The POCSO presumption shifts the onus, it does not tilt how a court reads the evidence
Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria set aside a ten-year sentence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, holding the presumption falls away once the prosecution case is found empty.
Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 presume certain things against an accused once a prosecution is launched. On 17 September 2026 the Supreme Court set out what those provisions do not do: they do not entitle a court to read the evidence with a thumb on the scale. Setting aside a conviction confirmed by the Delhi High Court, the Bench held that a presumption operates at the threshold to shift the onus, and ceases to be effective once the prosecution case is found to be evidentially empty or to border on perversity. On that reasoning the appellant was acquitted.
The prosecution case and the sentence
The complaint was lodged on 11 December 2015 at Kalkaji Police Station by the mother of the child, who was about two and a half years old. Her case was that on the evening of 9 December 2015 the child, while playing at about 5.30 pm, went to the appellant's jhuggi next to her own. When the child did not return, the complainant went looking for her and learnt from her brother-in-law that the appellant had taken the child to a park for an outing. She reached the park at about 6.30 pm, found the appellant with her daughter, and brought the child home, where she went to sleep. On waking at about 7 pm the child began to cry and pull at her clothing, and blood was noticed.
The Additional Sessions Judge sitting as the designated Special Court at Saket, New Delhi, convicted the appellant on 21 August 2023 under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and acquitted him under Section 506. For the offence under Section 6 he was sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 5,000, and for the offence under Section 363 to one year's rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 3,000. Of the total fine of Rs 8,000, the trial court directed that Rs 7,000 be paid to the child as compensation. The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal by a common judgment of 3 July 2025.
What the Court found in the record
On its own assessment of the material, the Court held that the evidence led by the prosecution carried inconsistencies, improbabilities and material contradictions. The medical evidence, it found, was non-corroborative in all respects and pointed away from the commission of the offence by the appellant. The defence version, by contrast, was cogent, and its evidentiary value had the effect of displacing the prosecution's account.
Taking the evidence as a whole, the Court held that it could hardly be said that the prosecution had proved the guilt of the appellant, much less beyond reasonable doubt.
How far a statutory presumption can carry a case
The substantial part of the judgment addresses the role of the presumptive provisions. Where an issue concerning the liberty of an individual has to be dealt with, the Court said, the court must be extra careful and cautious, and must undertake an objective assessment and appreciation of the evidence. In deciding whether an accused is entitled to an acquittal, a court should not overweigh itself with provisions such as Section 29 or Section 30 of the POCSO Act.
The existence of a presumptive provision in a statute does not change the standards by which evidence is appreciated. The court is not expected to influence itself by that provision so as to lean towards the prosecution while analysing and interpreting the evidence. The presumption has its play at the primary stage, with the effect of shifting the onus on to the accused; but once evidential emptiness is found in the prosecution case, or the prosecution version lacks credibility or borders on perversity, the presumption of guilt no longer remains effective.
The accused, correspondingly, must be given full room to prove the contrary, both to displace the presumption and to demolish the prosecution case. In this case, the Court held, the appellant had succeeded in rebutting the prosecution story. Even if Sections 29 and 30 initially operated to raise a presumption against him, the state of the evidence meant that it could not survive.
The principle the Court applied
The judgment invokes the familiar proposition that where guilt is not proved, “the public interest and the interest of the accused alike require an acquittal”. The Court's point in quoting it here is that the proposition is not displaced by a statute that contains a presumption; it is the standard against which the effect of the presumption is measured.
Order
The judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated 3 July 2025, confirming the trial court's conviction and sentence under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, was set aside. The appellant was held not guilty and acquitted of those offences, and directed to be released forthwith if in custody, unless his custody is required in connection with any other offence. The appeals were allowed.