Supreme Court upholds witch-hunting murder conviction on sole eyewitness testimony

A Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria affirmed a life sentence, holding the daughter’s direct account reliable despite her relationship to the deceased.

The Supreme Court has dismissed the appeal of Balku Oram and confirmed his conviction for murder in a killing rooted in an allegation of witchcraft. In Balku Oram v. State of Odisha, a Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria held that the conviction could stand on the testimony of a single eyewitness — the deceased’s daughter — whose account remained consistent and was corroborated by medical evidence. The Court refused to treat her as an unreliable witness merely because she was related to the deceased. It also rejected the plea to convert the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and found the day’s delay in lodging the FIR sufficiently explained. The judgment records that the killing followed a branding of the victim as a practitioner of witchcraft.

How the dispute reached the Court

The prosecution case is that on 17 February 1998, at Gundibali Luhakera village in District Sundergarh, the family of one Manobodha Naik blamed the death of his youngest daughter on witchcraft practised by the deceased, Puni Naik. The appellant and co-accused Udai Oram dragged Puni Naik from her house and assaulted her severely with a lathi. She died during the early hours of 18 February 1998.

The entire incident was witnessed by the deceased’s daughter, Sukra Naik (P.W.3). On 18 February 1998, she went to the police station with her maternal uncle and lodged a complaint, on which FIR No. 19 was registered under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

Nine witnesses were examined for the prosecution and none for the defence. The Trial Court convicted the appellant and co-accused, relying on P.W.3’s testimony, and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The High Court of Orissa, by its judgment dated 29 September 2022 in Criminal Appeal No. 158/2003, affirmed the conviction, holding the injuries were on vital parts and the medical evidence corroborated P.W.3.

The scope for interfering with concurrent findings

The Court began by cautioning that it should be slow to interfere with concurrent findings of two courts below. It set out the principles from Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, that power under Article 136 is wide but exercised in criminal appeals only in exceptional circumstances — where a question of general public importance arises, a decision shocks the conscience, or the High Court has acted perversely or improperly.

With that caveat, the Bench examined whether the record disclosed any exceptional circumstance justifying interference.

Quality over quantity of witnesses

P.W.3 was the only eyewitness. The Court found her deposition unshaken in chief and cross-examination on the aspect that the appellant and co-accused inflicted the fatal assault. It reaffirmed that direct ocular evidence, if natural, cogent and trustworthy, is the best form of evidence.

Relying on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, the Court reiterated that a court may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated, since Section 134 of the Evidence Act requires no particular number of witnesses. As that judgment put it, “Evidence has to be weighed and not counted”. The Court also drew on Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab for the position that it is quality, not quantity, that is material, and a conviction may rest on a solitary reliable witness.

Applying these principles, the Bench held P.W.3’s testimony inspired complete confidence. As the natural sole witness, her presence at the scene was unquestionable and her version on the manner of assault and weapons used was consistent.

A relative is not an interested witness

The appellant argued that P.W.3, being the deceased’s daughter, was an interested witness whose sole testimony could not sustain a conviction. The Court rejected this, relying on Shio Shankar Dubey v. State of Bihar and the decisions it discussed. A witness is “interested” only where there is a direct motive or animus to falsely implicate the accused; a close relative is often the most natural witness. The Court held that mere relationship does not render a witness unreliable, and P.W.3’s direct testimony was corroborated by medical evidence.

Why it remained murder, not culpable homicide

The defence sought conversion of the conviction to Section 304 Part I or Part II, pleading grave and sudden provocation. The post-mortem, conducted by P.W.6 on 18 February 1998, recorded multiple ante-mortem bruises and lacerated wounds on the head, neck, chest, abdomen and thighs, with blood clots on the skull and brain congestion.

Applying Pulicherla Nagaraju alias Nagaraja Reddy v. State of A.P., the Court held that intention is gathered from circumstances such as the weapon used and the part of the body targeted. Given the grievous injuries to vital parts, it found a clear intention to cause death, with nothing on record attracting any exception to Section 300. The plea for conversion was rejected.

The one-day delay in the FIR

On the delay, the Court cited Om Pal v. State of U.P. and Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra for the position that delay explained to the court’s satisfaction is not fatal. The incident occurred on the evening of 17 February 1998, and the report was lodged at about 11:00 a.m. on 18 February 1998. P.W.3 was aged 15–16 years and, after witnessing her mother’s killing, went to the police station only after her maternal uncle reached the house. The Court held the delay well explained.

Observations on witch-hunting

The Court recorded that the facts had disturbed its conscience, describing the branding of a defenceless woman as a practitioner of witchcraft and the effect on the daughter who witnessed the killing. It observed that witch-hunting persists in sections of society where prejudice and superstition supersede the rule of law, and that the Constitution envisioned a society founded on equality, fraternity and scientific temperament.

Order

The Court held that the direct evidence against the appellant was compelling and that both the Trial Court and the High Court had correctly found him culpable. The conviction and sentence were affirmed and the appeal was dismissed.