Rejection of Section 156(3) application does not bar a later FIR, holds Supreme Court

A bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria held that refusing a Section 156(3) plea is no adjudication on merits and cannot bar a subsequent FIR on the same allegations.

The Supreme Court has held that an order rejecting an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not amount to a final adjudication on the merits, and therefore cannot bar the later registration of an FIR founded on the same or substantially similar allegations. Deciding a criminal appeal by Pramod Kumar Shukla, a bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and N.V. Anjaria dismissed his challenge to an FIR registered at Prayagraj. The Court traced the statutory architecture of Sections 154, 156(3) and 190, examined the reach of res judicata in criminal proceedings, and confirmed that the police duty to register and investigate a cognizable offence flows independently from the Code. The judgment matters because it settles that a threshold refusal to order investigation does not extinguish the statutory obligation recognised in Lalita Kumari.

How the dispute reached the Court

The complainant alleged that Shukla represented that he had influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure clerk appointments for the complainant’s son and grandson on payment of ₹20,00,000. The complaint alleged transfers of ₹50,000, ₹25,000, ₹50,000 and ₹50,000 to Shukla’s State Bank of India account in January 2023, and that no interview was ever conducted.

According to the complainant, when repayment was sought near Prachi Hospital, Shantipuram, on 19 May 2024, Shukla abused the family and threatened to implicate and kill them. FIR No. 405/2024 was registered for offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.

Before the FIR, the complainant had filed an application under Section 156(3) before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj. The Magistrate, by order dated 11 September 2024, noted that the police report showed the dispute related to a land transaction, contrary to the employment-payment version, and rejected the application. A revision was dismissed by the Sessions Court.

Shukla then moved the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 to quash the FIR. By order dated 5 June 2025 the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that rejection of an earlier Section 156(3) application does not itself bar registration of an FIR if cognizable offences are otherwise disclosed.

What the Court held on the main issue

The Court framed the question as whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the FIR despite the earlier rejection of a Section 156(3) application on substantially the same allegations. It held the answer must be in the negative.

An order under Section 156(3), the Court explained, is confined to directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory investigative power under Chapter XII. It neither adjudicates the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or liability of the proposed accused. Rejection of such an application, rendered at the threshold, cannot be accorded the finality needed to attract res judicata so as to bar a subsequent FIR.

Reasoning on the statutory scheme and res judicata

The Court set out the graded scheme of Sections 154, 156(3) and 190. Recourse to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is a step taken where the primary recourse to the police under Section 154 has failed, while cognizance under Section 190 is a distinct and subsequent stage. Relying on Sakiri Vasu and Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy, and noting the temporal clarification in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya, it held that an order under Section 156(3) merely sets the investigative machinery in motion.

On res judicata, the Court drew on S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, authored by Justice Mishra, which reconciled earlier authorities. Decisions like Pritam Singh, Bhagat Ram and Tarachand Jain applied the doctrine where there had been a final adjudication, while Devendra and Muskan Enterprises arose in successive Section 482 petitions without any adjudication on the merits. The decisive consideration, the Court said, is the character and legal effect of the earlier proceeding.

The Court found direct support in Mahendri v. State of U.P., where it was held that declining a Section 156(3) prayer would not affect the merits of the controversy or the veracity of allegations in a later FIR. It added that the duty of the police under Sections 154 and 156 flows directly from the Code, not from a Magistrate’s direction. Citing the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari, it reiterated that where information discloses a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory.

Distinguishing the appellant’s authorities and the quashing test

The Court held that Mohan Karthik, relied on by the appellant, concerned the maintainability of a second Section 156(3) application, an issue not before it, and had no application. On the quashing prayer, it applied the settled test from Bhajan Lal, reaffirmed in Neeharika Infrastructure: the Court examines only whether the FIR, taken at face value, discloses a cognizable offence.

The FIR alleged inducement to part with money on a promise of public employment, receipt of the amounts in a bank account, forged admit cards and results, and threats when repayment was sought. The record also indicated the appellant was arraigned in five FIRs with substantially similar allegations. The Court said these allegations, accepted at face value, disclose cognizable offences warranting investigation. Contentions about the true nature of the transactions and the evidentiary worth of the audio recordings, bank records and documents were matters for trial.

Order

Finding no perversity in the High Court’s findings, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as being without merit.