate incident to occur before extending necessary protection.
Pulling the reasoning together, the High Court held that once a subsisting injunction is allegedly being obstructed and police assistance is sought only to facilitate implementation, the civil court ought to extend police protection so that the dignity, authority and majesty of judicial orders remain preserved and public confidence in the administration of justice remains unshaken.
Scope of Police Authority Under the Direction
The High Court was careful to circumscribe the role of the police under its direction. It made clear that the police authorities shall merely facilitate implementation of the judicial order and shall not permit either party to travel beyond the scope of the injunction granted by the competent civil court. The direction does not empower the police to adjudicate any dispute between the parties or to act in a manner inconsistent with what the ad interim order of 3 July 2025 actually permits.
Outcome
The writ petition was allowed. The impugned order dated 13 June 2026 passed by the Additional Civil Judge No. 1, Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur in Civil Misc. Case No. 27/2026 was quashed and set aside. The application under Section 151 CPC preferred by the petitioner was allowed.
The Additional Civil Judge No. 1, Jodhpur Metropolitan was directed to forthwith issue appropriate directions to the Superintendent of Police and the concerned Station House Officer for extending adequate police protection and assistance to the petitioner to facilitate peaceful, smooth and unobstructed execution of the renovation work of the Temple of Lord Mahadeva in accordance with the subsisting ad interim injunction order dated 3 July 2025, and to ensure its faithful implementation in letter as well as spirit.
The stay petition was also disposed of.