Supreme Court restores decree, holds illiterate testator’s Will shrouded in unexplained suspicion

A Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan held the High Court exceeded Section 100 jurisdiction in upholding a Will disinheriting the testator’s widow for non-relatives.

The Supreme Court has set aside a judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and restored a trial court decree that had discarded a registered Will and declared a widow the owner of her late husband’s property. In Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass & Ors., decided on 6 July 2026, a Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and K.V. Viswanathan held that the Will set up by the defendants was surrounded by unexplained suspicious circumstances, and that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure when it reversed concurrent findings of fact.

The Court found the testator was an illiterate agriculturist who could only thumb-mark a document, the disposition disinherited his sole Class I heir in favour of non-relatives, and the Will carried incorrect recitals. On those facts, it held the propounder had failed to satisfy the Court’s judicial conscience about valid execution.

How the dispute reached the Court

The suit was filed by Bhambo Devi, wife of the late Chhajju Ram, seeking a declaration that she was the sole owner in possession of property left by her husband, who died issueless on 5 February 1992. She pleaded she was his sole heir and that the defendants had obtained mutation on 14 August 1992 based on a forged Will dated 6 November 1974, which she said Chhajju never executed.

The defendants claimed Chhajju had executed a registered Will of his entire estate in their favour, out of love and affection and as a reward for services rendered to the testator and his wife.

The trial court decreed the suit, declaring the plaintiff owner in possession and issuing a permanent prohibitory injunction. During the defendants’ first appeal, the original plaintiff died. Sardari Lal was later brought on record as her legal representative after the High Court restored the appeal by order dated 8 November 2002, and the first appellate court allowed his impleadment on 14 August 2003. The first appellate court affirmed the trial court decree. The High Court, on 18 July 2016, allowed the defendants’ second appeal and dismissed the suit.

The pleadings challenge rejected

The respondents argued that the plaint carried self-contradictory pleas — that no Will was executed, yet also that the Will was a product of fraud and undue influence — and that the alternative plea amounted to admitting execution, shifting the burden onto the plaintiff, who examined no witness of fact.

The Court rejected this. A plaintiff may rely on inconsistent alternative pleas, and a plea assailing a Will on grounds of fraud without admitting its signature does not amount to an admission of execution. To constitute an admission, a statement must be clear, unequivocal and unconditional.

The Court also held that non-examination of the plaintiff did not defeat the suit. Her status as legally wedded wife and sole Class I heir was not traversed in the written statement and stood admitted under Order 8 Rule 5 of the CPC and Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act. The burden to prove due execution of the Will lay on its propounder regardless of the plaintiff’s failure to lead evidence on fraud.

The suspicious circumstances

Surveying Rani Purnima Debi, H. Venkatachala Iyengar, Kalyan Singh and Shivakumar, the Court reiterated that proving a Will is not confined to establishing execution under Section 63 of the Succession Act and attestation under Section 68 of the Evidence Act. That is only the first step. The propounder must satisfy the Court’s conscience that the testator signed with free will, aware of the contents.

The Court held the disinheritance of the widow, who had cared for the testator throughout, in favour of non-relatives was an unnatural disposition raising suspicion. The explanation in the Will — that the wife had jewellery and cash, and that the legatees were nephews who served the testator — was found untenable. The site plan showed the couple lived separately from the legatees, one legatee was a student at the time and the other was in service, and the nephew relationship was not established.

On timing, the Court held that executing the Will in 1974, when the testator lived till 1992, was by itself the testator’s prerogative, but became a relevant factor alongside the disinheritance of a caring wife with many years to live.

On the attesting witnesses not being from the testator’s village, the Court disagreed with the first appellate court, holding that the place of residence of an attesting witness was not a material circumstance where nothing showed the witness did not know the testator.

The cuttings and the failed registration

The Court called for the original record. The front page bore a thumb mark of “Chhajju” and signatures of two attesting witnesses. The back, carrying the Sub-Registrar’s endorsement, named the presenter as “Laxmi Kant Basi,” struck off at multiple places and replaced by hand with “Chhajju,” without any initials of the Sub-Registrar against the cuttings.

DW-2 admitted the testator was illiterate. The Court reasoned that an illiterate testator could not have read the Will unless it was read to him, and two recitals were found incorrect: the claim that the legatees were his nephews, and that he lived with them and was fed and clothed by them.

Examining Sections 32, 34, 35, 52, 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act, 1908, the Court held that the uninitialed cuttings meant it could not be said with certainty that the registering officer followed the required procedure. The benefit of the presumption that the Will was read over to Chhajju was therefore unavailable, and the registration did not dispel the doubt.

Second appeal jurisdiction

The Court distinguished Madhukar D. Shende and Sridevi, relied on by the respondents. In Madhukar D. Shende, the legatee was the testator’s sister’s daughter and probable only heir, and the challenge came from a trespasser; here the challenge came from the sole Class I heir and the legatee was a non-relative. In Sridevi, the testator had not totally deprived his children.

Citing Mansinghrao Yeshwant Rao Patil, the Court held that whether circumstances are suspicious is a question of fact, and that the phrase about the conscience of the court being satisfied cannot convert a question of fact into one of law. A second appellate court may interfere only where a Will is rejected on suspicions that are figments of imagination, or where the finding rests on an erroneous approach in law, such as misplacing the onus of fraud on the caveator.

On these facts, the Court held no substantial question of law arose and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the first appellate court.

Order

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment and order dated 18 July 2016, and affirmed the decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court. There was no order as to costs, and all pending applications were disposed of.