No Pecuniary Advantage, No Conviction Under Section 13(1)(d): Supreme Court Acquits Store-in-Charge

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court set aside a corruption conviction, holding that Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot stand without proof of pecuniary advantage.

The Supreme Court on 8 September 2026 acquitted Khanindra Kr. Dutta, a store-in-charge in Assam's Veterinary Department, of an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. A Division Bench of Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran held that the conviction was impossible to sustain once the High Court itself had categorically recorded that no pecuniary advantage had been obtained by the accused. The Bench also criticised the prosecution for leading 62 witnesses to largely irrelevant effect and for failing to trace the money trail in a case where over five lakh rupees had been disbursed to a fictitious firm.

How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court

The case arose from a complaint to the Veterinary Department of the State of Assam. The allegation was that false RCC Bills were submitted for the supply of medicines that were never actually supplied, with payments routed to a fictitious firm. The loss was quantified at Rs. 5,97,200.

Seven persons were charge-sheeted. Four were convicted by the trial court and three were acquitted. Of the four convicted, three filed appeals before the High Court. The High Court acquitted the accountant who had passed the bill. The appellant, Khanindra Kr. Dutta, who was the store-in-charge, and another accused who was the storekeeper, remained convicted under Section 13(1)(d) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with Section 120B of the IPC.

The High Court had found that the storekeeper made entries in the store register and that the appellant certified the receipt of medicines that were never received. At the same time, the High Court acquitted both of them under Sections 420, 471, 465, and 477A of the IPC, having found no evidence that any of them had obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage from the commission of the alleged offence.

The appellant then approached the Supreme Court by way of Criminal Appeal No. 1882 of 2024, challenging his continued conviction under Section 13(1)(d).

The Core Legal Question

The question before the Court was narrow: whether a conviction under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act can be sustained when the same court that convicted the accused has returned a clear finding that no pecuniary advantage was obtained.

Section 13(1)(d) defines criminal misconduct as obtaining, by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing one's position as a public servant, any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for oneself or any other person. Sub-clause (iii) extends this to obtaining a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for any person without any public interest, even while holding public office.

Each of the three sub-clauses within Section 13(1)(d) requires the obtaining of a valuable thing or a pecuniary advantage. The High Court's finding that no such advantage was established went to the heart of the offence itself.

What the Court Held

The Court held that without a pecuniary advantage, there could be no conviction under Section 13(1)(d). The High Court's own finding on this point was categorical and had not been challenged by the CBI. The Bench held that the benefit of that finding had to inure to the accused.

The Court observed that the evidence could have been read to attract at least Sections 420 and 477A of the IPC, but the High Court did not do so. The CBI did not appeal that part of the order either. In those circumstances, the conviction under Section 13(1)(d) could not survive in isolation.

The Bench also noted that the offence alleged dated to 1993 and pointed out that the department could have initiated disciplinary proceedings and quantified the loss, which was not done.

The Court's Observations on Corruption Prosecutions

The Court went beyond the immediate facts to make pointed observations about how corruption cases are prosecuted. It said the prosecution had examined 62 witnesses, but the High Court found only 9 of them worth referring to in its judgment. Of those nine, eight were in-charges of Veterinary Dispensaries across the State at the relevant period, called to prove that medicines had not been supplied as per the challans and bills. The ninth was the actual owner of the supplier firm, who appeared and denied receiving any money or even supplying medicines.

The Court said it found no investigation having been done to trace the money trail after the amounts were disbursed from the department. It characterised corruption prosecutions as having “a history of long pendency” caused by voluminous and often unnecessary evidence.

The Bench observed that voluminous evidence in corruption cases is “often intimidating to the Court” because much of what is led does not substantiate the allegation or bring home the guilt of the accused public servant. In this case, examining 62 witnesses served no prosecutorial purpose that the High Court found relevant to the conviction.

Why the CBI's Silence Proved Decisive

A significant strand of the Court's reasoning turned on what the CBI chose not to do. The High Court acquitted the accused under Sections 420, 471, 465, and 477A of the IPC on the basis that there was no evidence of any pecuniary advantage having been obtained. The CBI did not challenge that finding. The Supreme Court held that the benefit of the unchallenged acquittal on those counts necessarily had to enure to the accused when the very same factual deficit — the absence of pecuniary advantage — was also fatal to the conviction under Section 13(1)(d).

This placed the prosecution in an untenable position: having allowed the High Court's factual finding to become final, the CBI could not rely on the same set of facts to sustain the corruption conviction before the Supreme Court. The Court did not accept that the two convictions — under the IPC and under the PC Act — could be treated as resting on distinct factual bases when the element that was missing from both was identical.

Outcome

The Supreme Court allowed Criminal Appeal No. 1882 of 2024. Khanindra Kr. Dutta was acquitted. The Court directed that if he was in custody he be released forthwith, unless required in any other case, and that if he was already on bail his bail bonds stand cancelled. Any pending applications were also disposed of.