Daughter sued 23 years after gifting land to her father; Supreme Court says time had run out
Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan hold that the three-year limit to cancel a gift runs from knowing what the deed is, not from the end of the donor influence.
On 29 October 2026, the Supreme Court threw out a suit that a daughter filed in 1997 to cancel a gift of land she had made to her father in December 1974. The trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court had all ruled for her. The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by limitation.
A bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan set aside all three decisions. It held that time to cancel a gift allegedly procured by undue influence runs from the day the donor knows the true nature of the deed.
It does not run from the day the influence ends, or from the day a father stops sharing produce from the land.
A gift deed, a second marriage, a notice
The respondent, Chennamma (K. Bharathi), sued her father on 30 August 1997. The appellants, D. Kalidasreddy and another, are his successors-in-interest. She asked the court to set aside a gift deed dated 19 December 1974, and to award possession of the properties, mesne profits and costs.
Her case was that the properties came to her and her three sisters from their mother, who died in 1955. By 1974 her elder sisters were married, and she was still studying for her graduation. One by one, the sisters gifted their shares to her.
She said her father, in whose care she lived until her marriage in February 1975, used his position to get a gift deed executed in his favour. His pretext was that if she married and settled with her husband, he would have no means to maintain himself.
She called the gift nominal, made on his word that he would stay unmarried and safeguard the properties.
He then married in secret, she said, and she learnt of it some time after her own wedding. For years he had visited her and brought gifts in cash and kind. In the last two years before the suit, she said, his affection shifted to his second wife and her children, and he began planning to alienate the properties.
On 27 February 1997 she issued a notice declaring the gift void. The plaint gave the cause of action as 19 December 1974, when she signed the deed, and again 1995, when she says she learnt of the fraud.
The father's written statement called the gift unconditional and absolute. He said it had been acted on and that he dealt with the properties as his own, so there was nothing to revoke. He also pleaded that the suit was not maintainable and was barred by limitation.
Three courts, one view on limitation
The trial court decreed the suit. It held that the father, being her father, could dominate her will, and that the gift was a product of undue influence and was not in good faith. It rejected her plea that she did not know about the deed, because she was a B.A. student who dealt with third parties and understood transactions.
On limitation, the trial court counted from 1995. That was when, according to her, the father stopped giving her a share and failed to explain accounts, and her suspicion began. The notice of 27 February 1997 followed, so the suit was within time.
The first appellate court affirmed the decree. The father had not entered the witness box, it noted, while she had shown that she acted on his dictates. The burden of proving free consent therefore lay on him, and he had not discharged it.
That court found the suit was filed nearly 23 years after the deed. It still held it was in time, relying on a 1968 Supreme Court ruling cited by her counsel: limitation ran from when she learnt of the fraud. In its view the father had stayed cordial and kept supplying produce until 1995.
In Second Appeal No. 611 of 2006, the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Amravati affirmed that the gift was an outcome of undue influence. It accepted that she knew the true nature of the deed she signed.
But it fixed the start of limitation at 1995, when the father stopped sharing the fruits of the properties. The High Court dismissed the appeal on 8 April 2026.
The father's side then came to the Supreme Court. Its core ground was that the suit was ex facie barred, so it had to be dismissed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Section 126, trust and burden of proof
Senior Advocate V. Giri appeared for the appellants. He said a gift can be revoked only on the grounds in Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Since this gift was not conditional, it could be rescinded only if grounds for rescinding a contract existed.
The plaint itself, he argued, showed she was aware of the deed and of her father’s influence throughout. Limitation therefore began on the date of execution. As for fraud, there was no proper pleading, failing to keep a promise is not fraud, and no such promise appeared in the deed.
He added that even if the second marriage were fraud, she learnt of it some time after her own marriage in February 1975. Counting from then, limitation had still lapsed long before 1997.
The respondent was represented through Advocate-on-Record firm Veritas Legis, with Advocate Ananga Bhattacharyya. Her side read the plaint as a whole and said the gift created a trust under which the father had to safeguard her interest. Section 10 of the Limitation Act, which lifts the bar for suits against trustees, would then apply.
It also argued that fraud came to her knowledge only in 1995, and that the plaint did not say when she learnt of the second marriage. The father had not entered the witness box, so the burden of showing when she learnt of the fraud was not discharged. All courts, it added, had concurrently found undue influence.
The question the bench framed
The bench did not take up the undue influence finding. It put one question to itself:
“the short question that arises for our consideration is whether the suit in question is barred by limitation or not” (para 15)
It said her limitation case was two-fold. First, the gift in fact created a trust for her benefit, so Section 10 of the Limitation Act lifted the bar. Second, if Article 59 applied, time ran from 1995, when the father stopped sharing the usufruct.
Why the gift was not a trust
The bench found nothing in the gift deed to show that the properties were to be held for her benefit. In its words, “creation of any kind of trust is negated by the recitals in the gift deed” (para 17).
The deed spoke of love and affection and of a gift of land worth Rs 25,000. It said the donor would keep no right in the property. Title therefore vested absolutely in the donee, with no obligation to safeguard the property or share its usufruct with the donor.
That made it an unconditional gift. The bench rejected the Section 10 argument.
Time runs from the deed, not from freedom
She had also sought possession, but the bench said Article 65 of the Limitation Act did not govern the suit. Even on her case, the gift would be voidable and not void. Until it was set aside, possession could not be granted, so the limitation for setting it aside was what mattered.
That fell under Article 59, which gives three years for a suit to cancel or set aside an instrument, from when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have it cancelled first become known to her.
The bench read the plaint as a whole. She had executed the deed under her father’s influence, relying on his assurance that he would safeguard her property and not remarry. She was conscious of that influence, the plaint showed, and she had signed under it.
It applied the Court’s decision in Ningawwa v. Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar (1968): limitation runs from the date the plaintiff became aware of the true nature of the instrument, not from the date she came out of the influence.
Even if the date of release mattered, the bench said, she came out of her father’s influence in 1975 when she married. On the findings of the courts below, she was both conscious of the influence and aware of the nature of the deed. The period expired well before the suit was filed in 1997.
A broken promise is not fraud
On fraud, the bench began with the pleadings. There was no specific allegation that the father suppressed any material fact when the gift was made. Even if he had promised not to marry again, a later breach of promise does not show fraud.
It relied on Reliance Salt Ltd. v. Cosmos Enterprises ((2006) 13 SCC 599, para 17). That ruling holds that fraud vitiating a contract must have a nexus with the acts of the parties before they enter it, and that a later breach of promise does not vitiate the contract.
The bench gave three reasons why the fraud case failed. The deed did not stipulate any condition barring the donee’s marriage. It transferred the interest absolutely, without restriction on his right to transfer or enjoy. And nothing indicated a fraudulent intention from the very beginning.
The bench also dealt with the produce. A father sharing gifts with his daughter, it said, does not point to a legal obligation, because it is quite normal for a father to share his income with his children.
If those gifts stopped in 1995, that alone gave no cause of action to sue to set aside a gift made in 1974.
The courts below, it concluded, committed a manifest error in counting limitation from the day the father stopped sharing profits. The bench held that “the suit was clearly barred by limitation and was liable to be dismissed” (para 21).
Order
The Supreme Court granted leave and allowed the appeal on 29 October 2026. It set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court, the first appellate court and the trial court.
The suit by the plaintiff-respondent stands dismissed, and pending applications are disposed of (paras 22 to 24). The order is marked reportable. The record of proceedings lists Senior Advocate V. Giri for the petitioners and Veritas Legis, Advocates-on-Record, for the respondent.