Uttarakhand HC Quashes POCSO and Section 354A Summoning Where Statements Under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC Did Not Support the Allegations
The Uttarakhand High Court partly allowed a Section 482 CrPC petition, holding that summoning under Section 354A IPC and Sections 11/12 POCSO was unsustainable where the complainant's own recorded statements lacked the required ingredients.
The High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, in a judgment delivered on 18 June 2026, partly quashed a summoning order issued by the Additional Sessions Judge/FTC, Haridwar, in Criminal Complaint Case No. 88 of 2019. Justice Siddhartha Sah, sitting singly, found that while the trial court had rightly summoned the accused under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC on the strength of medical evidence and witness statements, the summoning under Section 354A IPC and Sections 11 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) could not be sustained. The reason was straightforward: the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not contain the ingredients those provisions require, even when read at face value.
The Complaint and the Summoning Order
The complaint was filed by respondent no. 2 before the Special Judge, POCSO/FTC, Haridwar. The complainant alleged that on 19 March 2019, while she was about to leave for school on her scooty, the applicants arrived and abused her in filthy language and outraged her modesty. When she protested, she was assaulted with fists and blows. Her father, who came to the spot on hearing her cries, was also abused and threatened with dire consequences.
In support of the complaint, statements were recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC. The Additional Sessions Judge/FTC, Haridwar, on the basis of the complaint and those statements, passed the summoning order dated 15 January 2020, calling the applicants to face trial under Sections 323, 354A, 504, and 506 IPC and Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act.
The applicants — Priyansh Atray and another — then approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the summoning order and the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 88 of 2019.
The Applicants' Case Before the High Court
Counsel for the applicants, Mr. Pankaj Kumar Sharma, raised several grounds. He submitted that no specific role had been assigned to the applicants in the complaint and that there was no independent witness to the alleged incident. He also pointed to what he described as an inordinate and unexplained delay in filing the complaint.
On the POCSO angle, counsel argued that the complainant was a major, but the incident had been narrated as occurring on an earlier date so as to attract the provisions of the POCSO Act. He further submitted that the summoning order had been passed in a cursory manner, without proper application of mind to the facts and the applicable law. His core submission was that if the statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC were read alongside the complaint, the basic ingredients of Section 354A IPC and Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act would not be made out.
The applicants also placed on record that their family resided as tenants on the first floor of the complainant's father's house, while the complainant's family occupied the ground floor. There was a pre-existing dispute between the two families, and the applicants' mother had herself filed a complaint on 10 March 2019 before the SSP, Haridwar, and the SHO, Kankhal, alleging that the complainant's father had been harassing and torturing their family.
The Respondent's Defence of the Summoning Order
Counsel for respondent no. 2, Mr. Narendra Bali, submitted that the witnesses had duly supported the complaint in their statements under Section 202 CrPC, and the complainant had recorded her statement under Section 200 CrPC. He pointed to a medical report in which the examining doctor, recorded as CW2, clearly noted four injuries on the complainant. On that basis, he argued that a prima facie case had been made out and the summoning order warranted no interference.
However, when the court put a direct query to him regarding Section 354A IPC, counsel for respondent no. 2 fairly conceded that while the complaint contained an allegation of outraging the complainant's modesty, that allegation was absent from the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC.
Similarly, when asked how Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act were attracted, counsel again fairly acknowledged that while certain allegations appeared in the complaint, the statements under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC contained no clear averments regarding sexual harassment with sexual intent.
The State's counsel submitted that one of the applicants had caught hold of the complainant, abused her, and assaulted her, and on that basis no interference was called for.
The Court's Reasoning on Section 354A IPC and Sections 11/12 POCSO
Justice Siddhartha Sah examined the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC alongside the text of Section 354A IPC and Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act.
Section 354A IPC defines sexual harassment as a man committing acts such as physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures, demands for sexual favours, showing pornography against a woman's will, or making sexually coloured remarks. The court found that none of the ingredients listed in Section 354A(1) IPC were attracted on a reading of the statements, even if those statements were taken entirely at face value.
Section 11 of the POCSO Act defines sexual harassment of a child as acts committed with sexual intent, including uttering words or making gestures intended to be heard or seen by the child, making a child exhibit their body, showing pornographic material, repeatedly following or contacting a child, threatening to use depictions of the child's body in media, or enticing a child for pornographic purposes. Section 12 prescribes punishment for such offences. The court found that the ingredients of Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act were equally missing from the complainant's statements.
The court's conclusion was direct: the trial court had committed an error in summoning the applicants under Section 354A IPC and Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act. The complaint may have contained those allegations, but the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC — which form the evidentiary basis for a summoning order in a complaint case — did not carry them forward.
On the other charges, the court took a different view. The medical officer's statement about four injuries sustained by the complainant provided sufficient basis for the summoning under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC. To that extent, the court found no scope for interference under Section 482 CrPC.
Outcome
Criminal Misc. Application No. 764 of 2020 was partly allowed. The summoning order dated 15 January 2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/FTC, Haridwar, in Criminal Complaint Case No. 88 of 2019 (Km. Megha Arora v. Shivansh Arora and Anr.) was quashed to the extent it summoned the applicants under Section 354A IPC and Sections 11 and 12 of the POCSO Act. The summoning under Sections 323, 504, and 506 IPC was left undisturbed.
The court clarified that no observations made in the judgment would affect the trial, and the trial court would decide the case on its own merits and in accordance with law.