Section 5 Limitation Act applies to externment appeals under Chhattisgarh security law: Supreme Court

Justices Nagarathna and Bhuyan held Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam does not exclude Section 5, condoning delay and restoring an externment appeal.

The Supreme Court has held that an appeal against an externment order under the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 can be entertained after the 30-day limitation period, because Section 9 of that law does not exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. A Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan, deciding Jittu Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, allowed the appellant’s plea, condoned his delay and restored his externment appeal before the State Government for a decision on merits. The order matters because it settles that a bare limitation period in a special law does not automatically shut out the power to condone delay. Absent restrictive words such as “but not thereafter” or a fixed outer cap, the general law of limitation continues to operate. The Court set aside the High Court order that had upheld dismissal of the appeal.

How the externment dispute reached the Court

The District Magistrate, Balodabazar-Bhatapara, issued a show-cause notice to Jittu Yadav on 24 April 2025 under the Adhiniyam. He replied on 5 May 2025. The District Magistrate then passed an Externment Order on 18 June 2025, directing his removal from the district for one year.

The State said the action followed a report of 13 April 2025 by the Superintendent of Police, citing five cases under the Excise Act and two preventive proceedings, which it described as showing repeated criminal involvement prejudicial to public order.

Yadav appealed to the State Government under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam. The appeal, filed on 12 September 2025 — about 50 days late against the 30-day limit — was dismissed on 3 October 2025 as barred by limitation. His writ petition, WPCR No. 548 of 2025, was dismissed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur on 16 October 2025.

The question the Court framed

The Bench set the issue narrowly: whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded, expressly or by necessary implication, from proceedings under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam.

The appellant argued that Section 9 prescribes a limitation period but neither provides a condonation mechanism nor expressly excludes Section 5, so Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act brings Section 5 into play. He also contended the externment carried serious civil consequences affecting rights under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21.

The State argued the appeal was rightly dismissed as time-barred, that no condonation application had even been filed before the State Government, and that both the State Government and High Court proceeded on the premise that delay was incapable of condonation under the statutory scheme.

How the Court read Section 29(2) and the case law

The Court accepted that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act applied, since the Adhiniyam is a special law prescribing a 30-day period different from the Schedule. The remaining question was whether Sections 4 to 24, particularly Section 5, were excluded.

Reviewing precedent, the Bench noted that exclusion can arise expressly or by necessary implication from the scheme of a special law. It traced the phrase “expressly excluded” through Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra and Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker.

It surveyed cases where Section 5 was held inapplicable: Union of India v. Popular Construction Company, where “but not thereafter” in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act was treated as express exclusion; Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India, where the Central Excise Act was a self-contained code; Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, where the Electricity Act fixed an absolute outer limit; and Bengal Chemists & Druggists Association v. Kalyan Chowdhury, where “not exceeding 45 days” in Section 421(3) of the Companies Act had the same restrictive effect.

The Bench drew from these that exclusion is founded on clear statutory language or a scheme showing the limitation is absolute, not merely on the existence of a distinct period.

Why the Adhiniyam did not exclude Section 5

Applying this, the Court found Section 9 of the Adhiniyam stood on a different footing. It merely allows an appeal within thirty days and contains no expression like “but not thereafter” or “not exceeding,” and prescribes no maximum outer limit for condonation.

The Court held the Adhiniyam does not create a self-contained code of limitation, nor suggest the appellate authority becomes functus officio after thirty days. It pointed to Section 9(4), which excludes the time for obtaining a certified copy, as showing the legislature did not intend total insulation from the general law of limitation.

The Bench stressed the nature of the remedy. An externment appeal guards against arbitrary orders affecting liberty, movement, livelihood and reputation, and should not be defeated on technical grounds unless the statute clearly mandates strict exclusion. Denial of appellate scrutiny on delay alone, despite sufficient cause, could cause irreversible prejudice when the limitation period is only thirty days.

The Court concluded that neither the text of Section 9 nor the scheme of the Adhiniyam showed an intent to exclude Section 5, and that there was no contra provision barring condonation of delay beyond thirty days.

Order

The Court held that Section 9 of the Adhiniyam does not bar the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Since no condonation application was before the State Government, the appellant’s application for directions (Crl. M.P. No. 150947 of 2026) was taken on record and allowed, and the delay in filing the appeal was condoned.

The appeal before the State Government under Section 9 was restored and directed to be decided on merits as expeditiously as possible, and at any rate on or before 15 June 2026. The appellant was directed to appear before the State Government on 1 June 2026.

The High Court judgment dated 16 October 2025 in WPCR No. 548 of 2025 was set aside, and the appeal was disposed of in these terms.