Haryana's 2002 Remission Policy Flows From Article 161, Cannot Be Overridden by Statutory 2008 Policy, Holds Supreme Court

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh rules that Haryana's 2002 remission policy derives from the Governor's constitutional pardon power, not statute, making the 2008 policy's supersession clause legally untenable.

The Supreme Court has held that Haryana's “Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002” dated 12 April 2002 is an exercise of the Governor's power under Article 161 of the Constitution of India, and that the subsequent “Premature Release of Life Convicts 2008” policy, being a statutory instrument under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, cannot override or supersede it. The ruling, delivered on 1 July 2026 in Parveen Kumar @ Parveen Chauhan v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2026 INSC 667), directly affects the remission eligibility of a life convict who had served over 13 years of actual imprisonment. It also declares, for the first time in this line of cases, that the coordinate bench decision in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar is per incuriam to the extent it treated the 2002 Policy as statutory, since a larger bench in State of Haryana v. Jagdish had already held otherwise on an identical policy.

From Conviction to a Contested Remission Claim

Parveen Kumar was convicted for the murder of a 12-year-old child. On 3 January 2009, in connection with FIR No. 670 of 2007 dated 25 September 2007 lodged at PS City, Gurgaon, he was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code 1860, five years under Section 365 IPC, and two years under Section 201 IPC.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court, by judgment dated 16 July 2013, partially allowed his appeal and set aside the conviction under Section 365 IPC. His further appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed on 15 September 2015 and has attained finality.

On 26 May 2022, Parveen Kumar filed a representation seeking premature release on the basis of the 2002 Policy, claiming he had served 14 years of actual imprisonment. No response came. He then filed a writ petition, which was disposed of on 16 August 2022 with a direction to the prison authorities to decide his representation within three months.

The representation was eventually decided on 20 October 2022. It was rejected on two grounds: first, that the appellant would be governed by the 2008 Policy and not the 2002 Policy; and second, that as on 21 September 2022 he had completed only 13 years, 7 months, and 16 days of actual imprisonment and 16 years, 5 months, and 16 days of total imprisonment — short of the 2008 Policy's thresholds of twenty years of actual sentence and twenty-five years of total sentence.

He filed a second writ petition placing reliance on the three-judge bench decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish. That petition was dismissed on 27 January 2025. The present criminal appeal arose from that dismissal.

Two Competing Policies, Two Competing Sources of Power

The central question before the Court was narrow: which policy governed the appellant's remission application — the 2002 Policy or the 2008 Policy?

The appellant's position was that the 2002 Policy was issued under Article 161, a constitutional power of the Governor. Since a constitutional power is distinct from and superior to a statutory one, the 2008 Policy, explicitly framed under Section 432 and Section 433 of the CrPC, could not displace it. He also argued that a more liberal policy in force on the date of consideration of his case should enure to his benefit, and that Raj Kumar had no binding force because it was decided by a coordinate bench and ran contrary to Jagdish, which was decided by a bench of three judges.

The State countered that Raj Kumar had found both the 2002 and 2008 Policies to be statutory in nature, that the latter superseded the former, and that since the 2008 Policy alone was in force on the date of conviction, the appellant could claim no benefit under the 2002 Policy.

Reading the Text of the Policies Side by Side

The Court carried out a careful textual and structural comparison of the successive Haryana remission policies, tracing their lineage from 1971 through 2008. The exercise produced a clear demarcation.

Both the 2000 and 2002 Policies state expressly that cases are to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution of India. The 2008 Policy, by contrast, states that papers shall be put up before the Chief Minister for orders under Section 432 of the CrPC. The Court found this to be decisive: it “clearly shows the constitutional ambit of the former and statutory ambit of the latter.”

The Court then compared the 1993 Policy and the 2002 Policy in tabular form. Both were internal circulars issued by the Commissioner and Secretary, Haryana Jails Department, addressed to the Director General of Prisons. Both directed that cases be placed before the State Level Committee and thereafter before the Governor through the Minister for Jails and the Chief Minister — specifically for orders under Article 161. The language in the operative paragraphs was, in the Court's assessment, identical in their constitutional grounding.

The Court then compared the 2002 Policy against the 2008 Policy. The 2008 Policy stated on its face that it was issued “in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 432 read with Section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.” It designated the Chief Minister as the authority, and it expressly superseded all earlier policies including the 2002 Policy. The 2002 Policy had no such statutory attribution, and its operative paragraph directed cases to the Governor for orders under Article 161.

Why Raj Kumar Was Held Per Incuriam

The Court's reasoning on precedent is among the most consequential parts of the judgment. In State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, a two-judge coordinate bench had held that the 2002 Policy, despite seeking the Governor's approval, was merely a departmental memo traceable to the provisions of the CrPC, and therefore statutory. It placed both the 2002 and 2008 Policies on equal footing as statutory instruments, with the latter superseding the former.

The three-judge bench in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, however, had already held that the 1993 Policy was in exercise of Article 161 powers of the Governor, that it was constitutionally grounded, and that a statutory policy like the 2008 Policy could not override it. Jagdish had further held that if a more liberal policy prevailed on the date of consideration of a life convict's case for premature release, the convict should be given the benefit of it.

The Court in the present case found that the 1993 and 2002 Policies were, in all material respects, identical in their constitutional source of power. Both routed cases to the Governor through the same procedural chain and for orders under Article 161. If the 1993 Policy was constitutionally grounded, the inescapable conclusion was that the 2002 Policy bore the same character.

Raj Kumar, by treating the 2002 Policy as statutory without reconciling this with Jagdish's express holding on the identical 1993 Policy, fell foul of the reasoning of the larger bench. The Court set out the conditions for a judgment being per incuriam: it applies where the ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier decision by an equal or larger bench, or where a relevant provision was not placed before the Court. A bench of lesser strength cannot dissent from the view of a larger bench.

Applying those principles, the Court held that Raj Kumar was per incuriam to the extent it characterised the 2002 Policy as statutory. Since Jagdish, decided by a three-judge bench, was already a controlling precedent, no reference to a larger bench was necessary.

The Constitutional Power of the Governor Cannot Be Overridden by Statute

The Court was direct in articulating the constitutional principle at stake. A statutory policy, even if validly enacted, cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161 of the Constitution. That power is “distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature.”

The 2008 Policy's declaration that it supersedes the 2002 Policy and all earlier policies is, therefore, legally untenable in so far as it purports to displace a constitutionally grounded exercise of gubernatorial power. Two distinct and separate policies would now operate in Haryana: the 2002 Policy, under Article 161, and the 2008 Policy, under Section 432 CrPC.

The Court left it to the State to determine how it wishes to proceed with two concurrent remission frameworks in operation.

Prospective Operation and the Appellant's Entitlement

The Court clarified that its findings would apply prospectively. They would not operate to reopen remission applications that had already been decided. For the appellant specifically, the Court held that the 2002 Policy would still have its effect. Under that policy, the lesser period of actual imprisonment would make him eligible for consideration of remission. The holding in Jagdish — that a more liberal policy in force on the date of consideration must be applied — would govern.

Order

The appeal was allowed. The State of Haryana was directed to take a decision on the appellant's remission application, consistent with the judgment, within four weeks from the date of the order dated 1 July 2026. The Registry was directed to send a copy of the judgment to the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana, within four days, for onward action by the appropriate authority. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.