Supreme Court Decrees Tribal Plaintiff's Suit, Holds Ghardamad Custom Cannot Be Extended to Uncle-in-Law

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh reversed concurrent findings of three courts, holding that customary adoption of a ghardamad by an uncle-in-law was unproved and the nearest male agnate succeeds to the property.

The Supreme Court on 9 July 2026 set aside concurrent judgments of the Munsif's court, the First Additional District Judge at Gumla, and the Jharkhand High Court, and decreed the suit filed by the original plaintiff — now represented through legal heirs — in a tribal property dispute governed by Udaon customary law. The central question was whether one Punai could be treated as the ghardamad (son-in-law adopted into the household) of Ledura Oraon, who was his uncle-in-law, not his father-in-law. The Court found that the custom as alleged was not proved, that the defendant witnesses were internally inconsistent, and that under the acknowledged sources of law applicable to the Oraon community, the nearest male agnate — the plaintiff — was entitled to succeed.

The Family Dispute and Its Journey Through the Courts

The dispute traces back to one Sukhu Oraon, who had three sons: Dhungru, Ledura, and Bhoula. The plaintiff, also named Sukhu, was Dhungru's second son and claimed ownership of all land that had belonged to his grandfather. His claim was resisted by Budhain, who was Bhoula's daughter, and her husband Punai.

The defendants' case rested on the assertion that Ledura, who had no children, had taken Punai as his ghardamad. They also relied on a deed dated 27 February 1975, said to record a partition of properties between Budhain and Ledura. The plaintiff contended that since the defendants had no title in the first place, any such partition deed was non est.

It was an undisputed position across all courts that under the local custom applicable to the Udaon community, daughters have no right of inheritance. The dispute therefore turned on whether Punai had legitimately acquired Ledura's property through the ghardamad custom, and, if not, who the rightful heir was.

The civil court at Gumla in TS No. 22 of 1975 dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The First Additional District Judge, Gumla, affirmed that dismissal in TA No. 42 of 1990. The Jharkhand High Court, in Second Appeal No. 35 of 1995, upheld the concurrent findings by judgment dated 10 June 2024. The plaintiff's legal heirs then approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition, which was converted into a Civil Appeal.

The Custom of Ghardamad and What Needed to Be Proved

Before examining the evidence, the Court set out the legal framework for proving a custom. Drawing on Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition, Volume 12(1)), the Court noted that a valid custom must be immemorial, reasonable, certain in terms and locality, and must have continued without interruption. Proof must be made by matter of record or by evidence of usage since time immemorial.

The Court also distilled principles from a line of its earlier decisions. He who alleges a custom must prove it, and must also prove that he is governed by it. Long usage must be established. A custom is proved by general evidence of members of the tribe or family, and if supported by public record, can safely be relied upon. Section 48 of the Evidence Act, 1872 requires courts to take into account the opinion of those likely to know of the existence of the custom.

The Court cited, among others, Abdul Hussein Khan v. Bibi Sona Dero, 1917 SCC OnLine PC 68; Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari, (1952) 1 SCC 713; and Ujagar Singh v. Jeo, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 195, in mapping these requirements.

Concurrent Findings and the Scope of Interference Under Article 136

Before turning to the evidence, the Court addressed its own jurisdiction. Three courts had concurrently dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The Court surveyed its established practice on when interference with concurrent findings of fact is permissible under Article 136 of the Constitution.

From Srinivas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad, 1951 SCC 136, it recalled that the Court would not ordinarily review evidence a third time “unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying departure from this normal practice.” From Ramachandran v. Vijayan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3384, it drew a non-exhaustive list of scenarios justifying interference: findings not emanating from pleadings; findings divorced from evidence; findings based on irrelevant evidence while material evidence is ignored; findings contrary to law; findings that a reasonable judicial mind could not have reached; and findings that shock the conscience of the court.

With that framework in place, the Court proceeded to examine the testimony on the six issues that the lower courts had identified.

Issue-by-Issue Analysis of the Evidence

Partition. The Court found that almost all witnesses agreed that no partition took place among the members of grandfather Sukhu's family. The only witness who said Ledura had “written land to Budhain” did not explain the authority for doing so, what customs permitted it, what land was involved, or what was retained. The Court held this was not proved.

Daughters' inheritance rights. The plaintiff's witnesses were consistent that a daughter does not get a share in property under any circumstance. The defendant witnesses were internally inconsistent — two said a daughter could get a share through a written instrument, one denied it, and one professed ignorance. The plaintiff's statements withstood cross-examination. The Court accepted them: daughters do not get any right or share in the property.

Ghardamad's right to property. On this narrower issue, the testimonies across both sides established that the custom of a son-in-law acquiring a right in the property of his father-in-law is proved. This, however, was the custom as it applies to a father-in-law, not an uncle-in-law.

Property of an issueless Udaon. The defendant witnesses were again inconsistent. DW-1 said both nephew and niece would get property; DW-2 and DW-3 said the nephew would get it; DW-4 said the nephew would not. The plaintiff's witnesses who spoke on this point were doing so in the specific facts of the case, and a custom cannot be established on the testimony of one witness who does not fall squarely within the scope of Section 48 of the Evidence Act.

Entitlement after deaths of Bhola, Ledura and Buranga. The plaintiff's witnesses were consistent that the plaintiff would be entitled. Defence witnesses were once more inconsistent. The Court noted that Punai is deceased and that there are no other descendants through the males in the family. SC Roy, the scholar whose work on the Oraon community has been relied upon by this Court and the High Court, states that in such situations the nearest male agnate becomes entitled. On that basis, the plaintiff would succeed.

Validity of the deed. The Court observed a discrepancy: all witnesses except DW-4 described the document as a lease deed, but the civil court had called it a partition deed. The Court declined to resolve that characterisation conclusively. It held that lease deeds do not confer title, and partition can only be effected among those who already hold shares. Since only Ledura had shares, there could be no partition between Ledura and Budhain. The deed became irrelevant to title, and the question of whether it was executed secretly or openly became inconsequential.

The Critical Flaw: Uncle-in-Law as Adoptive Father of Ghardamad

The most decisive part of the judgment concerns the High Court's failure to answer the substantial question it had itself framed: whether an uncle-in-law can adopt a ghardamad under the prevalent customary law.

The trial court, relying on SC Roy's book The Oraons of Chotanagpur, had found that Punai was a ghardamad of Ledura. But the Court found the trial court misdirected itself. The book explicitly states that a ghardamad may be adopted by “the last male owner or even by his widow.” Ledura was Budhain's uncle, not her father. Budhain's father was Bhoula. The consistent record showed that it was Ledura — the uncle-in-law — who was said to have adopted Punai. There was nothing on record to show that Bhoula had any role in this adoption, nor that DW-4 (Budhain) had explicitly adopted him.

The Court said plainly that it is nowhere established that an uncle-in-law can adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad within the applicable customary law. Further, the alleged partition was between Budhain and Ledura, with Ledura's portion passing to Punai. But if Punai was actually the ghardamad of Bhoula and not Ledura, the permissibility of that entire arrangement became untenable.

The High Court had framed the question but did not answer it, reasoning that it was bound by the concurrent findings. The Court rejected that approach: once a substantial question is framed under Section 100 CPC, the parties must be heard and the question decided. The High Court's observation that no bar against adoption by an uncle-in-law had been “clearly stated” was insufficient. Those who allege a custom bear the burden of proving it. The absence of an explicit counter-statement is not proof. That, the Court held, is not an appropriate answer to a substantial question of law.

Outcome

Taking a cumulative view, the Court held that the customs alleged — beyond the established right of a ghardamad to property of his father-in-law — were not proved. The acknowledged sources of law applicable to the Oraon community postulate that in the absence of a ghardamad or any other male heir directly related to the land owner, the nearest male agnate is entitled to the property. The plaintiff, as the nearest male agnate, succeeds.

The judgments of the civil court, the first appellate court, and the Jharkhand High Court were set aside. The plaintiff's suit was decreed. All necessary consequences were directed to follow. The appeal was allowed. Each party was directed to bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.