Convenor and chief witness were brothers: Supreme Court voids dismissal of school teacher
Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan held that a disciplinary inquiry run by one family, with the brother of the complainant as convenor, carried a reasonable likelihood of bias and could not stand.
An assistant teacher in a Nagpur school faced 20 charges. The man who issued the charge-sheet was the school Secretary, and he was also the sole witness on 11 of the charges. The inquiry committee that heard him was convened by his own brother.
On 17 November the Supreme Court held that an inquiry built like that cannot be saved by any amount of procedure. It set aside the Bombay High Court and restored the School Tribunal’s order quashing the termination.
Close kinship that raises a reasonable likelihood of bias disqualifies, the Court said, and it saw no reason to treat administrative bodies differently from courts.
One man in five roles
Kiran Bhujade joined a Nagpur school as an Assistant Teacher on 1 July 2009. The school belongs to Sudhir Shikshan Sanstha, whose Executive Committee her counsel described as dominated by the Masurkar family. The Education Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur, approved her appointment on 5 September 2015, with effect from the date she joined.
Rajesh Masurkar was the Sanstha’s Secretary and the school Headmaster. He issued the statement of allegations on 8 June 2021 and the charge-sheet on 9 August 2021. Bhujade’s counsel listed five roles for him, including principal witness and signatory of the termination order.
The Executive Committee at the relevant time included, by that chart, his wife as President and his daughter as Vice-President. The convenor of the inquiry committee, Prakash Masurkar, was his real brother.
A grant-in-aid complaint, then a show-cause notice
On 1 July 2016 a Government Resolution gave the school 20 per cent grant-in-aid status from the academic year 2016-17. Bhujade said the management then left her name off the salary grant bills. Only nine employees’ names were forwarded on 1 June 2018.
On 26 March 2021 she complained to the Education Minister and other authorities that the Secretary had wilfully excluded her from the grant lists. The Education Officer set up a three-member inquiry committee on 15 April 2021. Bhujade alleged threats and intimidation and lodged a further complaint on 22 April 2021.
The management served a show-cause notice on 13 May 2021 alleging misconduct, including tampering with documents. On 20 May 2021 the Education Officer directed that a proposal to include her in the grant-in-aid list be submitted. On 6 June 2021 the Executive Committee authorised the Secretary to hold an inquiry against her.
Who sat on the inquiry committee
Under Rule 36 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, the inquiry committee has three members. The Sanstha named Prakash Masurkar, an Executive Committee member, as convenor, and Bhau Wasnik, a retired Principal on the list of State-awardee teachers, as a member.
Bhujade nominated Kamaldas Laxman Deshpande as the third member. On 14 July 2021 she wrote to the Deputy Director of Education about her apprehension of bias. On 18 February 2022 the committee gave its findings by a majority of two to one.
She was terminated by an order of 23 February 2022, effective the next day. The committee constituted by the Education Officer had reported on 9 June 2021 that the Secretary failed to include her name in the grant-eligible list, and had directed her inclusion.
Tribunal, remand and the High Court
Bhujade appealed to the School Tribunal, Nagpur, on 21 March 2022. The Tribunal set the termination aside on 25 April 2023, but the High Court remanded the matter on 4 December 2023 because the Tribunal had not discussed material evidence.
On 21 March 2024 the Tribunal again quashed the termination and ordered reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages. It said Rajesh Masurkar was the key witness for the charges and had himself issued the charge-sheet, and that a person cannot be judge in his own cause. It called the inquiry a farce.
The Sanstha went to the High Court in Writ Petition 4965 of 2024. The High Court allowed it on 29 April 2025 and confirmed the termination. It held that the Chief Executive Officer was not a committee member and so had not acted as a judge, and that the Rules did not stop him from appearing as a witness.
What each side told the Court
Mr Sachin Patil, for Bhujade, produced a chart of the Executive Committee showing its family links. He said the charges were reverse-engineered out of a personal vendetta. Rajesh Masurkar, he said, joined the school only on 4 October 2014, was junior to her, and manipulated seniority records to become Headmaster.
Mr Patil argued that Rajesh Masurkar’s five roles made the inquiry void from the start. Bhujade had objected to Prakash Masurkar as convenor on the ground of personal bias, he said, and that objection was never decided by a competent authority. He also invoked Article 14.
Mr Sudhanshu Choudhari, senior counsel for the Sanstha, said the objection to Prakash Masurkar had been declined by a communication of 5 July 2021, and that Bhujade accepted him as convenor in a letter of 8 September 2021. That, he argued, was a waiver.
He said the Act allows family-run trusts to run schools, and Rule 36(2)(a)(i) lets any Executive Committee member be nominated, so necessity applied. Rajesh Masurkar was a formal witness who proved documents, and other staff and two independent witnesses also pointed to guilt on all charges.
No specific instance of bias was pleaded, he said, and bias in one member of a three-member committee could not undo its finding.
In rejoinder Mr Patil said Bhujade had objected at every stage and never waived anything. Two independent members were available on the Executive Committee, so necessity did not arise. The letter of 8 September 2021, he said, only drew attention to an article by Bhau Wasnik saying the convenor should record proceedings in his own hand.
The question the Court framed
Justice Manmohan, writing for the Bench, framed the issue in one sentence:
“whether the circumstances of the present case give rise to reasonable likelihood of bias from the perspective of a fair-minded person and whether the same renders the inquiry proceedings against the Appellant unsustainable in law?” (para 33)
Bias is judged by appearance
Natural justice requires that no one be a judge in his own cause and that the affected party be heard, and it also requires a decision-maker who is independent and impartial. Citing an English Court of Appeal decision, Flaherty, it described bias as a predisposition against one side for reasons unconnected with the merits.
The rule exists to protect the integrity of the decision-making process and public confidence in it. Even a decision-maker who is in fact impartial can taint a process if the circumstances create an appearance or risk of bias. The rule therefore looks to appearance or risk, not bias in fact.
Pecuniary, personal and official bias
The Court listed three kinds of bias. Pecuniary interest, however small, disqualifies, as Manak Lal held. Personal bias covers a close relative or business associate of a party.
The Court cited a Canadian case in which a tribunal chairman was married to an executive officer of a party. It called that directly analogous to a close blood relationship on an inquiry panel.
In Mohd Nooh, an officer left an inquiry when a witness turned hostile, gave evidence against the accused, returned and dismissed him. The Court said natural justice was completely discarded.
Official bias, the third kind, arose in L.K. Ratna. There the Disciplinary Committee was drawn from the same Council that acted on its report.
When necessity overrides bias
The doctrine of necessity lets an officer decide a matter where no other person or authority is eligible, competent or available. The Court cited Krishnadatt Awasthy (2025) 7 SCC 545 for the point that necessity is an exception to the rule against bias, and gave the example of judges reviewing, on the judicial side, administrative decisions of the court.
Kinship once passed, now it disqualifies
The Bench told the story of Justice Badruddin Tyabji of the Bombay High Court. Two of his sons practised at the Bar, and Bombay solicitors briefed one for the plaintiff and the other for the defendant in his court. Told the arrangement was questionable, he is recorded as telling the Chief Justice to mind his own business.
The legal world, the Court said, now takes bias far more seriously. In Kraipak a selection board member who was also a candidate sat when rivals were considered, and the selection fell.
The test there was not whether he was biased but whether there was reasonable ground for believing he was likely to be.
The Constitution Bench in Ashok Kumar Yadav carved out a limited exception for Public Service Commissions. Even there, a member whose close relative is interviewed must withdraw and not discuss that candidate.
Reasonable likelihood is the test
The Court traced the test of real likelihood of bias through Parthasarathi, Sarana and Ranjit Thakur. It is met when a reasonable person in possession of the relevant information would think bias likely. It also noted Pinochet, where the House of Lords set aside its own decision over a judge’s undisclosed link to a party.
Indian courts, it said, have consistently adopted the test of reasonable likelihood, and there is no significant difference between a real danger and a real possibility of bias when seen through a fair-minded observer. The Sanstha’s argument that Bhujade had to prove a specific instance of bias was therefore not legally tenable.
Kinship disqualifies wherever it is close enough to raise reasonable likelihood of bias. The Court saw no reason to apply a different approach to administrative bodies than to courts.
A family running the whole apparatus
The Court found the admitted position was that the inquiry apparatus had undergone “a total familial capture”. Prakash Masurkar was brother-in-law of the President, uncle of the Vice-President and husband of a Committee Member. He was also the real brother of the complainant and chief witness.
The complainant, it noted, gave his evidence before his own brother, who accepted it and held Bhujade guilty. The Sanstha’s plea that the committee had decided independently of Rajesh Masurkar failed on the record, because he was the sole witness on 11 of the 20 charges.
Rajesh Masurkar was therefore not a formal witness producing records. The Court added that he had secured the Headmaster’s post by superseding Bhujade’s seniority, which made his personal interest in the outcome plain.
Where the separation of functions collapses
When the roles of complainant, prosecutor, witness and adjudicator overlap, the Court held, the separation of functions essential to fair disciplinary proceedings collapses. An inquiry must be fair, transparent and impartial. Gathering those roles in one close-knit family denies the employee an effective hearing.
An immediate blood relative of a person who starts disciplinary action, or who is directly interested in its outcome, is disqualified from adjudicating. The Court called nemo judex in causa sua a constitutional imperative under Article 14, and the defect a jurisdictional one, not a procedural irregularity capable of cure.
Mere compliance with procedure does not help. Multiple hearings, many witnesses and extensive cross-examination cannot repair a defect of this kind.
“bias affecting the root of the disciplinary mechanism is not a curable procedural irregularity” (para 57)
Why necessity, waiver and the majority vote failed
Rule 36(2)(a)(i) did allow any Executive Committee member to be nominated. But procedural fairness required avoiding immediate members of the controlling family, the Court said, when two unrelated members were available. The Sanstha did not say those two were disqualified, so necessity was not attracted.
On the plea that one biased member of three could not matter, the Court relied on Kraipak. In group deliberation each member influences the others, particularly one closely connected with the school. The Court could not accept that Prakash Masurkar and Bhau Wasnik had no mutual discussion.
On waiver, it applied the De Smith formulation. A waiver must be voluntary, informed and unequivocal. That was not met, because Bhujade had objected at every stage.
The majority report of 18 February 2022 recorded her objection that the convenor was the Secretary’s brother. It rejected the objection because no actual bias had been established. Her appeal to the School Tribunal also took the objection, and the Tribunal recorded it on 21 March 2024.
The Court also noted that the High Court had mistaken the convenor for Rajesh Masurkar, instead of Prakash Masurkar. Given the number of Masurkars on the Executive Committee, it said, some confusion was perhaps inevitable.
Order
The Court held that on an objective view the circumstances gave a reasonable likelihood of bias from the perspective of a fair-minded person, so the inquiry against Bhujade was unsustainable in law. It allowed the appeal.
The High Court’s judgment of 29 April 2025 in Writ Petition 4965 of 2024 was set aside, and the School Tribunal’s judgment of 21 March 2024 was restored.
The Court also directed the Education Officer, the third respondent, to consider the feasibility of absorbing Bhujade in any other 100 per cent grant-in-aid school in its jurisdiction, under Rule 26(2)(iii) of the MEPS Rules. Pending applications were disposed of.