Death sentence to acquittal: Supreme Court says disowned police statements cannot prove murder
Justice Satish Chandra Sharma and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh acquitted a man of killing two widows in a Haryana village, holding that the courts below used Section 161 statements as proof of guilt.
A trial court sentenced Naresh to death for murdering two widows in a Bhiwani village. Every private witness who could have named him then told the court they knew nothing. On 16 November, the Supreme Court acquitted him, because the courts below had filled that silence with police statements the witnesses had disowned.
Justice Satish Chandra Sharma wrote the judgment for a bench that also included Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh. The court set aside the conviction under Sections 302, 449, 297 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code. It also set aside the compensation order and directed his release if in custody.
Two widows found dead in a village chowk
On the night of 17 April 2011, two widows of village Ranila in Bhiwani district, Haryana, were found dead at their homes along the Post Office chowk. Suman, about 35, lived alone; her son Nakul was in a hostel. Shakuntla, about 40, was the widow of the appellant’s paternal uncle.
The prosecution said both women were attacked in the chowk and their bodies dragged into their houses. FIR No. 23 was registered at Police Station Baund Kalan under Section 302 IPC on the statement of a village panch, Kailash Chander (PW-7), naming only Naresh.
PW-7 did not claim to have seen anything. His statement said only that he came to know later that Naresh had done it, without saying from whom.
The weapon that changed after the post-mortem
Until the post-mortem, the danda was the weapon in every version. The FIR, both inquest reports and Naresh’s first disclosure statement all spoke of it. The crime scene report recorded that the women had been beaten to death.
The post-mortem on 18 April found that every fatal injury on both women was an incised, bone-deep wound. The doctor later opined that these could not have been caused by a blunt weapon such as a danda.
On 21 April, with Naresh in police custody since his arrest on 18 April, a second disclosure was recorded. It said he had used a gandasi hidden in a room in his field, and it was recovered the next day.
His co-accused Subhash, alias Tinku, made a parallel second disclosure leading to an axe. The doctor gave identical opinions on both weapons.
Twenty-two witnesses, none who could help
The prosecution examined 22 witnesses before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani. Every private witness who could speak to the killing or to Naresh’s role turned hostile. That included the informant, the village Lambardar, a relative of Suman and her son Nakul, about 11 when he testified.
Hukam Singh, the father of Subhash, had told the police he saw Naresh beating both women. In court he denied making any such statement. Nakul had told the police he saw both men beat his mother; in court he said he did not see anybody hurt her.
The trial court relied on the earlier statements anyway. It reasoned that the witnesses had recanted because they were relatives or neighbours of the accused, and called the crime an honour killing. On 20 February 2013 it convicted both men on all charges and sentenced each to death.
How the High Court split the two accused
The Punjab and Haryana High Court heard the death reference with the appeals. It acquitted Subhash: he was not named in the FIR, the clothes recovered from him did not connect him, and his axe disclosure came only after the post-mortem showed incised wounds.
It upheld Naresh’s conviction because his name was in the FIR, and used Nakul’s earlier statement against him alone for the same reason. It held the case was not one of the rarest of rare and commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.
On the mismatch between danda and wounds, the High Court suggested that Naresh possibly used both blunt and sharp weapons. Naresh appealed through the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee, and leave was granted on 5 May 2014.
What each side argued
Counsel for Naresh argued that the conviction rested on no admissible evidence. The FIR was hearsay, Section 162 forbids using police statements as proof, and no link in the chain was complete. The reasons for acquitting Subhash, counsel added, applied equally to Naresh, who had been in custody since 18 April 2011.
Counsel for the State said the statements were recorded within hours and consistently named Naresh, and the witnesses resiled only because they were relatives or neighbours. The State relied on the Bhagwan Dass decision and urged restraint over concurrent findings under Article 136.
The question the court asked
The bench framed one principal issue. It then split it into five questions: whether the FIR and police statements could prove involvement and motive; whether the disclosures and recoveries were proved under Section 27 of the Evidence Act; what the medical and forensic evidence showed; whether Sections 449, 297 and 201 survived; and whether parity with Subhash applied.
“The principal issue for consideration is whether the prosecution has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, a complete chain of circumstances pointing only to the guilt of the Appellant.” (para 28)
Section 162 permits one use, not this
Section 162(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure bars the use of a police statement for any purpose, save one. The proviso lets the accused, or the prosecution with the court’s leave, use it to contradict the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act.
The bench drew on the Constitution Bench in Tahsildar Singh for the reason behind the bar.
Where a witness denies part of an earlier statement, that part must be proved through the officer who recorded it. Even then, a proved contradiction only damages the witness’s credit. It does not make the earlier statement evidence of what it says.
Every statement relied on here was recorded by the police, and none by a Magistrate under Section 164. Both courts below had used the statements as proof of their contents, which the bench called an error of law striking at the root of the conviction.
The contradictions were not even proved. PW-17, the investigating officer, said only that he had recorded the statements. One statement, attributed to PW-8 (Parveen) and dated 22 April, mentions the axe and gandasi that surfaced only on 21 and 22 April, though PW-8 said he never met the police after 18 April.
Cases the lower courts read too broadly
In Bhagwan Dass, the bench said, the conviction rested on independently proved circumstances, and the Constitution Bench ruling in Tahsildar Singh was not placed before the court. It cannot stand for treating a hostile witness’s police statement as substantive evidence.
The hostile-witness decisions in Ramesh Prasad Misra, Zakir and Himanshu hold only that a hostile witness’s court testimony is not rejected wholesale. None treats what he told the police as proof. Here no witness implicated Naresh in court, before or after being declared hostile.
“There is, in effect, no grain to be separated from the chaff.” (para 39)
Trimukh Maroti Kirkan did not help either. It explains why neighbours may be reluctant to depose, which can account for scarce evidence but cannot supply it. It also concerned a death inside a matrimonial home, where the accused must explain; the Ranila killings were alleged to have happened in an open chowk.
The loyalty explanation did not fit
The courts below said the witnesses turned hostile out of loyalty to the accused. The Supreme Court found that PW-9 and PW-10 were related to the deceased Shakuntla as much as to Naresh. PW-15 and Nakul belonged to the family of the deceased Suman.
The High Court had grouped Nakul with the neighbours. The bench said nothing on record suggested he was won over, and the Public Prosecutor never put that to him.
The trial court had also said the whole locality must have seen the killing, and treated the lack of any rescue as aggravating the death sentence. Yet the only people said to have seen it were a relative of both sides and a child.
The two unrelated locals, PW-7 and PW-8, did not claim even to the police that they saw it.
An FIR that is hearsay on its face
An FIR is not substantive evidence. It can only corroborate or contradict its maker, and PW-7 did not support it. The investigating officer admitted PW-7 was no eyewitness, so even an affirmed FIR would have been hearsay.
The High Court had called the FIR a binding document because PW-7 admitted his signature. The bench disagreed. A signature proves that he made the statement, not that what unnamed persons told him is true.
It also noted the High Court’s inconsistency. Nakul’s statement was accepted against Naresh because the FIR named him, and rejected against Subhash because it did not. A statement that is not substantive evidence cannot be evidence against one accused and something less against another.
Nakul’s silence and the motive that vanished
The trial court read Nakul’s silence as confirming his earlier statement, relying on Krishna Master, which accepted a child eyewitness. The bench said the child there narrated what he saw in court and withstood cross-examination. Nakul gave no evidence of the occurrence at all.
The police remand application filed the day after his statement did not mention him as an eyewitness. The motive finding fell with the same material, since no witness said in court that Naresh held the belief attributed to him.
The prosecution’s motive was also inconsistent. Subhash’s disclosure gave a different reason, an alleged relationship between Suman and his younger brother. That part of a disclosure is a confession to a police officer and inadmissible under Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.
Disclosures never narrated in evidence
Section 27 of the Evidence Act admits only so much of an accused’s information as relates distinctly to the fact discovered. Applying Ramanand alias Nandlal Bharti, the bench said the investigating officer must depose to the exact words the accused used. Neither PW-17 nor PW-20 did; the memoranda were exhibited but the information was never narrated.
The danda recovery of 20 April was attested only by police officials. PW-17 said many people were present but none was joined because they showed their helplessness. More fundamentally, the danda was unconnected with the fatal injuries, since the only blunt-weapon injuries were a bruise on Suman’s thigh and an abrasion on Shakuntla’s shoulder, both possible by dragging.
The High Court had rejected Subhash’s axe disclosure because it was ascribed to him once the officer realised the injuries were from a sharp weapon. The Supreme Court said the same reasoning applied with greater force to Naresh’s gandasi disclosure, recorded the same day by the same officers after the same post-mortem.
The High Court’s only answer was the idea of two weapons.
“That is a conjecture and not a finding on evidence.” (para 56)
The only non-police witness to the gandasi recovery, PW-21 (Narender, a nephew of Shakuntla), came to the village on 22 April. He put the recovery in the morning, while the police put it in the evening, and placed the axe at Shakuntla’s house rather than Subhash’s.
A photograph also showed a knife near Suman’s body although the inquest recorded that nothing was found there. It was never seized or examined. The bench said it was saying nothing on what the knife signified.
What the doctor and laboratory could not say
The doctor’s opinion that the gandasi could have caused the injuries was identical to his opinion on the axe, which the High Court had discarded. An opinion that two weapons could each have caused the injuries shows capability, not use.
The Forensic Science Laboratory found human blood on Naresh’s clothes and the danda, but the blood group was inconclusive every time. On the gandasi the material had disintegrated and could not even be called human. The wooden thapi lifted from the spot was never sent to the laboratory.
The bench accepted that a blood-group match is not always required, citing Balwan Singh. That holds only if recovery is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the investigation is untainted. Neither condition was met here.
Several circumstances, including the forensic findings, the motive and Nakul’s statement, were also never put to Naresh under Section 313 CrPC. He was never asked to explain the blood on his clothes.
Why the chain did not hold
The bench recalled the five conditions for a circumstantial case from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda. It then listed what remained against Naresh. The deaths were homicidal, which points to no one.
The danda was unconnected, the clothes bore unidentified blood, and the gandasi came through an unreliable second disclosure and inconsistent evidence.
There was no admissible motive, and nobody saw him with the women or near the spot that night. Together these gave rise to suspicion at best, which the court said cannot take the place of proof. Where evidence admits two possibilities, the one favouring the accused must be adopted.
The charges under Sections 449, 297 and 201 IPC fell with the murder charge. The housebreaking finding rested on Nakul’s statement and a loose remark in the crime scene report. The dragging of bodies rested on no drag marks: the scientific officer prepared no site plan showing any, and PW-8 saw none.
Parity with the acquitted co-accused
The High Court distinguished Naresh from Subhash only because his name appeared in the FIR and police statements. Applying Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi, the bench said that once those materials were excluded, the evidence against the two was of the same kind and quality.
Each had made a first disclosure leading to blood-stained clothes of unknown group. Each made a second disclosure after the same post-mortem leading to a sharp weapon, on which the doctor gave the same opinion. Nakul named both together and did not support it in court.
The bench said it is slow to interfere with concurrent findings, but where they rest on material the law does not permit to be used, interference is necessary. It acknowledged that two women were brutally killed and their families waited more than fifteen years. A murder conviction, it said, must rest on evidence the law admits.
Order
The appeals are allowed and Naresh is acquitted of all charges. The High Court’s judgment of 8 October 2013, to the extent it upheld his conviction, is set aside, as are the trial court’s judgment of 20 February 2013 and sentencing order of 28 February 2013.
He is to be released forthwith unless required in another case. If on bail, his bonds and sureties are discharged. The Section 357 CrPC compensation order is set aside and any fine deposited is to be refunded.
The bench recommended that the District Legal Services Authority, Bhiwani, consider compensation for the legal representatives of Suman and Shakuntla under the victim compensation scheme, now under Section 396 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. The Registry is to communicate the judgment forthwith to the trial court and the jail Superintendent. There is no order as to costs.