Covered Rear Number Plate Cannot Be Cheating Under Section 420 IPC, Supreme Court Rules
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih holds that covering only a vehicle’s rear number plate lacks the essential ingredients of cheating, quashing criminal proceedings.
The Supreme Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a Hyderabad man who was booked under Section 420 of the IPC for riding a scooter with its rear number plate covered by a black mask. A division bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih found that the act of covering a rear number plate — without more — could not establish the three essential ingredients of cheating: dishonest intention, inducement of a person, and delivery or destruction of property. The Court allowed the appeal on 28 July 2026, setting aside the Telangana High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR, and clarified that the appellant’s liability under the Motor Vehicles Act for the regulatory breach remained intact.
How the Case Reached the Supreme Court
On 5 June 2020 at around 5:00 pm, Mohammed Abdul Ahad was stopped by a patrol officer in Hyderabad. He was riding a black Honda Activa with the rear number plate covered by a black mask. A First Information Report bearing No.90/2020 was lodged against him under Section 420 of the IPC and Section 80(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on the allegation that he had deceived the police by attempting to avoid traffic challans. A chargesheet was filed on 19 August 2020, and a Magistrate took cognizance, registering the matter as C.C. No.7840/2020 before the VIIth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Nampally, Hyderabad.
In September 2025, Ahad filed a petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) before the High Court of Telangana at Hyderabad seeking quashing of the proceedings. By its order dated 22 September 2025, the High Court dismissed the petition. It held that a prima facie case was made out and that the appellant could not have masked the number plate under any circumstances. Ahad then approached the Supreme Court, where leave was granted.
Arguments Before the Court
Counsel for Ahad argued that the ingredients of Section 420 IPC were wholly absent. The sole allegation was that the rear number plate was covered. There was no inducement, no wrongful gain or loss, and no delivery of property. Counsel pointed out that if there had been any actual intention to avoid detection, the front number plate would also have been covered — the fact that only the rear plate was masked was itself inconsistent with a planned scheme of evasion.
On the Motor Vehicles Act charge, counsel submitted that Section 80(a) of the MV Act does not exist as a provision. Rule 80-A of the Telangana Motor Vehicles Rules deals with improper display of a number plate, and at most, the general provision under Section 177 of the MV Act could be invoked. That section provides for a penalty of Rs.500 for a first offence and Rs.1,500 for a second offence for violation of any provision of the Act or rules thereunder — a regulatory penalty, not a criminal offence.
The State supported the High Court’s order and pressed for dismissal of the appeal, contending that a prima facie case had been made out.
The Legal Framework: Bhajan Lal and the Threshold for Quashing
The Court applied the settled position from State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), which set out the categories of cases where the power to quash proceedings ought to be exercised. The first and most directly applicable category is where the allegations, even if taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence against the accused.
The bench reproduced paragraph 102 of Bhajan Lal in full, including all seven categories. The first category — that allegations on their face disclose no offence — was the one the Court applied to the facts here.
Why Section 420 IPC Was Not Made Out
The Court set out the three essential ingredients of the offence under Section 420 IPC: dishonest intention, inducement of a person, and delivery of property or alteration or destruction of a valuable security. Applying these to the facts, the bench found none of them satisfied.
There was no material on record to show that covering the rear number plate was done with a dishonest intention, or that the act induced any person and caused wrongful gain or loss. The Court described the prosecution’s reasoning — that the number plate was covered to avoid challans, or that detection of a future crime would be difficult — as “at best, speculative.”
The bench went further. It held that the selective covering of only the rear number plate, while leaving the front plate visible and legible, was itself inconsistent with any planned scheme to evade identification. This factual detail cut against the existence of a dishonest intention. The Court was direct on the boundary between a regulatory breach and a criminal offence: the obstruction of a number plate under the MV Act and its rules “cannot be dressed as an offence under Section 420 of the IPC without establishing the essential ingredients as required.”
The Court therefore held that the allegations, even taken at face value, did not constitute the offence of cheating, and that continuing the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
The Motor Vehicles Act Position
The Court accepted the submission that Section 80(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as cited in the FIR does not exist as a provision. The applicable rule is Rule 80-A of the Telangana Motor Vehicles Rules, governing improper display of a number plate. Any prosecution for such a breach would at most fall under the general penalty provision of Section 177 of the MV Act, carrying a fine of Rs.500 for a first offence and Rs.1,500 for a second.
While quashing the criminal proceedings, the Court was careful to preserve this regulatory liability. It directed that the quashing shall not affect the appellant’s obligation to pay the penalty under Section 177 of the MV Act, and directed him to deposit the penalty before the concerned authority within one month from the date of the order, if not already done.
Outcome
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. The impugned order of the High Court of Telangana dated 22 September 2025 was set aside. The proceedings arising out of FIR No.90/2020 and pending before the VIIth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally, Hyderabad as C.C. No.7840/2020 stand quashed. The appellant remains liable to deposit the penalty under Section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act within one month, if not already paid. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.