Sikkim HC Refuses to Quash POCSO FIR on Compromise Deed, Cites Supreme Court Bar Against Settlement-Based Quashing in Rape Cases

The High Court of Sikkim dismissed a Section 528 BNSS petition seeking to quash a POCSO aggravated sexual assault case, holding that a compromise deed cannot override the statutory bar against quashing rape proceedings.

The High Court of Sikkim, in an order dated 2 September 2026, refused to quash an FIR and pending POCSO trial on the basis of a compromise deed signed by the families of the accused and the survivor. Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, sitting singly at Gangtok, held that the inherent power under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — the successor provision to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — cannot be invoked to extinguish criminal proceedings for aggravated sexual assault or rape, regardless of a subsequent settlement. The order rests squarely on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2023, which the High Court read as closing the door on compromise-based quashing in such cases.

The FIR and the Trial Before the POCSO Court

The FIR, bearing No. 113/2023, was lodged on 30 June 2023 at Sadar Police Station, Gangtok, and registered under Section 5(j)(ii) read with Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The alleged offence was said to have occurred on 26 November 2022. The complainant was the survivor herself, then a student aged 17 years.

According to the FIR, the accused was a good friend of the survivor whom she had known since Class VI. She stated that the sexual intercourse was initially not consensual, but that he had persistently persuaded her until she gave in, after which she became pregnant. The FIR was lodged after two developments: the accused repeatedly delayed obtaining medicine and hospital support for the survivor despite his promises, and the survivor's mother discovered the pregnancy.

The case was registered as S.T. (POCSO) Case No. 1 of 2024 before the Special Judge (POCSO), Gangtok. By the time the quashing petition was filed, the prosecution had closed its evidence. The survivor's deposition had been recorded on 21 August 2024, and the next step was the examination of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.

The deed of compromise adds a layer of context. It records that the accused and the survivor were classmates who had both passed Class XII in 2022. They had attended a training programme in Gangtok in November 2022 during which they indulged in a physical relationship. A child was born, who has since been adopted by responsible parents through the Child Welfare Committee. The survivor is now pursuing higher education. The accused was stated to be barely 22 years old at the time of the petition.

The Petition: Six Petitioners, One Deed of Compromise

The quashing petition was filed by six petitioners under Section 528 of the BNSS: the accused as petitioner no. 1; the survivor, now aged 20 years, as petitioner no. 2; the survivor's parents as petitioners nos. 3 and 4; and the accused's parents as petitioners nos. 5 and 6. Each petitioner filed a supporting affidavit.

The deed of compromise itself, dated 3 August 2025, was executed between the parents of the survivor and the parents of the accused. The survivor and the accused signed the deed, but not as parties to it. The petitioners' counsel explained that because the survivor was still a minor on 3 August 2025 — though she has since turned 20 — she could not be a party to the deed. No explanation was offered for why the accused did not sign as a party.

The petitioners argued that the compromise was reached freely, without force, coercion, or threat. They contended that the accused was at risk of losing a precious part of his life in prison for what they characterised as a voluntary act by two young people unaware of the legal consequences. They pointed out that if the POCSO Special Court were to convict the accused, the mandatory minimum sentence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act — not less than twenty years' rigorous imprisonment, extendable to life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, or death — would effectively destroy his ability to rehabilitate after release.

Two Questions the Court Framed

Justice Pradhan identified two questions requiring resolution before disposing of the petition.

The first was whether a deed of compromise entered between the parents of the survivor and the accused person could be treated as a deed of compromise between the accused and the survivor, both of whom are adults today.

The second, and more consequential, was whether the power under Section 528 of the BNSS could be exercised to quash criminal proceedings for aggravated sexual assault or rape under the POCSO Act and the IPC on the basis of a compromise deed.

How the Court Reasoned

On the first question, the Court took a practical view. A deed of compromise is an agreement between the parties to it, and the deed here was technically between the parents alone. The survivor and the accused signed, but not as parties. That said, because the petition itself was filed and supported by affidavits of both the accused and the survivor alongside their parents, the Court found that the intention to resolve the dispute was sufficiently evident. The first question was answered accordingly: despite the technical deficiency in the deed, the collective filing disclosed a genuine desire to compromise.

The second question received a categorical negative answer.

Justice Pradhan turned to the Supreme Court's decision in Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 INSC 614, which had arisen from a Calcutta High Court judgment that set aside a conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(2)(n) and (3) of the IPC after the survivor and accused reached a settlement. The Supreme Court restored the conviction and held, in terms that the Sikkim High Court quoted at length, that “even if the accused and the victim (who has now attained majority) were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution” under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution.

The Court also engaged with the earlier Supreme Court judgment in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, which had recognised that the High Court's inherent power may be used to quash proceedings based on settlement in cases with a predominantly civil character. However, Gian Singh itself had made clear that “in respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all.” Justice Pradhan read Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents as confirming that rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault under the POCSO Act fall squarely within that category.

The Court acknowledged the harshness of the potential outcome. The accused was approximately 19 years old at the time of the incident and the survivor was nearly 17. Both were classmates. The Court noted that the Supreme Court itself, in X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi, (2022) SCC OnLine SC 1321, had recognised that adolescents in India do engage in consensual sexual activity and that the POCSO Act's criminalisation of such activity — regardless of factual consent — can produce consequences that are disproportionate in individual cases. Justice Pradhan observed that the present case appeared to be one of many such situations.

The Court also noted that the POCSO Act does not define consent, and that settled law treats a child's consent as no consent at all. Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines a child as any person below 18 years. On the date of the alleged incident, the survivor was a child within that meaning.

Despite these observations, Justice Pradhan held that sympathy and recognition of the harsh consequences could not displace the Supreme Court's unequivocal ruling. The second question was answered in the negative: the power under Section 528 of the BNSS could not be exercised to quash the proceedings on the basis of the compromise deed.

Outcome

The petition filed under Section 528 of the BNSS was rejected. The Court characterised Section 528 of the BNSS as pari materia with Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., making the Supreme Court's rulings under Section 482 directly applicable.

The Court, however, noted that if the parties are inclined, they may approach the Supreme Court for relief. A copy of the order was directed to be sent to the Special Judge (POCSO), Gangtok, for information. The order was approved for reporting and publication on the internet.