Supreme Court declines to quash or club multi-State cyber fraud FIRs under Article 32

A Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih held that Article 32 relief for quashing FIRs needs an exceptional case, and refused to club FIRs disclosing distinct transactions.

The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition under Article 32 that sought to quash four FIRs registered in Maharashtra, Karnataka and Odisha, or, in the alternative, to club them into a single composite investigation. In Rutvij Bhagat Singh Wakhare v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., decided on 24 July 2026, a Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih held that the petitioner had not shown any violation of a fundamental right or exceptional circumstance justifying direct recourse to the Court. The Court also refused clubbing, finding the FIRs related to distinct transactions with different complainants and different amounts. The petitioner was left free to approach the High Court under Article 226 or the trial court under Section 482 CrPC. The order sets out when Article 32 can be invoked to quash criminal proceedings and how the “same transaction” test applies to multiple FIRs.

How the dispute reached the Court

The petitioner runs a proprietary concern, M/s Al Zeba Marinen Overseas. The four FIRs concern cyber fraud, where complainants were contacted by persons posing as police officials, told that money laundering had occurred in their names, and induced to transfer large sums for “verification”. Part of the transferred money was allegedly credited to a bank account held in the name of the petitioner’s concern.

The FIRs were registered as Crime No. 0275 of 2024 and Crime No. 0412 of 2024 in Bengaluru, FIR No. 0499 of 2024 in Pune, and Crime No. 0032 of 2024 in Rourkela, Odisha. They invoke provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Information Technology Act, 2000.

The petitioner is not named as an accused in any of the FIRs, though the account of his concern appears in them. He denied any role, saying he had permitted a friend, Mr. Ganesh Khaire, to use the account on commission for an online gaming business, and that the account was later operated by Mr. Khaire and one Mr. Krishnakant Sharma. On becoming aware of the misuse, he lodged a cyber crime complaint dated 9 May 2024 against them.

When Article 32 can be used to quash an FIR

The Court first examined whether a petition under Article 32 was maintainable to quash an FIR. It described the right to move the Court under Article 32 as itself a fundamental right, and the jurisdiction as wide but extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly.

The power under Article 32 is broad enough to quash criminal proceedings in an appropriate case to prevent abuse of process, and an alternative statutory remedy does not by itself bar it. But as a matter of orderly procedure, an aggrieved party is ordinarily expected to approach the High Court first, with direct recourse reserved for a violation of fundamental rights or other compelling circumstances.

The Court drew on Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, Union of India v. Paul Manickam, Jagisha Arora v. State of U.P. and Sunil Kumar Rai v. State of Bihar. It relied on Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India, where a coordinate Bench held that a petitioner should ordinarily be relegated to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC unless exceptional circumstances exist, marking a distinction between maintainability and whether a petition should be entertained.

The Court noted Vinod Dua v. Union of India, where it quashed an FIR that impinged on Article 19(1)(a), and cited Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., which reaffirmed maintainability where the grievance discloses a violation of a fundamental right. The passage from Paul Manickam was noted, requiring a petitioner to show why the High Court was not, could not, or was futile to be approached.

On the facts, the petitioner had only contended that he was serving abroad on a merchant ship, had no knowledge of the transactions, and that the account was misused by two named persons. The Court held he had failed to establish infringement of any fundamental right and had not shown exceptional circumstances to bypass the CrPC. It declined the quashing prayers, leaving him to pursue Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC.

Why the FIRs could not be clubbed

On the alternative prayer, the respondent States argued that each FIR was filed by a distinct complainant over an independent transaction, and that agencies in each State were competent to investigate offences within their jurisdiction.

The Court set out the settled law that there cannot be a second FIR for the same incident or occurrence, or for incidents forming part of the same transaction, while a subsequent FIR is permissible where it relates to a distinct occurrence, is a counter-complaint, or reveals a larger conspiracy. It referred to T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, Babubhai v. State of Gujarat and its “test of sameness”, Anju Chaudhary v. State of U.P., and State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Singh Rathore.

The Court applied the triple tests from State (NCT of Delhi) v. Khimji Bhai Jadeja — unity of purpose and design, proximity of time and place, and continuity of action — which need not be applied cumulatively.

Here, each FIR was lodged by a different complainant induced to part with money on different occasions, with no live link between the transactions or the persons. The account of the petitioner’s concern receiving part of the money did not, by itself, make the incidents one transaction. Though the modus operandi appeared similar, the victims, amounts, transactions and consequences were distinct, so the FIRs prima facie disclosed separate transactions.

The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s cardiac ailments and diabetic condition but held that such difficulty could not justify clubbing FIRs disclosing distinct offences. Clubbing could instead force complainants to run from pillar to post. With the investigation at a nascent stage and cyber frauds involving multiple accounts, fictitious identities and digital networks across jurisdictions, a composite investigation could impede a fair and effective inquiry.

Order

The writ petition was dismissed. The Court reserved liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum for relief he may be entitled to in law. All contentions were left open for the competent court to consider on merits. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.