Reach Stacker at ICD Tughlakabad Is Not a Motor Vehicle, Supreme Court Rules

A Division Bench of the Supreme Court held that a Reach Stacker operating inside an Inland Container Depot is excluded from the definition of motor vehicle under Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, restoring the Tribunal's dismissal of a compensation claim.

The Supreme Court has held that a Reach Stacker — a heavy machine used to lift and stack shipping containers — is not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when it operates exclusively inside an Inland Container Depot. Deciding Civil Appeal No. 10526 of 2024 on 29 July 2026, a Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh set aside a judgment of the Delhi High Court that had reversed a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal order and awarded compensation to a man whose leg was amputated after a Reach Stacker ran over him at ICD Tughlakabad in 2013. The Court found that the ICD is an enclosed premises and not a public place, and that the Reach Stacker, by its very nature and weight, is adapted for use only within such enclosed premises.

The Accident and the Claim

On 5 September 2013, respondent no. 1 Rishi Ranjan Mishra visited the Inland Container Depot at Tughlakabad, New Delhi. A vehicle — the Reach Stacker — struck him and ran over his pelvic region, causing severe injuries. His right leg was subsequently amputated; he underwent multiple surgeries. His physical disability was assessed at 90%, though he claimed 100% functional disability.

Mishra filed a petition for compensation before the Additional District and Sessions Judge sitting as MACT(SE-01), Saket Courts, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — MACT Petition No. 4791 of 2016. He sought Rs. 75 lakhs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., arrayed as respondent no. 3, challenged the claim at the threshold by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the vehicle did not qualify as a motor vehicle and therefore the MACT had no jurisdiction.

On 9 January 2018, the Tribunal allowed that application and dismissed the claim. It reasoned that Section 2(28) of the MVA excludes a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or any other enclosed premises, and the Reach Stacker fell within that exclusion.

The Delhi High Court's Reversal

In MAC. App. No. 614/2018, the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court set aside the Tribunal's order on 5 September 2019. The High Court placed reliance on judgments of the Supreme Court, including Western Coalfields Limited v. State of Maharashtra, and held that a Reach Stacker qualifies as a motor vehicle. It reasoned that the restricted area in which the machine plies does not strip it of its identity and classification as a motor vehicle.

Container Corporation of India Limited, the appellant before the Supreme Court, challenged that judgment in Civil Appeal No. 10526 of 2024.

The Central Question: Is a Reach Stacker a Motor Vehicle?

The Court framed two interconnected questions: first, whether ICD Tughlakabad is a “public place” within Section 2(34) of the MVA; and second, whether a Reach Stacker is a “motor vehicle” within Section 2(28).

Section 2(28) defines a motor vehicle as any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads. It expressly excludes a vehicle running upon fixed rails, a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises, and a vehicle with fewer than four wheels fitted with an engine capacity not exceeding twenty-five cubic centimetres.

Section 2(34) defines a public place as a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a right of access.

Ms. Pinky Anand, Senior Counsel, appeared for Container Corporation. Mr. Yadav Narender Singh appeared for the respondent. Ms. Shatakshi Singh was appointed amicus curiae by the Court and supported the respondent's case.

ICD Tughlakabad Is Not a Public Place

The Court dealt first with the character of the ICD. The respondent contended that the ICD spans approximately 10 sq. km. with extensive interconnecting roads, constitutes a public place, and is accessible to authorised members of the public. The appellant's position was that it is an enclosed premises within the exclusion.

The Court relied on its earlier decision in Tarachand Logistic Solutions Ltd. v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1851, which discussed the meaning of “public place” and affirmed that where members of the public are not allowed access without prior permission, and where there is a check on ingress and egress to prevent unauthorised access, the area is an enclosed premises and not a public place.

Applying that standard, the Court observed that ICD Tughlakabad is a customs bonded area within the meaning of Section 7 of the Indian Customs Act, 1962 — a notified place for loading and unloading of imported and exported goods. Only persons duly authorised by the competent authority have access to it. Roads within the ICD are specially constructed to bear the weight of Reach Stackers and other heavy machinery. No member of the general public can, as a matter of right, enter this space. The Court accordingly held that the roads within ICD do not constitute a “public place” as defined under Section 2(34) of the MVA.

Analysis of Precedents on Motor Vehicle Definition

The Court then addressed whether a Reach Stacker falls within the exclusionary second part of Section 2(28), working through the relevant precedents systematically.

On Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1974) 2 SCC 777, the Court noted the “suitability of use” test: the words “adapted for use” mean “suitable for use” on roads. A vehicle that would damage roads is not suitable for them. The Reach Stacker in this case weighs 71.8 metric tonnes unladen and approximately 102 metric tonnes at full capacity. A Gazette Notification issued by the Ministry of Road, Transport and Highways under Section 58(1) of the MVA sets maximum permissible gross vehicle weight at 49 tonnes for a rigid vehicle, 55 tonnes for a semi-articulated vehicle, and 54 tonnes for a truck-trailer combination. The Reach Stacker exceeds all these limits. The Court held that suitability is obviously impacted when a vehicle contravenes notified weight guidelines.

On Goodyear India Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 752, the Court applied the “dominant use” test: the phrase “adapted for use upon roads” refers to the principal or dominant use, not incidental use. The appellant's case was that the Reach Stacker is not used on roads at all — when it needs to be transported, it is dismantled first because it cannot be moved on public roads intact. The Court accepted this, finding that the Reach Stacker's use is confined to containers, ports, terminals, steel and aluminium facilities, and similar industrial environments. Its application is for a limited set of tasks within a limited kind of industry. The utility test was decided in favour of the appellant.

On Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 48, a coordinate bench had held that heavy earth-moving and construction equipment vehicles — dumpers, loaders, excavators, dozers and so on — though mechanically propelled, are excluded from the definition of motor vehicle by the second part of Section 2(28) because they are special type vehicles adapted for use only in a factory or enclosed premises. The Court in the present case found the respondent's attempt to distinguish Ultratech on the ground of different factual matrix to be “at best artificial.” The detailed analysis in Ultratech had specifically addressed the second part of Section 2(28) — the exclusion — which the earlier line of cases relied upon by the amicus had not. An analogy was drawn in Ultratech with airplanes and tanks: even if they are physically capable of being driven or landed on a road, that cannot be the deciding factor.

The Court distinguished cases cited by the amicus — Bose Abraham v. State of Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 157; Govt. of A.P. v. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Assn., (2004) 6 SCC 210; Rajasthan SRTC v. Santosh, (2013) 7 SCC 94; and Natwar Parikh & Co. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2005) 7 SCC 364 — on the basis that they concern road rollers, tractor-trailers, or motorised carts, none of which share the characteristics of a Reach Stacker. Road rollers are specifically built for use on roads; they belong in a different category. Western Coalfields Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 11 SCC 613, which the High Court had relied upon, was disposed of briefly: the Court noted it places sole reliance on Natwar Parikh, which itself is distinguishable because Section 2(28) expressly includes trailers within its first part, a factor absent with Reach Stackers.

The Court's broader reasoning on the exclusion is pointed. The exclusion in Section 2(28) does not require the vehicle to lack the characteristics of a motor vehicle. It recognises that certain vehicles, despite having those characteristics, cannot be equated to motor vehicles that are generally understood to ply on roads. A Reach Stacker exceeds the permitted weight; is dismantled before transport; lacks the general safety features required of road vehicles; and is dedicated to a particular kind of heavy industrial work in duly notified areas. It therefore falls within the exclusionary second part of Section 2(28).

Non-Registration and the Transport Authority's Certificate

The Court also considered a notification from the Office of the Joint Transport Commissioner and Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, Hyderabad, which stated that a Reach Stacker — given its tyre specifications and axle loads not prescribed under the MV Rules, 1989 — cannot be operated on a public road. The notification recorded that it is “a special type manufactured and adopted to be used only in enclosed premises” and does not come under the definition of motor vehicle under Section 2(28). It therefore does not require registration under Section 39 of the MVA.

The amicus argued that non-registration cannot by itself be a ground to escape liability, and that accepting such an argument would remove every unregistered vehicle from the Act's scope. The Court rejected this as a false equivalence. If a vehicle plies on a road without registration, that is a violation of the MVA. But registration under Section 39 is required only for motor vehicles. If the competent authority has determined that a Reach Stacker is not a motor vehicle, there is no basis for registration under that provision.

An Important Caveat

Before closing, the Court entered a caveat. Its holding that ICD Tughlakabad is not a “public place” under Section 2(34) should not prevent a claimant from seeking compensation under the MVA if an accident within the ICD involves a regular motor vehicle — one that ordinarily plies on public roads — that has been brought into the restricted area by officials of the department or others connected with the ICD or its processes.

Order

The Court set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dated 5 September 2019 in MAC. App. No. 614/2018 and restored the findings of the Tribunal. It directed that any money already paid to respondent no. 1 shall not be subject to recovery. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs. All pending applications were disposed of.