Supreme Court acquits RPF officer as CBI trap ends at intermediary, not accused

A division bench acquitted a former Divisional Security Commissioner, holding recovery of bribe money from an approver intermediary, without proof of demand attributable to him, cannot sustain conviction.

The Supreme Court has acquitted Bharat Raj Meena, a former Divisional Security Commissioner of the Railway Protection Force, in two corruption prosecutions built on a CBI trap and the testimony of pardoned intermediaries. In a judgment authored by Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh for a bench also comprising Justice Dipankar Datta, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification attributable to the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

The case arose from FIR No. RC19(A)/2005/KER/CBI registered on 4 August 2005 by the Anti-Corruption Branch, CBI, Kochi. The allegation was that Meena, while posted at Palakkad, ran a system of collecting money through subordinate intermediaries from RPF personnel seeking transfers and postings. Both appeals turned on whether tainted money recovered from an intermediary, and the word of accomplices, could fasten guilt on the officer himself.

How the two prosecutions reached the Court

The investigation produced multiple final reports and several prosecutions on distinct alleged transactions. The Special Judge (SPE/CBI)-III, Ernakulam convicted Meena by judgments dated 31 May 2016 in C.C. No. 2 of 2014 and C.C. No. 3 of 2015. The High Court of Kerala affirmed both by separate judgments dated 24 May 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 591 of 2016 and Criminal Appeal No. 587 of 2016, though in the latter it upheld only the conviction concerning bribe giver N.P. Gopi Kumar (PW-11).

In C.C. No. 2 of 2014, the conviction rested on a single trap laid on the complaint of P.P. Nandakumar (PW-6), who alleged a demand of Rs. 10,000 for a posting at the DSC's office. The trap was executed on 4 August 2005, but Meena was never caught. The tainted currency was recovered from Anantha Narayanan (PW-2), an intermediary later granted pardon under Section 306 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and examined as an approver.

In C.C. No. 3 of 2015, the surviving allegation concerned Gopi Kumar, with the other intermediary Abdul Gafoor (PW-7) also functioning as an approver.

Why the trap evidence broke down

The Court found the account of Nandakumar and the approver Anantha Narayanan did not sit together on points that mattered. Meena was said to have demanded the bribe himself, yet when Nandakumar offered the money directly in the officer's chamber with no one else present, Meena declined and told him to hand it to the intermediary. The bench called this behaviour difficult to reconcile with a direct demand.

The Court noted that the recovery from Anantha Narayanan was not confined to the tainted currency. A separate envelope of Rs. 10,000 attributed to an unrelated allegation was also on him, a matter in which Meena was acquitted at trial in another case. The CBI also accepted the intermediary's claim that further sums of Rs. 8,000 and Rs. 5,000 were his personal money and returned them, though he was then an accused. The bench found this treatment questionable.

A central objection concerned the truncated trap. The Court observed that if the money was meant to reach Meena at his residence, the CBI could have allowed the chain to complete and trapped him there. Instead it closed the operation at recovery from the intermediary.

“This is a serious lacuna,” the Court said, holding that the impatience of the investigating agency enured to the benefit of the appellant.

The bench also found that Nandakumar's transfer to the DSC's office lay within the authority of the Senior DPO, not Meena. The Senior DPO (DW-2) and the assistant personnel officer (PW-5) both deposed that no one approached them for the transfer, undermining the theory that Meena demanded a bribe for an act over which he had no authority or role.

The reasoning on approver evidence and the statutory presumption

The Court restated that proof of demand and acceptance is the gravamen of an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Relying on the Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), the bench held that the presumption under Section 20 arises only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts, and does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden.

On accomplice evidence, the Court applied Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, to hold that a pardoned participant carries a powerful incentive to shift blame and requires independent corroboration connecting the accused with the offence. The bench distinguished admissibility from credibility, holding that the law permitting such evidence does not answer whether it is safe to act upon.

The Court accepted that acceptance through an intermediary can satisfy the statute, citing State by Lokayuktha Police v. K. Rangayya and Explanation 2 to Section 7. But it stressed that the prosecution must first show the intermediary acted under the accused's authority, direction or for his benefit, and that the demand was attributable to the accused.

The Gopi Kumar transaction

The Court treated this transaction as standing on a different footing because it involved Meena's alleged presence at acceptance. PW-11 said he was summoned to the officer's quarters, where Meena asked in Hindi whether he had forgotten him after his transfer. The bench noted the words made no mention of money, and it was the witness's own understanding that supplied the connection to a bribe. It was PW-7 who then spoke of a balance of Rs. 5,000, and Rs. 3,000 was handed over.

The Court found the account uncharacteristic of Meena's alleged practice of staying absent when money changed hands, and unsupported by any independent witness. The Inspector said to have telephoned PW-11 was never examined, and no call record, muster roll or duty record placed Meena at his residence.

The appellant's monthly diary (Ext.D2) recorded that he left Palakkad on the evening of 29 July 2005 and returned only on the night of 31 July 2005. The only date attributed to the transaction, 30 July 2005, from PW-7's Section 164 statement, fell within this window, and the prosecution offered no explanation. No currency was recovered at any stage. The bench held the foundational facts for the Section 20 presumption were not established.

Order

The Court held that lingering reasonable doubts meant the charges were not proved to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Criminal Appeal No. 4733 of 2024 (from C.C. No. 2 of 2014) and Criminal Appeal No. 4732 of 2024 (from C.C. No. 3 of 2015) were both allowed, and Meena was acquitted of all charges.

The bail bonds furnished pursuant to the Court's order dated 22 November 2024 were discharged, and any fine deposited was directed to be refunded. The Court found it unnecessary to examine the appellant's conspiracy contention or the challenge to the validity of sanction.