High Court Cannot Issue Systemic Directions on Summons Enforcement While Exercising Bail Jurisdiction
A Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Prasanna B. Varale holds that statutory bail powers cannot be stretched to mandate administrative reforms in criminal process service.
The Supreme Court has set aside directions issued by the Allahabad High Court that, while dismissing a bail application, mandated the trial court to issue summons under Sections 62 and 69 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and take coercive measures against persons who delay or impede proceedings.
The Court, in Rambalak v. State of U.P. (2026 INSC 511), held that the power conferred by Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023 is limited to adjudicating whether an accused should be released or remain in custody, and does not extend to issuing systemic administrative directions. The judgment, delivered on 19 May 2026 by a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prasanna B. Varale, draws a firm line between constitutional powers and statutory powers, holding that one cannot be used to enlarge the scope of the other.
How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court
The appellant, Rambalak, was accused in Case Crime No. 175/2002 registered at PS Hamirpur under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code 1860. His second bail application before the Allahabad High Court was dismissed by an order dated 1 April 2025.
The dismissal itself was not the central controversy. What made the order unusual was what accompanied it. While rejecting bail, the Single Judge directed the trial court to issue summons under Sections 62 and 69 Cr.P.C. and to take coercive measures against persons who delay or obstruct proceedings. The Single Judge further directed the trial court to follow earlier judgments, specifically Bhanwar Singh @ Karamvir v. State of U.P. and Jitendra v. State of U.P., as well as directions issued by the Director General of Police and the Home Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, in compliance of those judgments.
Rambalak challenged this order before the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 16332 of 2025. On 26 November 2025, the Supreme Court granted him interim bail and posted the matter for consideration of the specific question: whether a court exercising bail jurisdiction has the power to issue such directions.
The Earlier Allahabad High Court Directions That Were Reiterated
To understand what was set aside, the Court traced the origin of the directions to two earlier bail proceedings before the Allahabad High Court.
In an order dated 14 September 2023 in Crl. Misc. Bail Application No. 9126 of 2023 (Jitendra v. State of U.P.), a Single Judge observed that the criminal justice system in Uttar Pradesh suffered from serious difficulties in the delay of execution of summons and the production of witnesses. The Judge called for personal affidavits from the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police on four issues: the failure of the existing departmental accountability system for service of summons and coercive measures; the need to create an efficacious accountability system; the inclusion of summons service performance in officers' appraisals; and the imposition of departmental penalties for non-compliance.
A subsequent order dated 20 December 2023 in Jitendra recorded that the Principal Secretary (Home) and the Director General of Police had filed affidavits setting out detailed administrative directions. These included the appointment of a Superintendent of Police rank officer as Nodal Officer in every district and police commissionerate for execution of court processes; the maintenance of a central register for processes received from trial courts; weekly examination of summons and warrants execution registers; monthly statements on process service; written warnings and show-cause notices for officers showing repeated laxity; and monitoring by Deputy Superintendent of Police and Additional Superintendent of Police at the district level.
The Allahabad High Court, in that order, directed that the Government Orders and the DGP's directions “shall be treated as orders of this Court for purposes of implementation.” It was these directions that the impugned order of 1 April 2025 reiterated and required the trial court to follow.
The Sole Question: Does Section 483 BNSS Permit Such Directions?
The Supreme Court identified the sole question for consideration as whether, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, the High Court could have issued such directions.
Section 483 BNSS confers special powers on the High Court or Court of Session regarding bail. Sub-section (1) permits the court to direct that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, to impose conditions for that purpose, or to set aside or modify conditions imposed by a Magistrate. Sub-section (3) permits the court to direct that a person released on bail be arrested and committed to custody. The provision contains no language authorising the court to issue administrative directions to police or executive authorities regarding the service of summons or the execution of coercive measures.
The Court found direct guidance in its recent decision in State of U.P. v. Anurudh (2026 SCC OnLine SC 40), which had arisen from a similar situation before the Allahabad High Court. In that case, the High Court had issued far-reaching directions under bail jurisdiction mandating the scientific determination of the age of victims in cases under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012. The Supreme Court had held those directions impermissible.
Constitutional Power Cannot Enlarge Statutory Power
The Court's reasoning in Anurudh, reproduced and applied in the present judgment, drew a clear distinction between constitutional powers and statutory powers.
Constitutional powers emanate directly from the text and spirit of the Constitution. They are self-sustaining, not contingent on any act of the Legislature, and cannot be abridged except through a formal amendment under Article 368. The Court gave examples: the President's power to dissolve the Lok Sabha under Article 85(2)(b), the Governor's authority to reserve a bill under Article 200, and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 32.
Statutory powers, by contrast, are derivative and conditional. They draw their vitality from a law enacted by Parliament or a State Legislature and exist only within the four corners of the enabling statute. Any exercise of statutory power beyond its express or implied authority is ultra vires and void. The Court held that “the constitutional power cannot overshadow the statutory power, enlarging its scope beyond what has been envisaged by the statute.”
Applying this to the facts, the Court held that the High Court's error was in the exercise of a statutory power, the bail jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS, and not in the exercise of any constitutional power. Even though the High Court is a constitutional court, that status does not permit it to expand the scope of a statutory power beyond what the statute authorises. The jurisdiction under Section 483 BNSS is limited to adjudicating whether the accused should be released pending trial or should remain in custody. Issuing systemic directions to police and executive authorities about summons service and accountability mechanisms falls outside that jurisdiction.
The Court found that the impugned order, in so far as it directed the trial court to follow the earlier bail orders containing those administrative directions, could not be sustained.
Outcome
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order to the extent it reiterated the administrative directions issued in the earlier bail proceedings.
However, the Court directed that the steps already taken by the State authorities, the appointment of Nodal Officers, the central registers, the monitoring mechanisms, and the other administrative measures, shall remain unaffected and continue to function independently of the orders in which they were issued. The State was given liberty to modify those measures to bring them in consonance with the prevalent laws of the land, should the need arise.
The Court clarified that setting aside the directions on account of jurisdictional error carried no comment on the grant or denial of bail in the earlier orders. The interim bail order dated 26 November 2025 was confirmed with the stipulations mentioned in that order. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.