Telangana HC Rejects Election Petitions Against KTR Over Son's Asset Non-Disclosure

The High Court for the State of Telangana dismissed both election petitions challenging KTR's 2023 Sircilla win, finding no material facts or triable issues on corrupt practice.

Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao, sitting singly at the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, rejected Election Petition Nos. 27 and 28 of 2024 on 4 August 2026, by allowing interlocutory applications filed by Kalvakuntla Taraka Rama Rao (K.T.R.) under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The two election petitioners — Kondam Karuna Mahender Reddy and Lagisetti Srinivas — had sought to void K.T.R.'s election from the 29-Sircilla Assembly Constituency in Rajanna-Sircilla District, declared on 3 December 2023 following polling on 30 November 2023. The court found that the election petitions contained no material facts constituting a complete cause of action, no identification of the specific clause of Section 123 under which corrupt practice was alleged, and that the sole allegation — non-disclosure of the assets of K.T.R.'s son in the nomination affidavit — did not disclose any triable issue.

The Challenge Before the Court

Both election petitions were filed under Sections 80, 80A, 81, 83, 84, 100(1)(b) and (d), 101, and 123(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The relief sought was twofold: a declaration that K.T.R.'s election was illegal, null, and void, and a further declaration that the respective petitioners were entitled to be declared elected from the 29-Sircilla constituency.

The central allegation was that K.T.R. had suppressed material facts in his nomination affidavit filed in Form 26 under the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Specifically, the election petitioners contended that K.T.R. had failed to disclose the immovable and movable assets of his son, Kalvakuntla Himanshu Rao, in the said affidavit. The case built by the election petitioners was that Himanshu Rao had attained the age of 18 years on 12 July 2023 and that, within one week of attaining majority, agricultural lands were purchased in his name from M/s Telangana Publications Private Ltd., with a consideration of Rs. 10,50,000/- and Rs. 88,15,500/- alleged to have been paid through Account No. 18090100019288 held with Bank of Baroda, Banjara Hills Branch, Hyderabad, through cheques dated 20 July 2023. K.T.R. filed his nomination on 9 November 2023, and the election petitioners contended that, because Himanshu Rao was still a student pursuing education in the United States at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, and had no independent means, he remained a “dependent child” whose assets were required to be disclosed.

The election petitioners further alleged that the suppression of this information constituted a corrupt practice amounting to undue influence on the electorate, warranting invalidation of the election under Section 100(1)(b) of the Act.

K.T.R. filed I.A. No. 2 of 2024 in each petition, seeking rejection at the threshold on the grounds that the petitions lacked material facts, disclosed no cause of action, and were barred by various provisions of the Act read with the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961.

The Legal Questions

Three distinct legal questions arose for consideration. First, whether the election petitions contained the concise statement of material facts mandated by Section 83(1)(a) of the Act, such that a triable issue was disclosed. Second, whether the sole allegation of non-disclosure of the son's assets — where the son had attained majority before the election notification — could, without more, constitute a corrupt practice or undue influence under Section 123 of the Act. Third, whether the election petitioners' reliance on Section 75A(5)(v) of the Act to characterise Himanshu Rao as a “dependent child” was legally sustainable.

Section 83(1) requires an election petition to contain a concise statement of material facts, set forth full particulars of any alleged corrupt practice (including the names of parties alleged to have committed it and the date and place of commission), and be signed and verified in the manner prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Section 123(2) defines undue influence as any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right by a candidate, his agent, or any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent.

How the Court Reasoned

Justice Rajeshwar Rao examined the pleadings in the election petitions closely and found them materially deficient at every level.

On the question of material facts, the court observed that the election petition at para No. 15 stated only that “due to the suppression of material facts, there is every possibility of there being undue influence on the Electorate.” This formulation, the court held, demonstrated that the election petitioner himself was not asserting the commission of undue influence as a definite fact but merely speculating about a possibility. Such a pleading could not form the foundation of a corrupt practice allegation. The court drew on the Supreme Court's observations in V. Narayanaswamy v. C.P. Thirunavukkarasu (2000) 2 SCC 294 — which held that failure to plead material facts is fatal to an election petition and no amendment can later introduce them — and on Kanimozhi Karunanidhi v. A. Santhana Kumar (2024) 18 SCC 592, which reiterated that the omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action.

The court further found that the election petition nowhere identified which clause or sub-clause of Section 123 the alleged acts fell under. Section 123 enumerates distinct categories of corrupt practice: clause (1) covers bribery, clause (2) covers undue influence, and the remaining clauses cover other forms. The election petitioners had failed to specify the relevant clause, leaving the allegation entirely at large. Without that specification, the court held, neither the returned candidate nor the court could identify what precise charge was being made.

On the son's status as a “dependent child,” the court addressed the election petitioners' reliance on Section 75A(5)(v) of the Act, which defines “dependent children” as sons and daughters who have no separate means of earning and are wholly dependent on the elected candidate for their livelihood. The court held that Section 75A is a post-election declaration provision applicable to elected members of both Houses of Parliament and that the definition in the explanation clause of that section restricts its application to Section 75A itself. Accordingly, the election petitioners' attempt to press that definition into service in relation to a nomination affidavit filed under the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 was “absolutely fragile” and founded on a misreading of the provision.

Himanshu Rao had attained majority on 12 July 2023 — well before the election notification on 3 November 2023 and before K.T.R. filed his nomination on 9 November 2023. As at the date of nomination, K.T.R.'s contention was that his son had his own source of livelihood and was not dependent on him. The court observed that the election petitioners had placed no specific averment or material on record to disprove this, and that mere assumptions could not constitute a valid cause of action.

The court also noted that the election petitioners had filed only two documents — Annexures A8 and A9 — relating to the land purchase, and that neither document disclosed that the consideration amount had originated from K.T.R. There was also no averment regarding any connection between M/s Telangana Publications Pvt. Ltd. and K.T.R. personally. The election petition was silent on how the alleged non-disclosure had influenced voters or affected the election result.

Drawing on the Supreme Court's recent judgment in Ajmera Shyam v. Kova Lakshmi and Others (2026) 3 SCC 373, Justice Rajeshwar Rao held that non-disclosure of assets does not, by itself, warrant setting aside an election. That judgment had articulated a distinction between the non-disclosure of criminal antecedents — which must be scrupulously adhered to — and non-disclosure of assets, where the court must assess whether the concealment was of substantial character and capable of materially affecting the election result. The court applied this test and found that the election petitioners had not pleaded, let alone established, that any non-disclosure was of such magnitude.

The court also considered the Supreme Court's ruling in Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang (2024) 15 SCC 112, which had held that every non-disclosure, irrespective of gravity or impact, does not automatically constitute a defect of substantial nature or amount to undue influence constituting a corrupt practice, and that Section 36(4) of the Act itself empowers a Returning Officer to reject a nomination only where the defect is of a substantial nature.

A further procedural point arose in relation to the election petitioners' failure to raise any objection before the Returning Officer at the stage of scrutiny of nominations, which was conducted on 13 November 2023. The court held that having chosen not to object at that stage, and having raised the allegation only after losing the election by a large margin, the election petitioners were precluded from challenging the nomination acceptance as improper after the result was declared. The allegation in the cause of action that the Returning Officer had “improperly and illegally accepted the nomination” was found to be unsustainable on this basis.

The court distinguished the Bombay High Court's decision in Sulakshana Raju Dhar v. Anna Dadu Bansode 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 4503, relied upon by the election petitioners, on the ground that in that case the petitioner had filed objections before the Returning Officer well before scrutiny commenced and the facts were entirely different. The observations of the Supreme Court in Thangjam Arunkumar v. Yumkham Erabot Singh (2023) 17 SCC 500 and Bhim Rao Baswanth Rao Patil v. K. Madan Mohan Rao (2023) 18 SCC 231 were similarly distinguished as turning on issues — non-filing of Form 25 affidavit and non-disclosure of criminal cases respectively — that had no bearing on the facts here.

Outcome

Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao allowed I.A. No. 2 of 2024 in both Election Petition No. 27 of 2024 and Election Petition No. 28 of 2024. Consequently, Election Petition Nos. 27 and 28 of 2024 were rejected. No order as to costs was made. All miscellaneous applications pending in the matters were ordered to stand closed.