Pursuing a Dental Career Is Not Cruelty: Supreme Court Expunges Desertion Findings Against Wife
A Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta expunges findings of cruelty and desertion against a dentist wife, holding that professional ambition cannot constitute a matrimonial default.
The Supreme Court has set aside findings of cruelty and desertion recorded against a qualified dentist who left her husband's posting at Kargil to run her own dental clinic at Ahmedabad and to secure better medical care for her daughter. A Division Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, deciding Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 25076 of 2024 on 12 May 2026, held that the Family Court's reasoning was “pedantic and regressive” and that the High Court had erred in affirming it.
The divorce decree itself was left undisturbed, but the Court directed that it be treated as having been passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, with all findings of cruelty and desertion expressly expunged. The husband's companion petition seeking prosecution of the wife for perjury was dismissed as lacking merit.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
Ann Saurabh Dutt and Lieutenant Colonel Saurabh Iqbal Bahadur Dutt married on 3 September 2009. The respondent was serving in the Indian Army and was posted at Pune when the appellant started her own private dental clinic there in June 2010. A year later, the respondent was posted to Kargil. The appellant gave up her practice and moved with him. After over four months at Kargil, she became pregnant and returned to Ahmedabad, citing limited medical facilities at the posting location.
The couple's relationship deteriorated, with the appellant citing differences arising from their different religious backgrounds — she is a Christian and he is a Hindu. Their daughter was born on 12 April 2012. The appellant subsequently took the child back to Kargil, where the daughter developed seizure episodes and required hospitalisation. Given the limited specialised medical facilities available there, both parties returned to Ahmedabad for the child's treatment. The discord between them deepened after this.
The appellant approached Army authorities for maintenance. By order dated 12 May 2014, the Army directed the respondent to pay 22% of his salary to the appellant and 5.5% to the minor daughter. The respondent challenged this before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Lucknow. Multiple proceedings followed before the Family Court No. 2 at Ahmedabad. Reconciliation efforts failed.
By order dated 11 February 2022, the Family Court granted interim maintenance of Rs. 55,000 per month — Rs. 35,000 to the appellant and Rs. 20,000 to the daughter. The High Court, in revision, scaled down the appellant's share to Rs. 25,000 per month while maintaining the daughter's amount. These figures were finalised by the Family Court on 30 September 2022.
The respondent had also filed Family Suit No. 2361 of 2017 seeking dissolution of marriage. In the same judgment dated 30 September 2022, the Family Court decreed divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion attributed to the appellant, while simultaneously rejecting the respondent's application under Section 195 of the CrPC read with Section 340 CrPC seeking the appellant's prosecution for perjury.
Both parties appealed to the Gujarat High Court. The appellant sought only expungement of the cruelty and desertion findings, not reversal of the divorce. The respondent pressed for the perjury prosecution. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed both appeals on 12 August 2024. Both parties then approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
What the Family Court Had Found
The Supreme Court extracted the Family Court's findings at length, describing them as “appalling and totally unacceptable.” Those findings included:
The appellant was held to have given precedence to her career over the marriage by operating a dental clinic at Ahmedabad. Printing and circulating invitation cards for the clinic's opening without the knowledge of the respondent and his family was treated as an act of cruelty, on the basis that a wife or daughter-in-law was expected to take such steps only with the husband's or his family's knowledge. Setting up the clinic without informing the family was said to show disregard for the family's emotions.
The appellant's request to stay at her parental home during visits to Ahmedabad was also treated as cruelty, since a married woman was expected to reside at the matrimonial home. An allegation that the appellant once prevented the respondent's mother from holding the minor daughter — allegedly over fear of infection — was treated as indicative of cruelty. The Family Court stated in paragraph 26 of its judgment that it was the “bounden duty” of a wife to reside with her husband wherever he chose to reside, and that the appellant's dental clinic was evidence of an intent not to join him at his posting, amounting to desertion.
The Court's Reasoning on Cruelty and Desertion
The Supreme Court rejected each of these findings. On the question of the appellant leaving Kargil, the Court found that her decision to reside at Ahmedabad was primarily driven by the need to provide a safer environment and better healthcare for a daughter who suffered from seizure episodes. That choice, the Court held, could not be construed as desertion under any circumstances.
The Court acknowledged that, in ideal conditions, an army officer's wife might be expected to accompany her husband even to difficult postings. But it drew a clear line: branding the wife's conduct as cruelty or desertion merely because she chose to remain at Ahmedabad for the child's welfare and her own professional career was, in the Court's words, “atrocious to say the least.”
On the dental clinic, the Court found that the Family Court's approach was designed to convey that a wife with a dentistry degree should have sacrificed her career to stay with her husband at his posting, and that her failure to do so amounted to cruelty. The Court said this approach “can never be countenanced and deserves to be deprecated.” It pointed out that the respondent's attitude throughout the proceedings reflected male chauvinism and a refusal to support his wife's career. If the appellant opened the clinic without informing the respondent, the Court said, it was likely a decision taken out of compulsion to prevent him from obstructing her professional pursuit.
The Court drew an explicit comparison: if the roles were reversed and the wife were the army officer while the husband were a medical professional, no court would expect the husband to sacrifice his career to accompany her, and his failure to do so would never be branded as cruelty or desertion. The Court said it was “afraid” the Family Court would never have taken the same view in that scenario.
On the allegation that the appellant had pressured the respondent to convert to Christianity, the Court found that the material on record did not indicate any clear or credible evidence. The only consistent circumstance was that the respondent had accompanied the appellant to the Velankanni Church in Tamil Nadu, which by itself did not constitute coercion or cruelty. The Court also noted that the marriage was a love marriage solemnised under both Hindu and Christian customs and subsequently registered under the Special Marriage Act.
The Court observed that the respondent's conduct during hearings and the thrust of his submissions — focused on prosecuting the appellant — revealed an attitude of domineering and control, which the Court found was the probable cause for the appellant's steps towards independence and career pursuit.
The Court stated that marriage does not eclipse a woman's individuality or subjugate her identity under that of her spouse. It held that both husband and wife must balance their marital ties in a manner that respects mutual aspirations, and that one spouse cannot unilaterally dictate the life choices of the other. A woman can no longer be treated as a mere appendage to the household of the husband, and her independent professional identity must receive due credence.
The Perjury Petition
The respondent's SLP(Civil) No. 28451 of 2024 challenged the rejection of his application under Section 195 CrPC read with Section 340 CrPC, which had sought prosecution of the appellant for allegedly making false statements on oath in the maintenance proceedings.
The Court dismissed this petition. It found that the allegations appeared to be instigated by personal vendetta and a spiteful approach, fuelled by anger and frustration arising from multiple cases and complaints filed by the appellant against the respondent and his family members. The Court held that the allegations did not disclose the necessary ingredients of perjury or giving false evidence. The grievances, it said, stemmed from a hyper-technical dissection of the record in the backdrop of escalated matrimonial acrimony. Concurrent findings had been recorded by the courts below rejecting the application, and the Court found no justifiable reason to interfere.
Outcome
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(Civil) No. 25076 of 2024 was partly allowed. The divorce decree passed by the Family Court on 30 September 2022 and affirmed by the High Court on 12 August 2024 was upheld. However, all findings and observations regarding cruelty and desertion attributed to the appellant were expressly expunged and set aside. The decree was directed to be treated as having been passed on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The Court noted that the appellant had stated she was no longer hopeful of reconciliation and that the respondent had reportedly remarried, and on that basis declined to disturb the divorce itself.
SLP(Civil) No. 28451 of 2024, filed by the respondent seeking prosecution of the appellant for perjury, was dismissed as lacking merit. All pending applications in both matters were disposed of.