Supreme Court issues contempt notice to Kerala Pradesh Congress over post telling CJI to resign

A bench headed by Justice Aravind Kumar asked KPCC office-bearers on 6 November 2026 why they should not be punished for contempt under Article 129. Scandalising the court, section 15 and the truth defence explained.

The Supreme Court on Friday, 6 November 2026, issued notice to office-bearers of the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC), asking why the court need not "punish for contempt of itself" under Article 129 of the Constitution. A bench headed by Justice Aravind Kumar said it will appoint an amicus curiae and seek the assistance of the Attorney General of India.

The notice arises from a post on X on 12 October 2026 from the Congress Kerala handle. It replied to Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, who had observed, on police restrictions on protests led by the Cockroach Janta Party at Jantar Mantar in Delhi, that law and order was not his domain and that the court could not interfere.

The post, the apology and the petition

The post told the Chief Justice that if law and order was not his domain, he should resign, and that a replacement who could handle it would be found. It was later deleted.

KPCC president Sunny Joseph apologised, calling it the act of one individual, posted without the party's authorisation. The party's response singled out one of the people who managed the handle, who denied being solely responsible and described the post as a "team effort".

Meenesh Dubey, an advocate and joint secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association, sent a legal notice over the post. By 28 October 2026 the KPCC had tendered an unconditional apology to the Chief Justice. The Supreme Court then took up a writ petition filed by advocate Vineet Jindal.

What Justice Aravind Kumar said

Justice Aravind Kumar asked on 6 November whether the apology was really heartfelt. He added that the Supreme Court does not need political endorsement or approval, and that its authority comes from the Constitution, not from an individual or a political party.

"The independence of the judiciary is not a matter of political convenience," the court remarked. It said judgments are always open to criticism, however severe, but that freedom of expression cannot become a shield for intimidation or interference with the administration of justice.

Article 129 and Article 215

Article 129 makes the Supreme Court a court of record with all the powers of such a court, including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Article 215 gives High Courts the same power.

M.P. Jain, in Indian Constitutional Law, describes it as a summary and extraordinary jurisdiction, used when public interest demands it, to protect the purity of the administration of justice.

The power sits beside the free speech guarantee. Article 19(2) lists contempt of court among the grounds on which the State may reasonably restrict the freedom in Article 19(1)(a).

The Court has applied the procedure of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 when exercising its Article 129 power. In Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001) it said a law fixing punishment, limitation or what counts as contempt does not abrogate the constitutional power, though a law that stultified it would not stand.

Scandalising the court under the 1971 Act

Section 2(c) defines criminal contempt as any publication, or other act, that scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court. It also covers acts that prejudice or obstruct judicial proceedings or the administration of justice.

The test in C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta (1971) asks whether the attack is a mere libel on a judge or one that interferes with the due course of justice. Jain notes that a defamatory attack on a judge becomes punishable only when it is calculated to interfere with the proper administration of law.

In E.M.S. Namboodiripad v. T.N. Nambiar (1970), the then Chief Minister of Kerala was held in contempt for remarks describing the judiciary as an instrument of oppression and as guided by class hatred. The Court held that free speech does not extend to lowering the authority of the courts.

Where the Court has refused to punish

In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shankar (1988), the Court dismissed contempt proceedings against the Union Law Minister over a speech accusing it of favouring the affluent. It adopted Lord Atkin's view that justice must withstand the scrutiny and outspoken comment of ordinary people, and said criticism is welcome so long as it does not impair the administration of justice.

The Court found no imminent danger of interference or disrepute in that speech. It also held that the Attorney General's refusal of consent to a petitioner is open to judicial review.

In In re Prashant Bhushan (2020), the Court held two tweets on the Chief Justice and the Court's functioning to be criminal contempt. On 31 August 2020 it imposed a fine of one rupee.

Raeesa Vakil, in the Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, calls the term scandalising the court nebulous and records repeated calls to narrow or remove the power. The Law Commission of England and Wales examined the concept in 2012.

How a contempt case begins

Under section 15, the Supreme Court may act on its own motion, or on a motion by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General. Any other person needs the written consent of one of them.

Jain adds that a private person may also place information before the Court and ask it to act on its own. In Daphtary, the Court accepted information brought by the president of the Supreme Court Bar Association, and the Court has since described such a person as only an informant, not a litigant.

Apology, truth and punishment

Section 12 allows simple imprisonment of up to six months, a fine of up to Rs 2,000, or both. The court may discharge the accused or remit the punishment if it is satisfied with an apology, and an apology cannot be rejected merely because it is qualified or conditional if it is made in good faith.

The 2006 amendment added section 13. A contempt is punishable only if it substantially interferes, or tends to substantially interfere, with the due course of justice, and truth may be pleaded as a defence if it is in the public interest and the request is bona fide.

Before that amendment, justification was not available as a defence, as the Court held in Namboodiripad. Jain observes that a judge may now have to answer in public if a judgment is said to have been prompted by improper motives.

The court has not decided whether contempt is made out. The KPCC office-bearers have been called to respond to the notice, an amicus curiae is yet to be appointed, and the court has said it will seek the Attorney General's assistance.