Supreme Court dismisses PIL on guidelines for appointing ministers facing criminal charges

A bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana dismissed the plea on 6 November 2026. Articles 75(1), 164(1), 102 and 191, Manoj Narula and Public Interest Foundation explained.

The Supreme Court on Friday, 6 November 2026, dismissed a public interest litigation seeking guidelines on appointing ministers who face serious criminal charges. A bench of Chief Justice of India Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana heard the plea, which sought safeguards and objective standards for ministers at the Centre and in the states.

Justice Bagchi cautioned that criminal cases can be used as a weapon against political opponents. The bench observed that cases are sometimes started against political leaders by their opponents.

What the petition sought

The petition, filed by Dilip Kumar Sharma under Article 32, relied on Articles 75(1) and 164(1), which govern the appointment of ministers at the Centre and in the states. It argued that without objective suitability standards at the post-election stage, persons facing serious charges can be made ministers and given sensitive portfolios.

It proposed that the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers carry out an objective suitability assessment, record their reasons in a public Suitability Memorandum, and avoid giving portfolios where pending criminal proceedings could create a conflict of interest.

The petition said this would not create a fresh disqualification or rewrite the constitutional provisions. It was meant, it said, to secure transparency and accountability and to protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The petitioner's case on data and conflict

Citing data compiled by the Association for Democratic Reforms, the petition claimed that 47 per cent of sitting ministers across the country had declared pending criminal cases, and 27 per cent faced serious charges.

It argued that ministers facing proceedings who control police and prosecution machinery create a structural conflict of interest and could undermine the right to a fair and impartial trial under Article 21.

The petition also cited the Vohra Committee, the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, the Second Administrative Reforms Commission and the Justice J.S. Verma Committee.

It referred as well to three Bills introduced by the Union government in 2025 to remove a Prime Minister, Chief Minister or minister who remains under arrest for more than 30 days over a serious offence.

An arrest-based threshold would not be enough, it contended, as it would miss ministers who face serious charges but are not arrested.

The hearing on 6 November

Advocate Nisha Tiwari, for the petitioner, said the plea did not seek any new disqualification under Articles 75 and 164. She argued that the discretion of the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers must be exercised reasonably and within set parameters.

"Whenever I cast my vote, I do not necessarily endorse somebody with criminal antecedents becoming a Cabinet Minister," she submitted. She also said the Supreme Court had flagged the criminalisation of politics more than a decade ago, and that Parliament has not done enough.

Justice Bagchi asked whether it would be appropriate for the court to frame guidelines curtailing the discretion of the Prime Minister or a Chief Minister in choosing a cabinet. He said the court would be entering difficult constitutional territory, particularly since prosecutions can follow a change of government.

He remarked that "criminal law is continuously weaponised" against people in the democratic process.

The bench dismissed the petition. The choice of ministers and the allocation of portfolios stays with the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers, and no judicially framed filter based on pending criminal cases applies.

How ministers are appointed

Under Article 75(1), the President appoints the Prime Minister, and appoints the other ministers on the Prime Minister's advice. Article 164(1) does the same in the states, with the Governor appointing the Chief Minister and the other ministers on the Chief Minister's advice.

M.P. Jain, in Indian Constitutional Law, writes that the President's role in this is purely formal, and that the Constitution contains no restriction on the Prime Minister's choice of colleagues. Shubhankar Dam, in the Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution, likewise notes that other ministers are appointed on the Prime Minister's advice.

Articles 102 and 191 and the 1951 Act

The Constitution does speak to who may sit in the legislature. Articles 102(1) and 191(1) list the grounds on which a person is disqualified from being a member of Parliament or a State legislature, and clause (1)(e) of each allows Parliament to add disqualifications by law.

Parliament has done so in Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. A person convicted of the listed offences stands disqualified from the date of conviction, and a sentence of two years or more also bars the person for six years after release.

The disqualification attaches to conviction, not to a pending charge. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, decided on 10 July 2013, the Supreme Court struck down Section 8(4), which had let sitting legislators stay in office for three months after conviction, or until an appeal was decided.

Manoj Narula and constitutional morality

The closest precedent is Manoj Narula v. Union of India ((2014) 9 SCC 1), decided by a Constitution Bench. The majority held that no disqualification for persons against whom charges are framed for heinous, serious or corruption offences can be read into Article 75(1) or Article 164(1), since none exists in the Constitution or in the 1951 Act.

It nonetheless spoke of constitutional morality and trust. The advice under Article 75(1), it said, is constitutional advice, and it could legitimately be expected that the Prime Minister would consider not choosing a person facing such charges. The Framers, it noted, had left the matter to the Prime Minister's wisdom.

Justice Madan Lokur wrote separately that the concern is real but cannot be met through guidelines issued by the Court. It is for the electorate to ensure that suitable, and not merely eligible, persons are elected, and for the legislature to decide whether to enact a more restrictive law.

Public Interest Foundation and the limits of directions

In Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India ((2019) 3 SCC 224), decided on 25 September 2018, a five-judge bench held that the Court could not direct the Election Commission to deny party symbols to candidates facing serious charges. Such a direction, it held, was not constitutionally permissible, as it would do indirectly what only Parliament can do by law.

The bench recommended that Parliament make a law requiring parties to expel members against whom charges are framed in heinous and grievous offences, and not to field them. It noted that false cases are sometimes foisted on candidates, and said Parliament can address this through legislation.

Within its limits, the Court issued disclosure directions. Candidates must state pending criminal cases in bold letters, parties must publish the details on their websites, and both must publicise them at least thrice in newspapers and the electronic media after nominations are filed.

The disclosure line goes back to Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002), which, as Aditya Sondhi notes in the Oxford Handbook, held that a voter's right to know a candidate's antecedents flows from Article 19(1)(a).

With the petition dismissed, appointments under Articles 75(1) and 164(1) continue to rest on the advice of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister.