Justice D. Datta Justice S.C. Sharma Civil Appeal A claim defined at Rs 2 crorecannot grow to Rs 17 crore
[ Supreme Court ]

Rs 11.7 crore award cut to Rs 2 crore: Supreme Court finds umpire went beyond the reference

Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma restored the Calcutta High Court Single Judge, who had held the umpire exceeded his jurisdiction, and treated Rs 4 crore already paid as full satisfaction.

In October 1989, GMB Ceramics nominated its arbitrator to decide a claim of over Rs 2 crore. The claim the umpire finally decided ran to Rs 17.16 crore, and the award was Rs 11.69 crore with 15 per cent interest. On 18 November the Supreme Court held that the reference had never been that wide.

Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma allowed appeals by Neycer (India) Ltd. They set aside a Calcutta High Court Division Bench judgment and restored the Single Judge’s order, which had confined the award to Rs 2 crore.

How the claim grew to Rs 17 crore

The dispute began with an agreement of 29 November 1986, amended on 26 June 1987, under which Neycer, formerly Neiveli Ceramics and Refractories Limited, was to help GMB set up a ceramics plant. GMB later claimed project overrun and losses. Its statement of claim of 16 April 1990 sought Rs 8,82,73,000.

After amendments the claim reached Rs 17,16,57,000 under six schedules. The Umpire made his award on 23 June 1999. It gave GMB Rs 11,69,62,910 with interest at 15 per cent a year.

Neycer challenged the award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. On 14 October 2015 a Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court restricted it to Rs 2 crore. On 24 September 2018 a Division Bench reversed him in an intra-court appeal and restored the whole award.

Neycer came to the Supreme Court, which granted special leave on 21 September 2021. The appeals were argued by Mr Amit Sibal, Senior Counsel, for Neycer and Mr Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Counsel, for GMB.

Four questions for the bench

The court said it would not repeat the facts, which both High Court judgments had set out. It framed four issues. The first asked whether the Division Bench erred in undoing the Single Judge’s finding that the claims were limited and that the Umpire exceeded his jurisdiction:

“in the arbitral reference were restricted to Rs.2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) and that the Umpire exceeded his jurisdiction in awarding sums beyond that limit” (para 5)

The others covered the setting aside of Schedule C on merits, the Umpire’s reading of Clause 20 of the agreement, and whether the Rs 2 crore the Single Judge upheld needed any interference.

Error within jurisdiction or beyond it

The court recalled that a judge hearing objections under Section 30 does not sit in appeal over an umpire’s findings or re-appraise evidence. But there is a clear difference between an error within jurisdiction and one in excess of it.

Relying on Sudarsan Trading Co., Associated Engineering Co. and Bharat Coking Coal, it described an umpire as a creature of the contract and the reference.

An error in construing the contract is within his powers. Wandering outside the contract or widening the reference is not.

A dispute about the scope of the submission lies outside the award, the court said. It must be decided by the court on an objective look at the documents constituting the reference.

What the telexes showed

The Division Bench had treated the question as one of a plausible reading of the pre-reference correspondence. The Supreme Court called that an error, since an umpire cannot give himself jurisdiction by misreading the reference.

GMB had quantified its project cost overrun at Rs 2 crore in telexes of 28 August, 4 September and 11 September 1989. On 6 October 1989, after Neycer invoked arbitration, GMB said the matter now boiled down to its claim for the overrun amount only.

On 19 October 1989 GMB nominated its arbitrator for adjudication of its claim for over Rs 2 crore for all losses sustained. A letter of 24 October 1989, five days later, repeated the Rs 2 crore overrun claim. For marketing assistance and the brand name it only reserved its rights.

Reading these together, the bench found no doubt that GMB had nominated its arbitrator for a quantified claim of Rs 2 crore. Once the reference crystallised, GMB could not widen it by a later letter. A reservation of rights to claim damages in future was not a reference of an existing dispute.

Why the Division Bench’s other reasons failed

The Division Bench had relied on Juggilal Kamlapat and Asis Ranjan Mohanty. The Supreme Court distinguished both.

The first involved a general submission of a breach and price difference with no money cap. In the second, the reference was not confined to the amount first mentioned.

Here, the bench said, GMB itself defined and limited the money value of its reference. It also rejected two subsidiary reasons. One was that Neycer’s letter of 19 September 1989, which mentioned any other dispute between the parties, kept the scope open.

The other was that Neycer, having contested every claim on merits, could not complain about scope. The court said Neycer’s letter only called on GMB to nominate an arbitrator, and GMB then restricted its own dispute.

Neycer had also objected from the start, in its rebuttal statement and additional counter statement, that claims above Rs 2 crore were outside the reference.

“does not amount to waiver or confer jurisdiction by acquiescence” (para 13)

That is how the court described contesting claims on merits without prejudice to a pleaded jurisdictional objection. The first issue was decided against GMB.

The Rs 2.03 crore brand claim

Under Schedule C, GMB claimed Rs 3.5 crore for being stopped from using the logo “GMB-NEYCER”, saying it needed Rs 70 lakh a year for five years of advertising. The Umpire relied on one estimate of 3 April 1990 from an advertising agency.

He assessed spending at Rs 50 lakh a year, or Rs 2.5 crore, deducted Rs 46,57,000 as the 2 per cent royalty payable to Neycer, and awarded Rs 2,03,43,000.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Single Judge that the claim also failed on merits, as speculative and based on no evidence.

By the time of the award in June 1999 the five years had long ended. GMB’s audited accounts showed actual spending on advertisement, publicity and films of only Rs 35,31,794 across 1988-89 to 1992-93. Its plant was shut from October 1991 to August 1993.

Nobody from the advertising agency was examined. On Schedule B, the court noted, the Umpire himself had refused anticipated expenditure unsupported by actual figures, and then used the opposite yardstick for Schedule C. GMB’s real spending was lower than the royalty deductible, so it had no net loss.

Clause 20 and the limit of the role

Clause 20 said that, subject to delivery of equipment, the consultants were to endeavour to commission the plant within 18 months of sanction of the term loan.

Mr Sibal argued that Neycer was only to advise and assist, for a fee of Rs 20 lakh of which Rs 18 lakh was reinvested in GMB’s equity, leaving Rs 2 lakh in cash.

The Umpire had treated the project as a joint venture. On that footing he awarded five years of projected profit under Schedule E, Rs 3,46,45,000, and five years of interest on GMB’s term loans from December 1989 to March 1994 under Schedule F, Rs 4,56,99,000.

The court found substantial force in this. On the Umpire’s own finding, the delay was seven months, from the extended date of 31 January 1989 to August 1989.

Neycer could not be treated as a partner underwriting profits and loan interest, even for the months when the plant was shut for labour problems and a power disconnection by the Orissa State Electricity Board.

“a turnkey guarantee or an insurance policy” (para 20)

The Umpire, it said, could not read Clause 20 and the agreement as that.

What survived under Section 30

Neycer also wanted the whole award set aside. The court examined its remaining challenges itself, rather than remand a dispute that had run for nearly four decades, and found no ground to interfere with the Rs 2 crore the Single Judge upheld.

Neycer’s plea that it owed no enforceable obligation at all, and its objections on the date of loan sanction, the tunnel kiln and a senior technician under Clause 10, asked the court to re-appreciate evidence. The Umpire’s findings rested on the 1987 addendum, the feasibility report and the minutes of December 1988.

The Umpire had held that the IFCI letter of intent of 19 May 1987 was the sanction, so the 18 months expired on 19 November 1988 and were extended to 31 January 1989. He found GMB had not defaulted on equipment and that Neycer failed to keep a senior technician on site after August 1988.

Clause 13, which said Neycer need not provide additional funds for an overrun, only capped its capital contribution at Rs 18 lakh. It did not shield Neycer from damages for breach.

The sustained claims were Schedule A, Rs 39,14,910 for idle costs during the seven-month delay; Schedule D, Rs 1,23,61,000 for lower price realisation after missing marketing help; and Schedule E, scaled down to Rs 37,24,090. Together they equal Rs 2 crore.

Because these schedules are distinct and severable, the court held, the valid part was rightly kept after severing the excess, citing Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. Neycer’s other points, on the 1993 amendments to the claim and a 2011-12 one-time settlement with GMB’s lenders, were academic.

Orders of the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction of 11 February 2003 and the BIFR scheme of 6 October 2008 gave no ground under Section 30. The scheme treated GMB’s claim as a contingent liability, and Neycer’s own accounts carried it as one.

Order

The Division Bench judgment is set aside and the Single Judge’s order of 14 October 2015, restricting the award to Rs 2 crore in principal, is restored.

Under interim orders of 22 November 2018 and 7 January 2019, Neycer deposited Rs 2 crore as principal and Rs 2 crore as interest. GMB withdrew the entire Rs 4 crore in January 2019.

The court directed that this sum be treated as full and final satisfaction of the award as modified. Nothing more is recoverable by either side.

GMB’s undertaking stands discharged. The appeals are disposed of, connected applications stand disposed of, and parties bear their own costs.