Justice S. Kumar Justice S. Sachdeva Civil Appeal A holiday that did not move theIBC deadline
[ Supreme Court ]

Filed on day 46 after a second Saturday: Supreme Court ends appeals against Lulu mall plan

Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva held that Section 4 of the Limitation Act cannot extend the extra 15 days allowed under the IBC, and that the NCLAT should have recalled its order.

Three people who say they bought commercial units in a planned mall challenged a resolution plan one day after the last date the insolvency law allowed. The tribunal let them in because that date fell on a second Saturday. On 16 November the Supreme Court said the holiday rule does not apply here, and dismissed their appeals as time-barred.

Justices Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva, judges of the Supreme Court, allowed the appeals of Lulu International Shopping Malls Private Limited. Justice Sanjay Kumar wrote the judgment, which is marked non-reportable.

A Rs 271.52 crore plan, two late appeals

The National Company Law Tribunal at Hyderabad began insolvency proceedings against Manjeera Retail Holdings Private Limited on 18 July 2023. Lulu emerged as the successful resolution applicant after its plan won the full approval of the Committee of Creditors.

The tribunal approved the plan on 26 March 2025. Lulu claims to have invested Rs 271.52 crore in carrying it out.

Three respondents then appealed. Gorinka Pratyusha filed Company Appeal 388 of 2025, and Srinivas Kalluri and Rajani Kalluri filed Company Appeal 389 of 2025, both before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal at Chennai.

They said they had agreements with the corporate debtor for commercial units in Manjeera Mall, which the debtor was to build. They paid the full sale consideration, they said, yet the Resolution Professional, Birendra Kumar Agarwal, recorded their payments as advances from customers and did not treat them as financial creditors.

They added that two earlier tribunal orders, in IA 384 and 492 of 2024, had directed the Resolution Professional to include their claims in the Information Memorandum. Those orders, they said, were never given effect.

Counting 45 days to a second Saturday

The Supreme Court did not go into those grievances. The appeals were late, and that settled the matter. Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 allows an appeal within 30 days of the order, with a condonable delay of 15 more days and no more.

The 30 days from the plan order ended on 25 April 2025. The extra 15 days ended on 10 May 2025. Both appeals were filed on 11 May 2025, the 46th day.

The respondents applied to condone the delay. On 10 October 2025 the NCLAT allowed their applications, relying on Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Its reasoning was that 10 May 2025, the last day of the extendable period, was a second Saturday and a holiday. The filing on the next day was therefore in time, it held.

Lulu seeks recall and the NCLAT refuses

Lulu went back to the NCLAT with recall applications against the 10 October order. It also applied to condone a three-day delay in filing those applications. Its case was that a Supreme Court ruling already barred Section 4 in this situation.

That ruling was Tata Steel Ltd v Raj Kumar Banerjee, reported at (2025) 9 SCC 483. It held that ‘prescribed period’ in Section 4 means the period of limitation and nothing else.

Any further period during which a tribunal has discretion to allow an appeal is not part of the prescribed period. The benefit of a closed court therefore applies only where the appeal is filed within the prescribed period.

On 10 February 2026 the NCLAT condoned Lulu’s three-day delay but dismissed the recall applications. It said its earlier order was passed on merits after hearing both sides. It could not be recalled on fresh material.

The NCLAT added that a precedent giving a different ruling, cited after the order, was no reason to recall it. Such a plea, it said, did not amount to an error apparent on the face of the record. Lulu, it said, should use whatever other remedies the law offered.

Lulu appealed to the Supreme Court. On 16 March 2026 the Court stayed the proceedings in the two company appeals before the NCLAT.

Tata Steel was decided months earlier

The bench first corrected a factual premise. The NCLAT had treated Tata Steel as a decision that came after its order of 10 October 2025. In fact the Supreme Court decided it on 7 May 2025, long before.

The bench then dealt with the principle. When the Supreme Court clarifies a statutory provision, it said, that “would be the law of the land” (para 9). A contrary order passed earlier by a court or tribunal is not saved by that fact, unless it has attained finality.

Recall without a power of review

The bench accepted that the NCLAT has no power of review under the IBC. It does, however, hold the power to recall its orders under its inherent jurisdiction, in Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016.

For this the Supreme Court pointed to Union Bank of India (erstwhile Corporation Bank) v Dinkar T Venkatasubramanian, a decision of a five-member bench of the NCLAT. It held that although the tribunal cannot review a judgment, it can entertain a recall application in exercise of inherent jurisdiction on sufficient grounds.

The Supreme Court had confirmed that decision in Union Bank of India v Financial Creditors of Amtek Auto Ltd. It said it agreed with the NCLAT bench and saw no reason to interfere.

More recently, in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v Prabhjit Singh Soni, a three-judge bench had reviewed the case law. A tribunal or court, it observed, has the ancillary and incidental powers needed to do justice between parties. Without a statutory provision, it can recall its orders in an appropriate case.

The NCLAT was therefore not justified, the bench held, in declining to use its inherent jurisdiction when told of the settled position on Section 4.

No sufficient cause shown

The bench added that the respondents had not shown sufficient cause for the delay in the first place. The NCLAT treated the second Saturday as ground enough to push the limit to the 46th day.

The bench pointed to an admitted fact. The appeals were e-filed on 11 May 2025, which was itself a holiday, a Sunday. E-filing could just as well have been done on 10 May.

In any event, it said, the use of Section 4 in this case was not valid in view of Tata Steel.

The finality argument fails

The respondents’ senior counsel argued that the order of 10 October 2025 had not been separately challenged and the time to do so had passed. There was no merger, he said, between that order and the one dismissing the recall applications. The condonation had therefore become final.

The bench called this a “specious argument” (para 13). The recall applications had kept the condonation alive. When the NCLAT refused to recall its order and that refusal came up in appeal, the Supreme Court could correct the position under Section 62 of the IBC.

It concluded that the NCLAT’s entertainment of the appeals was illegal, as they were filed beyond the time prescribed in Section 61(2). It also held that the tribunal had erred in failing to apply Tata Steel.

Order

The Supreme Court allowed Civil Appeals 3110 and 3111 of 2026. It set aside the NCLAT order of 10 February 2026 that rejected Lulu’s recall applications in IA 183 of 2026 and IA 232 of 2026.

The recall applications stand allowed. The common NCLAT order of 10 October 2025, which condoned the delay in IA 1139 of 2025 and IA 1141 of 2025, is set aside.

Company Appeals 388 and 389 of 2025 before the NCLAT at Chennai stand dismissed on the ground of limitation. The parties will bear their own costs.