Telangana HC Quashes Human Rights Commission Proceedings Against Wells Fargo, Rules Commission Has No Jurisdiction Over Private Employers

The Telangana High Court held that the State Human Rights Commission cannot entertain complaints against a private company and its employees, who are not public servants under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.

A Division Bench of the Telangana High Court, comprising Chief Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh and Justice G.M. Mohiuddin, on 13 July 2026 allowed two writ petitions filed by Wells Fargo International Solutions Private Limited and quashed proceedings H.R.C. Nos. 822 and 823 of 2020 pending before the Telangana State Human Rights Commission (TGHRC). The court held that the TGHRC had acted in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 12 of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, by entertaining complaints directed exclusively against a private company and its employees — none of whom answer the description of a “public servant” under the Act. The bench clarified that the gravity or nature of the allegations, including those relating to workplace harassment, cannot by itself enlarge the Commission's statutory jurisdiction.

The Dispute Before the High Court

Respondent No. 2 joined the petitioner-company on 9 May 2011 as an Associate Financial Analyst and rose over the years to the position of Senior Commercial Loan Servicing Representative. In July 2019, she lodged an internal HR complaint against two colleagues — Mr. Imtiaz Ahmed and Mr. Muralidhar Yedugani — alleging harassment and dissatisfaction with performance appraisals.

The HR Department conducted an inquiry, which was prolonged by the employee's medical leave between August and September 2019 and the submission of voluminous documents thereafter. The inquiry concluded in December 2019 with a finding that the allegations were not substantiated. A legal notice followed in February 2020, and the matter was then escalated to the petitioner's Employee Relations (ER) Department. That independent inquiry similarly concluded the allegations were unsubstantiated, and the findings were communicated to respondent No. 2 on 20 August 2020.

Even before the ER inquiry concluded, respondent No. 2 had, on 28 February 2020, filed two complaints before the TGHRC alleging violation of her human rights — principally harassment by her superior officer and inaction by the petitioner. The TGHRC issued fresh summons in April 2025 following a vacancy in the Registrar's office. On 14 October 2025, after hearing the parties on a preliminary issue of jurisdiction, the Commission rejected the petitioner's objection and directed that the complaints be listed for inquiry on merits.

Wells Fargo challenged that order before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash both the impugned order and the underlying proceedings.

The Jurisdictional Question

The central question framed by the bench was whether the TGHRC possesses jurisdiction to entertain complaints alleging violation of human rights against a private company and its employees who are admittedly not public servants.

The petitioner, represented by Senior Counsel Mr. A. Venkatesh (instructed by Mr. Pasham Mohith), argued that Section 12(a) of the 1993 Act authorises the Commission to inquire only into complaints alleging violation of human rights or negligence in preventing such violation by a public servant. Since the petitioner is a private limited company and its employees are private individuals outside the statutory definition of “public servant” under Section 2(m) of the Act — which adopts the meaning in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, now Section 2(28) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — the Commission lacked the foundational jurisdictional fact to proceed.

The petitioner further relied on Regulation 2(1)(b) of the Andhra Pradesh State Human Rights Commission (Procedure) Regulations, 2013, as applicable to Telangana, which defines a “complaint/petition” as a communication alleging violation by a public servant. The prescribed procedural forms — Form A (notice) and Form C (information or report) — were also said to be directed exclusively at “authorities” or public officials, reinforcing the limited scope of the Commission's jurisdiction.

The Commission's counsel (Ms. R.S. Vilasita, representing Mr. A. Samir Kumar Reddy) and counsel for respondent No. 2 (Ms. Ch. Sujatha) contended that the complaints raised issues of workplace harassment eroding a woman's dignity, equality and bodily integrity, which went beyond service disputes and engaged the definition of “human rights” in Section 2(d) of the Act. They urged a liberal, purposive reading of the Act and argued that the employment relationship should not oust the Commission's jurisdiction when the substance of the allegations concerned fundamental rights. Respondent No. 2 additionally alleged that sustained harassment by her immediate superior, Mr. Muralidhar Yedugani, caused her a miscarriage in August 2019 and that the internal inquiries were neither fair nor impartial.

How the Bench Reasoned

The bench began with the text of Section 12(a) of the 1993 Act. Reading the provision plainly, it held that the qualifying expression “by a public servant” governs all three categories listed in Section 12(a) — violation of human rights, abetment thereof, and negligence in preventing such violation. The existence of an allegation against a public servant, or negligence attributable to a public servant, is therefore the foundational jurisdictional fact. Without it, the Commission simply cannot be seized of the matter.

The court rejected the argument that the Act's beneficial purpose warrants an expansive reading. Where the language of a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the provision as it stands. Had Parliament intended to confer jurisdiction over complaints against private individuals, it would have used language to that effect. The legislative choice to incorporate the existing statutory definition of “public servant” from Section 21 of the IPC leaves no room for widening the category of persons against whom the Commission may act.

The Commission's reliance on its own order to distinguish this Court's earlier decision in IREP Dhan Pvt. Ltd. v. Telangana State Human Rights Commission (W.P. No. 899 of 2021, dated 27 October 2021) was also rejected. In IREP Dhan, this Court had held that the Commission cannot assume jurisdiction over disputes arising out of a private contract of employment. The TGHRC had attempted to distinguish that case on the ground that it involved “service benefits” whereas the present matter involved harassment. The bench held that such a distinction does not alter the jurisdictional analysis under Section 12. The decisive question is always whether the statutory preconditions are met, not the characterisation of the allegations.

The court drew further support from the Supreme Court's ruling in N.C. Dhoundial v. Union of India (AIR 2004 SC 1272), which held that the Commission is a creature of statute bound by its provisions and exercising no plenary powers. The bench quoted the Supreme Court's observation that even where the Commission cannot entertain a complaint, the aggrieved person is not left without remedy and may pursue other forums. That principle, the bench said, undercut the respondents' argument that refusing jurisdiction would leave respondent No. 2 remediless.

The 2013 Regulations reinforced this reading. Regulation 2(1)(b) expressly defines a complaint as one alleging violation of human rights by a public servant. Form A and Form C — the prescribed notice and information-request formats — are framed around an “authority,” not a private entity. The Commission, bound by its own Regulations, had no authority to issue notices to or call for reports from a private company.

On the allegation of miscarriage, the bench was careful. It acknowledged the seriousness of respondent No. 2's claim that harassment caused her to suffer a miscarriage in August 2019. But it held that the adjudication of that disputed factual question — which would require oral evidence, documentary evidence and expert medical evidence — was beside the point. Even assuming the allegations were correct for the limited purpose of the jurisdictional inquiry, the gravity of the allegations cannot confer jurisdiction where the statute does not provide for it.

On Article 14, the bench held that by assuming jurisdiction in excess of the powers conferred by Section 12, the Commission had acted arbitrarily and had compelled the petitioner to participate in proceedings before a forum lacking statutory competence. That was inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of fairness. The bench also noted that Wells Fargo International Solutions Private Limited is not a State instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution; the mere fact that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign banking company does not bring it within that category.

The court further distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra (AIR 1999 SC 625), cited by respondent No. 2. That case arose in the context of disciplinary proceedings and judicial review of punishment imposed by an employer. It did not address the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Commission under Section 12 of the 1993 Act and was held to be inapplicable on both facts and law.

On the Writ of Certiorari

The bench confirmed that a writ of certiorari lies to correct jurisdictional errors committed by statutory authorities — including cases where they act without jurisdiction or in excess of conferred jurisdiction. Since the TGHRC assumed jurisdiction without the foundational requirement of an allegation against a public servant being present, the impugned order of 14 October 2025 suffered from a jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under Article 226. The court added that an inherent lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by consent, acquiescence, or participation in proceedings, and the petitioner could not be relegated to raise the objection at a later stage.

Order

The Division Bench allowed both W.P. Nos. 36488 and 36486 of 2025. The common order dated 14 October 2025 passed by the Telangana State Human Rights Commission in H.R.C. Nos. 822 and 823 of 2020, rejecting the petitioner's preliminary objection, was set aside. H.R.C. Nos. 822 and 823 of 2020 pending before the TGHRC stand quashed.

The bench clarified that respondent No. 2 is at liberty to avail such remedy as may be available to her in accordance with law before the competent forum. Any such proceedings shall be decided independently on their own merits, uninfluenced by observations made in this judgment. No costs were awarded. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, were directed to stand closed.