Supreme Court Upholds Karnataka's Human Rights Court Rule, Rejects Mandatory Commission Gateway

A Supreme Court bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta holds Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules valid, restoring a criminal investigation against police officials accused of human rights violations.

The Supreme Court has set aside a Karnataka High Court judgment that had struck down Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006 as unconstitutional and ultra vires the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993. A division bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held, on 25 August 2026, that Rule 6 merely supplies the procedural machinery through which a Human Rights Court constituted under Section 30 of the 1993 Act may receive and act upon complaints of human rights violations. The Court found that nothing in the 1993 Act makes a prior inquiry or recommendation by the Human Rights Commission a condition precedent to the initiation of criminal proceedings before such a Court. With the High Court's judgment set aside, Crime No. 15 of 2024 registered against police officials at Jalanagar Police Station, Vijayapura, stands revived and the proceedings are to continue from where they stand.

How the Dispute Reached the Supreme Court

The appellant, Sayad Asifulla, was an accused in Crime No. 30 of 2023 registered at Jalanagar Police Station, Vijayapura. He alleged that police officials violated his human rights during his custody. On 19 January 2024, he filed a private complaint before the Principal District and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Human Rights Court, Vijayapura, which registered it as PCR No. 1 of 2024.

By order dated 20 January 2024, the Human Rights Court referred the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Vijayapura, for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Pursuant to that order, Crime No. 15 of 2024 was registered against the concerned police officials at Jalanagar Police Station.

The police officials against whom proceedings had been initiated approached the Karnataka High Court, challenging the validity of Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules and seeking the quashing of Crime No. 15 of 2024 and of the proceedings in PCR No. 1 of 2024. By judgment dated 17 July 2025, the High Court allowed the writ petition. It struck down Rule 6 as unconstitutional, inconsistent with the 1993 Act, and ultra vires the rule-making power conferred upon the State Government under Section 41 of the Act. As a consequence, it quashed Crime No. 15 of 2024 and held that the order dated 20 January 2024 in PCR No. 1 of 2024 did not survive for consideration.

Both Sayad Asifulla and the State of Karnataka appealed to the Supreme Court. By order dated 27 October 2025 in the lead matter, the Supreme Court stayed the effect and operation of the High Court's judgment pending final hearing.

The Central Question

The Court framed the principal question as whether Rule 6 of the 2006 Rules — insofar as it permits an aggrieved person to directly approach a Human Rights Court and prescribes the procedure for dealing with such a complaint — is inconsistent with the scheme of the 1993 Act or travels beyond the State Government's rule-making power under Section 41.

Rule 6 permits a victim of an offence arising out of a violation of human rights, his legal representative, or a registered non-governmental organisation or public person (with prior authorisation) to file a complaint directly against a public servant before the Human Rights Court. On receiving the complaint, the Court may either order investigation by a police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police or conduct its own inquiry in accordance with the procedure for private complaints under the Code. The Rule further provides for the steps to be taken after the investigation report is received, the process for obtaining sanction for prosecution where required, and the conduct of trial in accordance with the sessions trial procedure.

The Statutory Scheme: Two Distinct Mechanisms

The Court began its analysis by mapping the structure of the 1993 Act. It identified two parallel institutional mechanisms. First, the National and State Human Rights Commissions, which exercise inquisitorial and recommendatory powers under Sections 12 to 18. Section 18 empowers a Commission, during or after inquiry, to recommend initiation of prosecution or other suitable action. Second, Human Rights Courts constituted under Section 30, which are designated Courts of Session tasked with the speedy trial of offences arising out of violations of human rights.

The Court held that the functions of the two institutions are not identical. The Commission performs an inquisitorial and recommendatory role. The Human Rights Court exercises judicial power in relation to offences arising out of violations of human rights. Critically, the Court found that Section 30 contains no language making the jurisdiction of a Human Rights Court dependent upon the completion of any prior proceeding before the Commission.

No Mandatory Commission Gateway in the Statute

The Court directly addressed the High Court's central premise: that the mechanism in Sections 13, 14, 17 and 18 of the 1993 Act constitutes the exclusive route through which an alleged violation of human rights must travel before prosecution can be initiated. The Supreme Court rejected this reading.

The Court held that nothing in Sections 12 to 18 of the 1993 Act expressly provides that every prosecution for an offence arising out of a human rights violation must originate from a Commission recommendation. To read such a limitation into the statute would, in its view, amount to supplying a condition which Parliament itself had not enacted. Section 30 equally contains no such condition. The Court said that the remedies before the Commission and the Human Rights Court are “distinct and complementary” and that the Commission is not a mandatory gateway to the Court.

The Court also rejected the High Court's concern about double jeopardy. An inquiry or recommendation by a Commission, it held, does not amount to a prior prosecution or punishment, and therefore the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not engaged merely because a complainant simultaneously pursues remedies before the Commission and files a complaint before the Human Rights Court.

Rule 6 as Procedural Supplement, Not Substantive Departure

The Court turned to the rule-making power under Section 41 of the 1993 Act and the scope of Rule 6. It held that Rule 6 does not create any new offence, prescribe any new punishment, or enlarge the definition of human rights under the 1993 Act. It merely provides the procedural means through which the jurisdiction conferred upon a Human Rights Court under Section 30 may be invoked and exercised.

On the scope of Section 41, the Court rejected the argument that the rule-making power of the State Government is confined only to the matters enumerated in sub-section (2). Section 41(1) empowers the State Government to make rules “to carry out the provisions of this Act”. Sub-section (2) begins with the words “in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power”, signalling that clauses (a) to (c) are illustrative and do not exhaust the amplitude of the general power in sub-section (1).

Applying the principle drawn from St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE, (2003) 3 SCC 321, the Court held that rules cannot supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but may supplement them by providing for ancillary matters and filling up the details necessary for effectuating the legislative scheme. Viewed against that standard, Rule 6 supplements Section 30 by prescribing the procedure through which a Human Rights Court may deal with complaints of offences arising out of human rights violations. It does not supplant the 1993 Act.

The Court also drew support from Paramvir Singh Saini v. Baljit Singh, (2021) 1 SCC 184, where the Supreme Court had recognised that complaints relating to the use of force in police stations may be made not only to the State Human Rights Commission but also to Human Rights Courts constituted under Section 30. Although the validity of Rule 6 was not directly in issue in that case, the decision reinforced the conclusion that recourse to a Human Rights Court is not contingent on a prior inquiry or recommendation by the Commission.

Arguments of the Contesting Respondents Rejected

The police officials argued that Section 18 of the 1993 Act makes the Human Rights Commission the exclusive route for initiating prosecution. The Court found no support for this contention in the language of the statute. They further contended that Rule 6 creates a parallel substantive regime and that its operation raises questions of repugnancy and separation of powers. The Court held that in the absence of any inconsistency between Rule 6 and the parent enactment, these pleas could not be sustained.

On the requirement of sanction for prosecution, the Court held that this is a matter to be considered on the facts of each individual case in accordance with applicable law and cannot furnish a ground for invalidating Rule 6 as a whole. Any such defence remains open to be urged before the competent Court.

Order

The Court held Rule 6 of the Karnataka State Human Rights Courts Rules, 2006 to be not inconsistent with the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 and not in excess of the rule-making power conferred by Section 41. Rule 6 is intra vires the 1993 Act and is valid.

The impugned judgment and order dated 17 July 2025 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No. 200873 of 2024 is set aside. The consequential quashing of Crime No. 15 of 2024 and the finding that the order dated 20 January 2024 in PCR No. 1 of 2024 did not survive for consideration are also set aside. The proceedings arising therefrom are to continue from the stage at which they presently stand, in accordance with law.

The Court clarified that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the allegations and that all contentions and defences available to the parties remain open to be considered by the competent Court on their own merits. Both appeals are allowed.