Delay in Prosecution Sanction Cannot Curtail Accused's Liberty, Supreme Court Grants Bail

A bench of Justices Dipankar Datta and Sheel Nagu held that a sanctioning authority's inaction cannot be used to prolong an accused's custody under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The Supreme Court on 17 July 2026 granted bail to Ravinder Mehta, an accused under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, after finding that the sanctioning authority had not yet granted sanction for prosecution despite the charge-sheet being filed nearly five months earlier. The Allahabad High Court had rejected Mehta's bail application on 20 March 2026. A division bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu set aside that order, holding that the absence of prosecution sanction — and the resulting inability of the trial court to take cognizance — could not be turned against the accused to keep him in custody.

How the Dispute Reached the Court

Ravinder Mehta was arrested on 9 December 2025, the same day FIR No.0231 of 2025 was registered against him at Police Station Adarsh Mandi, District Shamli, Uttar Pradesh. The offence alleged was under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

A charge-sheet was filed on 7 February 2026 after the investigation was completed. The prosecution indicated it intended to examine 19 witnesses. Mehta applied for regular bail before the Allahabad High Court, which rejected the prayer on 20 March 2026 in CRMBA No.5778/2026. He then approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9005/2026, which was converted into a criminal appeal after leave was granted.

Sanction Not Yet Granted — State Could Not Say Otherwise

The bench's attention turned to a critical procedural gap: prosecution sanction under the Prevention of Corruption Act had not been obtained. Without sanction, the trial court could not take cognizance of the offence, meaning the trial had not even commenced.

The Court specifically asked counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh whether sanction had been granted. No clear answer was provided. The bench proceeded on the basis that sanction remained pending, and expressed its surprise that the sanctioning authority had not acted even after the charge-sheet was filed as far back as 7 February 2026.

The Court's Reasoning on Liberty

The bench identified what it considered the decisive factor: the delay in granting sanction was not the accused's doing, yet it was the accused who remained in custody while the state's own machinery remained inactive.

The Court held that <“the delay in grant of sanction to prosecute cannot be used to the disadvantage of a citizen for curtailing his liberty.” Taking an overall view, it found that further detention was unnecessary. The combination of the pending sanction, the consequent inability of the trial court to act, and the time already spent in custody persuaded the bench to allow the appeal.

Senior counsel Mr. Siddharth Dave appeared for Mehta. The respondent-State was represented by Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR, along with several other advocates.

Conditions Attached to Bail

The Court directed that Mehta be released on bail subject to furnishing bail bonds to the satisfaction of the trial court, along with any additional conditions the trial court may impose. Several specific directions were laid down:

• Mehta must not, directly or indirectly, by inducement, threat or promise, dissuade any person acquainted with the facts of the case from disclosing those facts to the court.
• He must diligently attend trial proceedings unless exempted. Unjustified absence could itself be treated as a breach of bail conditions.
• Any breach of the bail conditions would entitle the trial court to cancel bail.

The bench also clarified that the observations made in the order and the grant of bail would not be treated as findings on the merits of the case.

Order

The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal, set aside the Allahabad High Court's order dated 20 March 2026, and directed that Ravinder Mehta be released on bail on the terms set out above. All pending applications were disposed of.