Justice S.C. Sharma Justice N.K. Singh SLP Civil A third round of challenge to acoal arbitration ends
[ Supreme Court ]

Rs 348 crore coal awards stand as Supreme Court tests all nine claims against Rajasthan utility

Justices Satish Chandra Sharma and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh dismissed the power utility petition after finding no patent illegality in any claim, and held the Commercial Court had stepped beyond Section 34.

Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Limited has lost its last challenge to arbitral awards worth about Rs 348 crore in principal, in favour of its coal-mining joint venture. On 16 November the Supreme Court dismissed its special leave petition after testing each of the nine claims in turn, and found no patent illegality or perversity in any.

Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh wrote the 79-page judgment for a bench with Justice Satish Chandra Sharma. The Commercial Court in Jaipur had set the awards aside in 2023. The Rajasthan High Court restored them in May 2026.

A coal block cancelled, then handed back

The petitioner, RVUNL, is a Government of Rajasthan undertaking that generates and sells electricity. The respondent, Parsa Kente Collieries Limited (PKCL), is a joint venture company set up to develop the Parsa East and Kanta Basan coal block. It mines, washes, transports and delivers coal to RVUNL’s thermal power stations.

The Government of India allocated the block to RVUNL in June 2007. RVUNL and PKCL signed a Coal Mining and Delivery Agreement, the CMDA, on 16 July 2008, followed by an addendum on 22 September 2010. A mining lease came from Chhattisgarh on 30 May 2012, and PKCL paid the stamp duty on it.

Mining began in early 2013. Then, on 25 August 2014 and 24 September 2014, this court in Manohar Lal Sharma cancelled the allocation of 204 coal blocks, including this one. The lease fell with it, though mining was allowed to continue until 31 March 2015.

Under the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act, 2015, the Nominated Authority allocated the block to RVUNL again on 24 March 2015. Section 11(1) let an allottee continue existing contracts. RVUNL’s board resolved to adopt the CMDA, and a Supplementary Agreement followed on 29 July 2016.

Nine claims, two awards, three courts

PKCL said RVUNL had not paid or reimbursed what it owed. It invoked the arbitration clause and brought nine claims before a sole arbitrator, Justice Sudhir Kumar Katriar (retd), a former Patna High Court judge.

The Award of 15 January 2021 allowed Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 in full and Claim 5 in part, at Rs 43,59,18,563 of the Rs 58,96,93,602 claimed. It declined 24 per cent interest and gave simple interest at 11.95 per cent a year, with costs of Rs 2,19,06,176.

On PKCL’s application under Section 33(4), an Additional Award of 5 July 2021 allowed Rs 66.70 crore with interest for land acquisition in four villages. That was the first part of Claim 8, and the main Award had rejected only its fifth-village part, as premature.

Adding the principal sums awarded on Claims 1 to 8 gives about Rs 348 crore. The Commercial Court, the High Court and now this bench each went through them claim by claim.

RVUNL went to the Commercial Court under Section 34. On 20 May 2023 that court upheld the findings on Claims 1, 3 and 5 and the interest rate, but set aside those on Claims 2, 4, 6 and 7 and the Additional Award. Holding it had no power to modify an award, it set both awards aside entirely.

PKCL appealed under Section 37. By judgment of 21 May 2026 a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that the Commercial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and restored both awards. RVUNL then came to the Supreme Court, in what the bench called the third round.

Why Article 136 is a narrow door

The bench began with its own jurisdiction. Article 136, it said, is a special and residuary power of a purely discretionary nature, and is not part of the architecture of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. An award would ordinarily reach finality at the Section 37 stage.

It relied on DMRC Ltd v Delhi Airport Metro Express, which says this court must interfere sparingly and only for exceptional circumstances. It must test whether the Section 37 court failed to apply the correct tests, and not substitute its own view of the award.

Paragraph 10 sets out the principles. A Section 34 court does not sit in appeal over an award. Patent illegality means a perverse finding, meaning one based on no evidence, on irrelevant material or ignoring vital evidence, or a contract reading no fair-minded person would adopt.

It also covers an award that breaches the Act itself, such as one without reasons under Section 31(3), or breaches natural justice. The proviso to Section 34(2-A) bars setting aside an award merely for erroneous application of law or reappreciation of evidence. A Section 37 court is confined to the same grounds, and its powers are, if anything, narrower.

From this the bench framed three questions. Were the Tribunal’s findings on each claim a plausible view, free from patent illegality or perversity? Did the Commercial Court stay within Section 34, and did the High Court rightly use Section 37?

A cross-objection the court left open

RVUNL had filed no Section 37 appeal and no cross-objection, because the Commercial Court had set the awards aside on its own application. So could it still attack Claims 1, 3, 5 and 9 before the High Court? It said yes, relying on Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

On 22 April 2026 the High Court was prima facie inclined to agree, citing Rattanindia Power. It then recalled that order in view of Gayatri Balasamy.

This court did not decide the point. RVUNL had been heard exhaustively on every claim, including those four, on the merits.

Coal used up before it was tested

Claim 1 was for Rs 71,77,82,356 for coal rakes delivered between May 2016 and July 2018, which RVUNL rejected on quality. The Arbitrator found that RVUNL consumed all the coal before it received the analysis reports. That denied PKCL the chance, implicit in Clause 4.3.3, to improve quality.

He noted that RVUNL itself said it had no space to stack the rakes. Applying contra proferentem, he resolved any ambiguity against RVUNL as drafter. RVUNL had neither pleaded nor proved a loss, and its witness admitted there was no loss of generation.

RVUNL argued that Clauses 4.3.3 and 5.4.1 bar payment for rejected coal and that Clause 3.4.1 vests title in it. It also said the Award disclosed no rate or formula, in breach of Section 31(3), and that Section 70 of the Contract Act cannot apply where Clause 5.4.1 governs.

The bench said the Tribunal had not denied RVUNL’s right to reject coal. It held that coal consumed before the reports arrived was deemed accepted, and that Clause 5.4.1 covers only coal that is rejected and not consumed. That is a possible construction of the CMDA.

The finding that RVUNL failed to prove the reports and suffered no loss rested on its own witness. Reappreciation of evidence, the court said, is not permitted under Section 34 and certainly not under Section 37.

The Rs 83 crore stamp duty bill

Claim 2 was for Rs 83,47,64,575, the stamp duty and charges PKCL paid to register the fresh mining lease after the 2014 cancellation. The CMDA treats a change in law as force majeure, and the Arbitrator recorded that RVUNL’s counsel agreed a court judgment counts as one.

He held that the cancellation removed the basis on which the contract was made. PKCL had adopted the CMDA only for its residual term and obligations.

In the Supplementary Agreement RVUNL put bank guarantee charges on PKCL but not stamp duty. PKCL had also paid stamp duty once already, in 2012.

The Commercial Court reversed on the wording of Clause 7.1. That clause speaks of an event that “adversely and directly” makes performance impossible, and it held the Arbitrator read the first word in isolation from the second. The cancellation might hurt PKCL economically, it said, but it did not directly make performance impossible.

This court disagreed. The Arbitrator had set out Clause 7.1 in full, noticed that requirement, and held with reasons that continued allocation of the mine was a fundamental basis of the CMDA. Whether that is the only possible reading, the bench said, is not the question.

The question is whether no fair-minded person could take it. By substituting its own construction of Clause 7.1, the Commercial Court exceeded its jurisdiction.

Interest at 11.95 per cent, no SBI loan

Claim 3, for Rs 67,27,40,731, was short-paid interest on overdue bills up to 30 September 2018. Everyone accepted that interest was due under Clause 6.3. The fight was over the rate, which the clause ties to what the State Bank of India charges RVUNL on working-capital loans.

The Arbitrator found RVUNL had no such loan from SBI, so the clause could not be applied literally. He took the rates RVUNL actually paid other banks, which averaged about 11.95 per cent. RVUNL called this a substitute rate that the clause does not provide for.

PKCL said the Tribunal found State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur to be a subsidiary or associate of SBI, and that RVUNL took its loans from it. The Commercial Court noted that RVUNL could not point to any payment pending beyond three years. This court saw no perversity in the concurrent finding.

Bank guarantee charges and a new argument

RVUNL had deducted Rs 58,96,93,602 from PKCL’s dues for charges on guarantees it gave the Ministry of Coal. Clause (k) of the Supplementary Agreement makes PKCL reimburse all charges of furnishing and renewing the guarantee, on documentary proof from RVUNL.

The Arbitrator held that the clause could not cover payments to other parties. Interest on margin money, interest on the guarantee and a payment to the State Government for standing guarantor were not charges for furnishing it. He allowed Rs 43,59,18,563 and gave RVUNL four weeks to produce documents for the rest.

RVUNL argued that the clause covers whatever relates to the guarantee, judged by subject matter and not by the payee. It also relied on Clause (j), an indemnity against liabilities imposed by governmental authorities.

PKCL answered that Clause (j) was never argued before the Tribunal. The bench found no patent illegality and said RVUNL cannot set up a new case in this court.

Legal fees and the limitation plea

Claim 4 sought Rs 3,75,35,000 in legal fees PKCL said it paid on RVUNL’s behalf. The Arbitrator held it was in time, because limitation ran from RVUNL’s rejection on 19 February 2018, after it told PKCL on 21 December 2017 that it was re-examining the claim.

On merits, RVUNL’s own officers signed the vakalatnamas, pleadings and affidavits, and the advocates’ bills were in its name. Relying on Section 230 of the Contract Act, the Arbitrator treated PKCL as RVUNL’s agent for this, and held that defending litigation was outside PKCL’s scope of work.

The Commercial Court called that a plausible view but set the finding aside as time-barred. It counted from the last payment on 19 August 2014 and held limitation expired on 18 August 2017. RVUNL repeated that argument here, along with Clauses 13.1 and 3.2.1.

The bench said the Commercial Court went into detail, reappraised the evidence and took a contrary view, as if sitting on appeal on facts and law. The Arbitrator’s reasoning was neither perverse nor patently illegal.

Families and a training centre

Claim 6 was Rs 8,01,00,000 for 267 additional project-affected families, on top of the 458 in the memorandum between RVUNL and the Collector. Claim 7 was Rs 3,38,71,562 for a vocational training centre required by a forest clearance after a ministry notification of 4 January 2011.

The Arbitrator held both were later impositions that fell under change in law, not within PKCL’s scope of work. The Commercial Court set both findings aside, reading Clauses 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 9.2 as putting such obligations on PKCL even when the law changed.

The bench said Claim 6 never depended on force majeure. It rested on the scope of PKCL’s work, which was limited to the 458 families in the impact assessment RVUNL used for its clearance. The extra 267 came from a later Gram Panchayat resolution.

Claim 7 rested on a condition inserted in 2011, after the 2009 acquisition notification and the CMDA. Both findings, the bench said, were possible views of the contract. The Commercial Court went beyond Section 34.

Rs 66.70 crore and the Additional Award

RVUNL said the Arbitrator was functus officio, since the main Award had already rejected Claim 8 for the fifth village. A claim considered and refused is not a claim omitted, it argued, so Section 33(4) did not apply. It also pressed limitation, which the Commercial Court had accepted.

The bench found no infirmity in the Arbitrator’s view that the four-village claim had escaped adjudication entirely, so deemed rejection could not apply. On limitation, the plea was never raised before the Tribunal.

Where limitation starts, the court said, is a mixed question of fact and law. The Additional Award was not patently illegal merely because it was silent on a plea never raised. On merits it rested on the reasoning for Claims 6 and 7 and on RVUNL’s acceptance of quantum and payment in its Statement of Defence.

Interest, costs and the severability plea

Claim 9 covered interest and costs. The Arbitrator refused 24 per cent as excessive and allowed 11.95 per cent, the rate PKCL itself used for overdue payments. Both parties had accepted that interest was in his discretion.

Interest and costs followed the claims upheld, and the bench saw no reason to disturb them.

RVUNL had also argued that, under Gayatri Balasamy, the awards could be severed only after a claim-wise inquiry, or else the matter should go back to the Commercial Court. The bench said severability arises only if some part of an award is invalid. It found none, so severance and remand did not arise.

The complaint that the High Court decided on one omnibus finding was met by the claim-wise review the bench itself had now done.

Plausible, not perfect

The bench stressed that its exercise was not a review on merits. It asked only whether each forum stayed within the established principles.

Some findings, it accepted, “may admit of another plausible view”, and others may rest on a wrong appreciation of facts or law (para 48). That is not the test under Sections 34 and 37.

Patent illegality, it said, goes to the root of the matter and appears on the face of the award:

“The Arbitral Tribunal is the final arbiter of the facts” (para 49)

Where the contract reading is possible and plausible, a court cannot substitute its own, however persuasive the alternative. Read as a whole, the awards showed no patent illegality, perversity or other Section 34 ground.

Order

The Special Leave Petition is dismissed, with no order as to costs. The High Court judgment of 21 May 2026 stands, and with it the Award of 15 January 2021 and the Additional Award of 5 July 2021.

Pending applications are disposed of. The judgment is marked reportable and dated 16 November 2026.