Telangana HC Quashes Criminal Case Against Vijaya Diagnostic Staff Over Discrepant HBsAg Report, Holds No Gross Negligence Shown
Justice N. Tukaramji quashed Section 336 IPC proceedings against four diagnostic centre employees after finding that a discrepant rapid HBsAg screening result does not establish criminal negligence, and that omnibus allegations against managerial staff without specific overt acts cannot sustain criminal prosecution.
The High Court for the State of Telangana has quashed criminal proceedings initiated against four employees of Vijaya Diagnostic Centre in connection with an allegedly erroneous HBsAg test report. Justice N. Tukaramji, sitting singly, allowed Criminal Petition No.1226 of 2023 filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and quashed the proceedings in C.C. No.8530 of 2022 pending before the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad. The charge sheet, arising from Crime No.291 of 2022 registered at the Osmania University Police Station, alleged an offence punishable under Section 336 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The court held that a discrepancy between a rapid screening test and a subsequent confirmatory test does not, without more, satisfy the threshold of gross rashness or criminal negligence that Section 336 IPC requires. The proceedings were found to amount to an abuse of the process of the court.
The Complaint and the Charge Sheet
The case arose from a visit by the de facto complainant to Vijaya Diagnostic Centre on 10 June 2022. She had been advised to undergo a major surgical profile prior to hernia surgery. Her blood sample was tested using the HBsAg Rapid Test, which returned a “Reactive” result. The complainant alleged that this report caused her severe mental trauma, depression, suicidal thoughts, and an increase in the anticipated cost of her proposed surgery.
On the advice of doctors at Yashoda Hospital, she underwent a fresh HBsAg test, which was reported as “Non-Reactive.” She returned to Vijaya Diagnostic Centre on 17 June 2022 to question the staff about the conflicting results. According to the prosecution, the accused responded rudely, insisted on obtaining a fresh blood sample, and then tested the retained blood sample using the Chemiluminescent Microparticle Immunoassay (CMIA) method, which also yielded a non-reactive result.
During investigation, the accused explained that the initial test was only a rapid screening test (Immunochromatography/Hepacard) forming part of the surgical profile, that the complainant had declined to give a fresh blood sample, and that such rapid tests are susceptible to occasional false-positive results. The Investigating Officer sought an expert opinion from the Superintendent of Gandhi Hospital. That expert stated that whenever an HBsAg rapid test is reactive, the result should be confirmed by a second method—such as CMIA, CLIA, or ELISA, preferably on a repeat blood sample—before a final report is issued. Relying on this opinion, the Investigating Officer filed a charge sheet against Accused Nos.1 to 4, concluding that they had negligently issued the initial reactive report without prior confirmatory testing.
Accused No.1 was the Consultant Microbiologist. Accused Nos.2 to 4 were the Associate Director (Microbiology), the General Manager (Operations), and the Cluster Manager (Operations) respectively.
The Legal Question: Civil Lapse or Criminal Offence?
Senior Counsel Mr. Raja Sripathi, appearing on behalf of counsel Mr. B. Dileep Kumar for the petitioners, argued that even accepting the charge sheet allegations entirely, they do not satisfy the ingredients of Section 336 IPC. Section 336 IPC attaches criminal liability only where a person does any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others. The defence position was that the allegations disclosed, at the highest, a civil claim for damages.
The petitioners also argued that the prosecution violated the principles in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1, because no independent and competent expert medical opinion was obtained before the FIR was registered or before the charge sheet was filed. They contended that the Gandhi Hospital Superintendent's opinion was merely a response to police queries during investigation and could not substitute for an independent expert opinion. They pointed out that the laboratory report itself carried a disclaimer stating that the rapid test should not be treated as the sole criterion for diagnosis and that a confirmatory test was necessary. They also submitted that petitioner Nos.1 to 4 were managerial or consulting staff who neither conducted nor participated in the testing process.
The Additional Public Prosecutor, Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, opposed the petition. He submitted that the complaint and investigation material disclosed that the accused had issued a reactive report causing unnecessary panic and trauma, and that the question of individual negligence involved disputed facts requiring a full trial. He urged the court to respect the limited scope of Section 482 CrPC jurisdiction.
How the Court Reasoned
Justice Tukaramji identified the principal question as whether the acts attributed to the petitioners constituted a rash or negligent act so as to endanger human life or personal safety within the meaning of Section 336 IPC. The court observed that criminal negligence is qualitatively different from civil negligence. To attract penal consequences, the negligence must be gross, culpable, or of so high a degree as to exhibit utter disregard for life and safety. Mere inadvertence, an error of judgment, or a lapse in due care cannot by themselves constitute an offence under Section 336 IPC.
The court examined the expert opinion the prosecution itself had placed on record. That opinion, from the Gandhi Hospital Superintendent, only prescribed the preferable laboratory protocol—confirmatory testing before issuing a final report. It did not state that a reactive screening result is necessarily erroneous, and it did not conclude that issuing such a report without prior confirmation would amount to gross or criminal negligence. The court held that the discrepancy between the rapid screening test and the CMIA confirmatory test, by itself, cannot automatically support an inference of criminal negligence. Scientific literature, the court noted, itself recognises that rapid HBsAg screening tests are susceptible to occasional false-positive results.
Applying Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and the principles of the Bolam test from Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, (1957) 1 WLR 582, the court reiterated that criminal prosecution of a medical professional cannot be sustained merely because another opinion is possible or because a diagnosis proves erroneous. The negligence alleged must be so gross as to amount to recklessness. The court also drew on Kusum Sharma v. Batra Hospital & Medical Research Centre, (2010) 3 SCC 480, and Arun Kumar Manglik v. Chirayu Health and Medicare (P) Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 401, both of which reaffirm that a mere error of judgment, a difference in professional opinion, or an adverse outcome does not constitute actionable negligence, let alone criminal negligence.
The court found that the investigation disclosed no material indicating that the petitioners intentionally issued a false report or acted with recklessness endangering the complainant's life or personal safety. The report related only to a rapid screening test and carried a disclaimer that it was not to constitute the sole basis for diagnosis. The petitioners' explanation, supported by scientific literature on false-positive results in rapid testing, was not controverted by any independent expert opinion obtained in accordance with Jacob Mathew. Even assuming some lapse in not awaiting confirmatory testing before issuing the screening result, the court held that such conduct might give rise to civil consequences or a consumer protection claim for deficiency in services, but falls far short of the stringent threshold for Section 336 IPC.
Vicarious Criminal Liability Rejected
The court addressed a separate but significant dimension: the charge sheet did not attribute any specific overt act to any individual petitioner. Their implication rested primarily on the official positions they held within the diagnostic centre. Accused Nos.2 to 4 were managerial and operations staff; Accused No.1 was the Consultant Microbiologist. None were shown to have directly participated in collecting the blood sample, conducting the rapid test, or issuing the report.
Justice Tukaramji held that criminal liability is personal in nature. Unless a statute specifically creates vicarious liability, no person can be prosecuted merely because of a managerial or supervisory position. “Such omnibus allegations are insufficient to sustain criminal prosecution.” The prosecution had failed to identify the particular role played by each petitioner in issuing the impugned report or in the alleged omission to conduct confirmatory testing. This ground, alongside the absence of gross negligence, independently supported quashing.
Section 482 CrPC and the Bhajan Lal Categories
The court reiterated the scope of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC by reference to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, under which criminal proceedings may be quashed where the uncontroverted allegations, even if accepted in entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence, or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the court. The court concluded that the present case squarely fell within that category. Even accepting every allegation in the charge sheet, the essential ingredients of Section 336 IPC were not made out. The dispute was, at its highest, one of alleged deficiency in professional services arising from discrepant laboratory reports.
Order
Criminal Petition No.1226 of 2023 was allowed. The proceedings in C.C. No.8530 of 2022 on the file of the IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad, were quashed insofar as they concerned petitioners/Accused Nos.1 to 4. All pending miscellaneous applications in the matter were directed to stand closed. The order was passed on 5 August 2026.