Composite Appeal Against Common Judgment in Two Suits Is Maintainable, Supreme Court Holds
A bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar rules that a single appeal challenging a common judgment in two consolidated suits is maintainable when court fees and certified copies of both decrees are filed.
The Supreme Court has held that a composite appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 against a common judgment disposing of two consolidated suits by the same plaintiff is fully maintainable, provided certified copies of both decrees and the requisite court fees for two separate appeals are furnished along with the memorandum of appeal. The Court set aside a judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated 2 September 2022, which had non-suited the plaintiff on the sole ground that two separate appeals had not been filed. The division bench — Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar — restored the two second appeals before the High Court for fresh adjudication on merits, finding that any deficiency in the composite appeal was one of form and not of substance, and was therefore curable.
How the Dispute Reached the Court
The predecessor of the appellants filed two suits before the Munsiff at Shahapur. The first, O.S. No.14 of 1986, sought a declaration that a registered sale deed dated 16 April 1977, executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant over eight acres eleven guntas from Survey No.132/1-A, was null and void and not binding on the plaintiff. The second, O.S. No.135 of 1987, sought permanent injunction restraining the first defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession of four acres five guntas from the same survey number.
On an application by the common defendant under Section 151 of the Code, and with the plaintiff's consent, the two suits were clubbed by order dated 16 June 1988. Common evidence was thereafter recorded in the first suit. By a common judgment dated 7 December 1990, the trial Court dismissed both suits, directing that a copy of the common judgment be preserved in the second suit as well.
The plaintiff filed a composite appeal, R.A. No.2 of 1991, under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code. The memorandum of appeal expressly stated that it was directed against the judgments and decrees in both O.S. No.14/86 and O.S. No.135/87. Certified copies of the common judgment and the decrees in both suits were filed. Court fees payable on two separate appeals were paid, calculated separately for each suit's relief. A prayer was also made to dispense with filing of more than one copy of the judgment under Order XLI Rule 1.
The first appellate Court allowed the composite appeal by its judgment dated 17 August 2007, set aside the common judgment and decrees, declared the sale deed not binding on the plaintiff, and passed a decree for permanent injunction. The defendants then filed two second appeals under Section 100 of the Code before the High Court of Karnataka, raising maintainability of the single appeal as a ground. The High Court allowed both second appeals, holding that since two separate suits had been filed, two separate appeals under Section 96 were required. It set aside the first appellate Court's judgment and consequently dismissed both suits, leaving the plaintiff without any adjudication on merits.
The Core Question Before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed the question as whether a composite appeal filed under Section 96 of the Code, challenging a common judgment in two suits filed by the same plaintiff, is maintainable where certified copies of both decrees are filed and the court fees payable for two separate appeals are paid.
Senior Advocate Basava Prabhu S. Patil, appearing for the appellants, argued that the High Court elevated a technical requirement over substance. The composite appeal satisfied every material condition: both decrees were annexed, requisite court fees were paid, and a specific prayer to set aside the common judgment in both suits was made. He submitted that the High Court's order left the appellants entirely remediless since the first appellate Court's judgment was set aside without any direction for fresh adjudication.
Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Sharanagouda Patil, supported the High Court's view, contending that two separate suits demanded two separate appeals under Section 96 regardless of the common judgment, and that the precedents relied upon by the High Court correctly stated the law.
What the Court Held
The Court held that the composite appeal was rightly entertained by the first appellate Court and that the High Court erred in setting it aside on maintainability grounds. It held that all statutory requirements under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code were satisfied by the plaintiff.
The Court identified what was present in the composite appeal: certified copies of the common judgment and both decrees, court fees calculated and paid as if two separate appeals had been filed, and an explicit prayer for setting aside the common judgment in both suits. A request was also made to dispense with filing of a second copy of the judgment, invoking the proviso to Order XLI Rule 1(1), which expressly empowers the appellate Court to grant such dispensation when two or more suits are tried together and decided by a common judgment.
The only element absent was a separate memorandum of appeal for each suit. The Court held this was a deficiency of form, not substance, and was curable. Even if the High Court had concluded that a separate memorandum was necessary, it ought to have afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to file one rather than dismissing the proceedings outright.
Reasoning: Substance Over Form, and the Res Judicata Analysis
The Court drew on the purpose of consolidation under Section 151 of the Code. Clubbing two or more suits is done to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, reduce delay, and spare parties the burden of adducing the same evidence twice. Here, consolidation itself was sought by the common defendant. Having consented to and benefited from a joint trial, the defendants could not then insist that the plaintiff litigate afresh in two separate appeals when every substantive requirement had been met in the composite one.
On the res judicata question, the Court referred to the Nagpur High Court's judgment in Manohar Vinayak and others v. Laxman Anandrao Deshmukh and others, AIR 1947 Nagpur 248, which held that when suits are consolidated by consent or court order, they lose independent existence and nothing decided in one can operate as res judicata against the other since there are no two independent decisions. The Court also cited this Court's own decision in Narhari and others v. Shankar and others, 1950 INSC 24, for the proposition that “where there has been one trial, one finding, and one decision, there need not be two appeals even though two decrees may have been drawn up.” That judgment further stated that the estoppel of res judicata is created by the judgment, not the decree, and that two decrees based on the same judgment are in substance one.
The Court also relied on its recent decision in Charan Singh v. Ram Saroop, Civil Appeals No.1585-1586 of 2025 decided on 3 February 2025, which had held that where a composite appeal is filed but a separate memorandum is required, the appellate Court ought to have alerted the appellant and granted liberty to file a separate memorandum. The defect there, as here, was not incurable.
On the right of appeal, the Court stated that the right of appeal is a substantive right and a party cannot be deprived of it merely for procedural defects. Rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and are not to be used as a sword to terminate proceedings. Courts should attempt to adjudicate cases on merits rather than end them for procedural non-compliance.
Distinguishing the Precedents Relied Upon by the High Court
The High Court had placed reliance on two Karnataka High Court decisions: Mallanna alias Appaiah v. Smt. Muninanjamma alias Nanjamma (RSA No.90 of 1996, decided on 12 February 2001) and Karnataka State Agro Corn Products Ltd. v. M/s Kerala Agro Seeds (RFA No.554 of 2012, decided on 2 December 2019). The Supreme Court distinguished both.
In Mallanna alias Appaiah, the two suits had been filed by opposing parties against each other — A sued B for eviction and B sued A for specific performance. The trial was held separately; a common judgment was passed only for convenience. B challenged only the decree in A's suit but not the decree in B's own suit. In that context, the High Court's finding that B could not obtain relief in A's single appeal without challenging his own suit's decree was correct on those facts. The Supreme Court held this scenario was entirely different from the present case, where both suits were filed by the same plaintiff, consolidated at a defendant's request, and decided by one common trial.
The decisions in M/s S.A.L. Steel Limited v. M/s Sreenidhi Trading Company and others and Sri Dinesh Poojary v. Sri Venkappa Gowda — relied upon by the respondents' counsel — dealt with situations where a plaintiff and defendant had filed a suit and counter-claim respectively, with separate adverse outcomes for each. The Court held these decisions did not assist the respondents because the present case involved no counter-claim: both proceedings were suits initiated by the same plaintiff.
The Court found support instead in the Himachal Pradesh High Court's Division Bench ruling in Ramesh Chand v. Om Raj and others (RSA No.57 of 2017), which, while answering a reference on conflicting Single Bench views, held that when two suits are consolidated and tried together with common evidence and a common judgment, a single appeal by the aggrieved party is maintainable.
Order
The Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeals Nos.9923-9924 of 2026. The judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated 2 September 2022 in RSA Nos.3214 of 2007 and 3215 of 2007 was set aside. Both second appeals were restored before the High Court for adjudication afresh on merits. The Court clarified that the respective contentions of the parties on the merits of the suits had not been examined in the civil appeals, and the High Court was to decide the second appeals on their own merits. Parties were directed to bear their own costs. A pending interlocutory application was also disposed of.