Supreme Court applies strict, not absolute, liability to electrocution compensation claims

A Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held electricity boards face strict liability, quashing writ-based awards where disputed facts required a proper forum.

The Supreme Court held that electricity supply bodies in electrocution cases are governed by the standard of strict liability rather than absolute liability, and that a writ petition seeking compensation cannot be entertained where the dispute turns on contested questions of fact.

The judgment, delivered by Justice Sanjay Karol for a Bench that also comprised Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, arose from appeals by the Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited against a Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, which had confirmed compensation awards passed by a Single Judge in writ proceedings.

The Court quashed the High Court awards, finding the writ petitions not maintainable given the disputed facts, while leaving the claimants free to pursue appropriate alternate remedies. The two appeals were allowed.

How the electrocution claims reached the Court

In the first matter, respondent No. 1 Rekha is the widow of N. Subramanya, who died in an electrocution incident on 22 February 2018. A first information report was registered the same day. She filed a writ petition seeking compensation, which the Corporation opposed on grounds of maintainability, absence of fault, and the presence of disputed questions of fact.

Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench rejected those objections and held the writ petitions maintainable, reasoning that the relief sought was for a tortious act of the State and did not require the claimant to first pursue a private law remedy before the Civil Court. On merits, the courts held the Corporation liable and awarded Rs. 25,52,500 with interest at 6% payable after three months of the date of judgment. The compensation framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was adopted.

In the connected appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 24854 of 2025, the injured party, Muizz Ahmad Shariff, had climbed onto the roof of a neighbouring building to retrieve a cricket ball and came into contact with a 66KV line, suffering severe injuries. The Single Judge awarded Rs. 44,32,050, upheld by the Division Bench.

The Corporation filed the present appeals against two of the three matters disposed of by the Division Bench. The Court framed two questions: the maintainability of the writ petition, and the yardstick for determining compensation in electrocution cases.

Why disputed facts defeated writ jurisdiction

On maintainability, the Court treated the position as no longer res integra. It drew on Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P., which sets out that the power under Article 226 may be exercised for any purpose, but the High Court retains discretion not to entertain a writ where an efficacious alternate remedy exists. The recognised exceptions are enforcement of a fundamental right, violation of natural justice, orders wholly without jurisdiction, or a challenge to the vires of a statute. Where disputed questions of fact arise, a High Court may decline jurisdiction.

These principles were affirmed by a three-judge Bench in T.N. Cements Corpn. Ltd. v. Unicon Engineers.

Turning to the specific context, the Court relied on Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v. Sukamani Das, where it was held that electrocution claims are actions in tort in which negligence must first be established, and that such disputes cannot be decided on affidavits alone. The Court summarised the position: “if questions of fact are disputed” Article 226 is not an appropriate remedy in electrocution cases.

The record showed genuine factual disputes in both appeals. In the first, these included whether the use of an aluminium ladder in a coffee plantation that touched an 11KV line amounted to negligence, whether the plantation owner was himself negligent, the condition of backup relays, and whether liability lay with a different party responsible for lines of a certain voltage. In the second, disputes concerned compliance with the statutory four-metre distance between line and building, the effect of an undertaking dated 19 April 2000, and whether negligence could be imputed to the Corporation.

Strict liability, not absolute liability

The High Court had treated the disputed facts as largely irrelevant, reasoning that absolute liability applied. Because absolute liability admits no exceptions, disputed facts could not absolve the Corporation. The Supreme Court examined this distinction.

Absolute liability, the Court explained, leaves no scope for exception and applies to enterprises engaged in inherently dangerous or hazardous activity, as laid down in the Constitution Bench decision in the Oleum Gas Leak Case (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India). Strict liability, by contrast, follows the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, under which a person who brings something likely to cause mischief onto land is answerable for the natural consequences of its escape, subject to recognised exceptions.

The Court reviewed Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, which explains strict liability as resting on the idea that those engaged in hazardous activity bear the burden of the risk and operate as a loss distribution mechanism, spreading losses through insurance or higher prices. That decision confirmed the rule in Rylands extends to electricity. The Court also cited M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, where in an electrocution matter the exception to strict liability was held inapplicable.

Applying these principles, the Court held strict liability, not absolute liability, to be the appropriate standard for bodies such as the Corporation. Transmission of electricity is inherently dangerous, and those carrying out such activity, including the State, must bear the burden, being best placed to spread the loss. They are liable irrespective of fault, provided none of the recognised exceptions applies. The exceptions, drawn from Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., include consent, common benefit, act of a stranger, statutory authority, act of God, default of the plaintiff, and remoteness of consequences.

The compensation yardstick

On calculation, the Court noted its two-judge Bench ruling in Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., which held the multiplier method inapplicable to electrocution compensation. Since the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 calculation depends on the multiplier, that framework could not be applied to electrocution cases, as the High Court had done.

The Court observed that the Electricity Act, 2003 does not prescribe a method for calculating compensation. Section 57 addresses the licensee's liability to pay compensation in certain scenarios but is silent on the method. The Raman holding relies on Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha. The Court stated that the overarching principle of just, fair and reasonable compensation would govern, based on the income of the person and other related claims.

Order

Having found that disputed questions of fact were involved, the Court held that the writ petition seeking compensation was not maintainable. The impugned judgments of the Division Bench and the Single Judge were quashed and set aside.

The Court had earlier stayed the operation of the impugned judgment while issuing notice and, by order dated 18 December 2025, directed payment of interim compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs. It clarified that this amount shall not be recovered from the respondents and shall not influence any compensation later awarded in appropriate proceedings.

The respondents were left free to take recourse to available alternate remedies before the concerned forum, to be decided in accordance with law on an expeditious basis and uninfluenced by the observations made. The same liberty was extended to the respondents in the connected appeal. Both appeals were allowed, with parties bearing their own costs.