Supreme Court lets DDA contest Narela flat order despite 95-day delay, but faults its diligence
Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh condoned the delay by DDA and restored its revision petition to the National Commission, expressing no view on the merits of the Narela allotment dispute.
A flat drawn by lot in March 1997 is still waiting for a ruling on its merits. On 20 November the Supreme Court gave the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) another chance to fight an order that it must allot an alternative flat, after the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission shut the revision petition out over 95 days of delay.
The Court did so while saying plainly that it did not approve of DDA’s lack of diligence. A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Aparesh Kumar Singh allowed DDA’s appeal against the Delhi High Court.
Justice Vikram Nath wrote the judgment. It sets aside the orders of the High Court and the National Commission and sends the revision petition back for a decision on merits.
A 1997 draw and a disputed letter
The respondents are the successors of Bachhi Devi, who applied for a residential flat under DDA’s Expandable Housing Scheme, 1996. A draw of lots on 21 March 1997 gave her Flat 286 in Sector B-4, Pocket 6, Narela.
DDA issued demand-cum-allotment letters dated between 12 and 20 January 2000, asking for payment within a stipulated period. DDA said the letter went to the correspondence address she had given. She denied receiving it.
The payment was not made. DDA issued a show cause notice on 9 August 2001 proposing to cancel the allotment, and she asked for a proper demand letter in her representations. On 20 October 2003 DDA told her that the allotment stood cancelled.
Four forums, two answers
The allottee filed Consumer Complaint 36 of 2009 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-II in New Delhi, alleging deficiency in service. On 11 August 2015 the District Forum dismissed it. It held that the letter had been sent to her correspondence address and that the cancellation was justified.
She appealed to the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Delhi, in First Appeal 462 of 2015. On 9 April 2021 the State Commission allowed the appeal, holding that the letter had not been duly served.
It directed DDA to allot an alternative flat at the rates in force at the time of the original allotment. That is the order DDA wants to contest on merits.
512 days and the 95 left over
DDA filed Revision Petition 1621 of 2022 before the National Commission on 2 December 2022, with an application to condone delay. The petition was reported to be 512 days late.
DDA asked for exclusion of the period covered by this Court’s orders extending limitation during the COVID-19 pandemic. It put the remaining 95 days down to administrative procedures, a change of counsel and the time taken to get a certified copy.
On 7 June 2024 the National Commission dismissed the application and with it the revision petition. It found that DDA had not shown sufficient cause for the 95 days.
DDA then went to the Delhi High Court under Article 227 in CM(M) 3690 of 2024. On 23 October 2024 the High Court dismissed the petition, saying DDA had not acted with due diligence and that no ground to interfere was made out.
The limited question
Leave was granted in the special leave petition, and the Court confined itself to a narrow issue. It framed that issue this way:
“whether the National Commission was justified in declining to condone the delay in filing the revision petition and whether the High Court erred in affirming the said decision” (para 5)
The judgment does not summarise DDA’s arguments in court beyond the explanation it had given for the delay. It says the bench heard counsel for the parties and perused the record, without naming either.
Liberal, but not limitless
The bench began with settled law. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v Mst Katiji and Others, reported at (1987) 2 SCC 107, this Court held that sufficient cause must be read liberally so as to advance substantial justice.
In N Balakrishnan v M Krishnamurthy, reported at (1998) 7 SCC 123, it observed that the length of delay is not decisive. What matters is whether the explanation is acceptable.
From these two decisions the bench drew an approach that is pragmatic and justice-oriented. It added that the requirement of sufficient cause must not be rendered meaningless.
How the 512 days came down to 95
The National Commission had recorded the 512-day delay. A substantial part of it fell inside the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022, which this Court excluded from limitation in its suo motu proceedings, In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) 3 of 2020.
The Commission itself accepted that exclusion. It went on to examine DDA’s explanation for the remaining 95 days, which is the stretch that remained in dispute.
Why the Court condoned the delay
The record showed that the delay arose while DDA obtained administrative approval, engaged panel counsel and got the certified copy of the order it wanted to challenge. The bench accepted that DDA ought to have acted with greater diligence. It also said that a change of counsel or internal procedure cannot by itself justify every delay.
But those circumstances had to be weighed “cumulatively rather than in isolation”, it said. The explanation disclosed the steps DDA took to pursue its remedy, and nothing on the record suggested the delay was deliberate or meant to gain an undue advantage.
The bench also pointed to the history. The District Forum and the State Commission had reached opposite conclusions, which made it appropriate for the challenge to be heard on merits. It expressly gave no opinion on which of the two was right.
“an unduly restrictive approach” (para 9)
That was how the bench described the National Commission’s handling of DDA’s explanation. The High Court, in affirming it, had also failed to give enough weight to the circumstances taken together.
The Court said that while it did not approve of DDA’s lack of diligence, the interests of justice would be better served by letting the revision petition be considered on merits than by ending the proceedings at the threshold.
Order
The appeal was allowed. The High Court judgment of 23 October 2024 in CM(M) 3690 of 2024 and the National Commission order of 7 June 2024 in Revision Petition 1621 of 2022 were set aside.
The delay in filing the revision petition stands condoned. The petition is restored to the National Commission to be decided on merits, after both sides are heard.
The Court clarified that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of the dispute and that all contentions of the parties remain open. Pending applications were disposed of.