Dismissed Order I Rule 10 Application Bars Repeat Impleadment Bid Under Order XXII Rule 10, Rules Supreme Court

A Division Bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Augustine George Masih held that a prior dismissed impleadment application bars a second attempt under a different CPC provision when the underlying issue is identical.

The Supreme Court has held that subsequent purchasers who once lost an impleadment application under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot revive the same claim by re-filing under Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC when the underlying question — whether the transferee should be brought on record on the basis of the same sale deed — was conclusively decided against them on merits. The Court partly allowed a civil appeal filed by Sanjiv Kumar, setting aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court's order restoring a second appeal and impleading the subsequent purchasers therein, while simultaneously sustaining their impleadment in the cross-objections on the ground that no earlier application had been filed in that separate proceeding and a fresh cause had since arisen from changed circumstances.

A Property Dispute Across Four Decades

The dispute traces back to the estate of one Girdhari Lal, whose two widows — Bhagwan Dai (original plaintiff, now deceased) and Shakuntla Devi (Respondent No. 1) — both asserted rights over the suit property. Bhagwan Dai had filed a suit seeking a declaration that she was the exclusive owner of a portion of property No. 4677 and held a half share in the remaining property. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding among other things that Sanjiv Kumar, the appellant before the Supreme Court, had failed to prove he was Bhagwan Dai's adopted son and that a Will dated 12 March 1982 executed by Girdhari Lal in favour of Respondent No. 2 (Varinder Kumar) was valid.

The First Appellate Court partly reversed these findings. It recognised Sanjiv Kumar as the validly adopted son of Bhagwan Dai and upheld her ownership of a portion of property No. 4677 shown as ‘C’ in the site plan — a property in the possession of tenants Budh Singh and Bihari Lal — on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Restraint orders were also passed against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from alienating that specific property.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 then filed Regular Second Appeal No. 1795 of 1990 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, challenging the adoption finding and the ownership determination. Sanjiv Kumar filed cross-objections seeking a decree for the entire suit. Critically, during the pendency of the second appeal, Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 — Santosh Rani and Mohan Lal — purchased property No. 4677/A from Respondent No. 1 (acting as power of attorney holder for Respondent No. 2) via a registered sale deed dated 28 June 1990.

The 2000 Rejection and the 2109-Day Gap

In 1999, the subsequent purchasers applied for impleadment in the main second appeal under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court dismissed that application on 19 May 2000, reasoning that the purchasers had bought the property in defiance of the First Appellate Court's injunction order. The High Court applied the doctrine of lis pendens and refused impleadment.

Both the main appeal and the cross-objections were then dismissed for non-prosecution on 2 February 2018. Sanjiv Kumar successfully obtained restoration of the cross-objections on 19 July 2019. The prior owners — despite requests from the subsequent purchasers — took no steps to restore the main appeal. This prompted Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 to file fresh applications in 2023, asserting collusion between the prior owners and the Appellant and claiming that as assignees their interests in the litigation were being prejudiced.

The fresh applications sought: condonation of a delay of 2109 days under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963; restoration of the main second appeal under Order XLI Rule 19 of the CPC; and impleadment in both the main appeal and the cross-objections under Order XXII Rule 10 of the CPC.

The High Court, by its interim order dated 13 November 2024, allowed all three applications. It reasoned that the 2000 rejection had been premised on an erroneous factual finding — the injunction applied only to the property in the tenants' possession (property No. 4677 ‘C’), not to property No. 4677/A which the subsequent purchasers had bought — and that an erroneous earlier order does not operate as res judicata. Sanjiv Kumar approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition.

The Court's Analysis on Res Judicata and the Two Impleadment Provisions

Before the Supreme Court, Sanjiv Kumar argued that the order of 19 May 2000 had attained finality and must operate as res judicata even if it rested on an incorrect factual assessment. He relied on State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee, Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee, and Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh for the proposition that an erroneous decision, once final, still binds. He distinguished the High Court's reliance on Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman as inapplicable because no statutory prohibition had been violated and the High Court had not acted without jurisdiction.

The subsequent purchasers countered that a fresh cause of action arose in 2018 when the appeals were dismissed and only the cross-objections were later revived, that the scope of Order I Rule 10 differs from Order XXII Rule 10, and that Section 146 of the CPC independently protects an assignee pendente lite.

The Court agreed with the Appellant that the High Court's reasoning was flawed. It held that the 2000 order had decided the impleadment question on merits — the court had examined the claim and the nature of the transfer — even if the factual premise was wrong. Once such a decision attains finality without being appealed, it binds the parties. An erroneous decision does not lose its res judicata character unless it was made without jurisdiction, in the face of a statutory prohibition, or by fraud. None of those exceptions applied here.

The Court then drew a careful distinction between the two CPC provisions. Order I Rule 10 governs the addition or deletion of parties who ought to have been joined at the inception of the proceedings. Order XXII Rule 10 governs the situation where an interest in the subject matter devolves upon a third party during the pendency, enabling that person to apply for leave to continue proceedings. As a general rule, a dismissal under Order I Rule 10 does not automatically bar a subsequent Order XXII Rule 10 application because the two provisions address fundamentally distinct legal situations.

However, the Court carved out a key qualification: where the Order I Rule 10 application was considered and rejected on its merits — with the court actually examining the transferee's claim, the bona fides of the transfer, and the nature of the interest — and that order attained finality, a second application under Order XXII Rule 10 based on the same transfer, same interest, and same facts is ordinarily barred by res judicata. The Court stated that the two applications in such a case are “different procedural doors to the same relief.”

Applying this to the facts, the Court found that the 2000 application under Order I Rule 10 and the 2023 application under Order XXII Rule 10 were both predicated on the same registered sale deed of June 1990, between the same parties, addressing the same question of whether the purchasers should be brought on record. The right to seek impleadment under Order XXII Rule 10 had squarely accrued at the time of the initial application. Re-agitating that settled issue under a different statutory provision was impermissible. The Court relied on Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan and Others (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1218) and B.S. Lalitha and Others v. Bhuvanesh and Others (2026 SCC OnLine SC 860) to underscore that once a challenge has been decided and attained finality, a litigant cannot re-agitate the same objections even by switching the specific legal provision invoked.

Why the Cross-Objections Stood on Different Footing

The position was different for the cross-objections filed by Sanjiv Kumar himself. The record showed that the 1999 application under Order I Rule 10 had been filed only in the main second appeal, not in the cross-objections. The principle of res judicata therefore had no purchase in that separate proceeding.

Beyond the absence of a prior application, the Court identified a fresh cause of action. When the cross-objections were revived on Sanjiv Kumar's application while the main appeal was allowed to die by the prior owners, the subsequent purchasers faced a materially changed situation: the property they had purchased — which was the subject matter of the cross-objections — was now in dispute in a proceeding in which they had no presence, with the sellers showing no interest in prosecuting or defending the main appeal. The Court found that the possibility of collusion between the Appellant and the prior owners could not be ruled out.

The Court placed reliance on Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited (2013) 5 SCC 397, which held that once a transferor pendente lite loses interest in litigation, the transferee can be added as a party to prevent prejudice. It also relied on Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon (2005) 11 SCC 403, where the Court had recognised that a transferee pendente lite is vitally interested in litigation to the extent of the acquired interest, and that the transferor may not properly defend or may collude with the opposing party.

This new factual matrix — non-prosecution by prior owners, revival of only one set of proceedings, and the spectre of collusion — constituted a cause of action that had neither been directly and substantially in issue in the 2000 proceedings nor could it have been raised at that time.

Outcome

The Supreme Court partly allowed the civil appeal. The impugned High Court order dated 13 November 2024 was set aside to the extent it directed restoration of the main second appeal and impleadment of the subsequent purchasers in that appeal. The High Court order allowing impleadment of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 as respondents in the cross-objections was sustained and upheld.

There was no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of. The judgment was delivered on 27 July 2026 by a Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih.