Section 498A covers live-in relationships in the nature of marriage, Supreme Court holds
A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held that the word husband in Section 498A extends to a live-in partner where the parties intended to marry.
The Supreme Court has held that Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code applies to a man in a live-in relationship, provided that relationship is one “in the nature of marriage” and the parties intended to marry. The judgment in Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., delivered by Justice Sanjay Karol for a bench that also comprised Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, answered whether a man who is not in a legally valid marriage can be prosecuted for subjecting a woman to cruelty. The Court gave the word “husband” a purposive construction, rejected the argument that a valid marriage is a precondition, and refused to quash proceedings against the appellant. It also built in safeguards, including an intent-to-marry requirement and strict compliance with the arrest directions in Arnesh Kumar.
How the dispute reached the Court
The appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H., moved the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash proceedings initiated by respondent no. 2, Smt. Theertha. The High Court rejected his petitions by a common judgment dated 18 November 2025.
The parties’ dispute rested on a single fundamental point: whether they were married at all. The appellant contended they were never married, so Section 498A could not apply. Respondent no. 2 said they were in a valid subsisting marriage, married by Hindu customs on 17 October 2010 and living in Bengaluru until the marriage broke down in 2016. Two complaints followed, leading to charge-sheets under Section 498A and other provisions, including Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The High Court held that “husband” in Section 498A must be given an expansive construction and that a man who induces a woman to believe she is lawfully married cannot escape liability by pleading a void marriage. It found the appellant had suppressed his first marriage and presented himself as respondent no. 2’s husband.
What the Court held
The Court framed the question as whether Section 498A can be construed to include a man in a live-in relationship. The appellant, supported by the Union of India, argued that a penal provision must be read strictly to cover only a man in a valid and lawful marriage, and that other provisions of the IPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 remain available to the woman. Respondent no. 2 and the amicus curiae argued for a purposive reading.
The Court rejected the strict-literal contention. It held that Section 498A applies to a woman in a “relationship in the nature of marriage,” giving “husband” a purposive interpretation aligned with the section’s reformative and socially beneficial object.
Why strict construction did not control
Surveying its own precedent on strict interpretation of penal statutes, the Court held that strict construction does not amount to strict literalism where literalism produces absurdity or defeats legislative intent. It applied the mischief rule and purposive interpretation, treating text and context together to identify the statute’s purpose.
On the section itself, the Court relied on Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, where it had asked whether a man could hide behind the absence of a valid marriage while meting out cruelty, and which was affirmed by a three-judge bench in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab. The Court read down the value of the order relied on by the appellant, holding that Shivcharan Lal Verma v. State of M.P. decided the Section 498A question on its own facts and did not lay down a binding precedent, more so given the affirmation of Reema Aggarwal.
Section 498A, introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983, was aimed at deterring cruelty toward women in a household setting. The Court held that whether the woman is married “does not have a proximate link to the objective of the section.”
Why the Domestic Violence Act was not enough
The Court examined the argument that the DV Act already covers relationships in the nature of marriage. It held the DV Act is essentially a civil legislation, providing civil remedies and reliefs, with the sole penal element being Section 31, which punishes breach of a protection order. Treating the DV Act as adequate protection for women in such relationships, the Court said, would be a misstatement of law, since civil and criminal law carry different consequences and deterrent effect.
The constitutional dimension and safeguards
The Court also read the issue through Articles 14, 15 and 21. It reasoned that a married woman and a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage are strikingly similar for the purpose of Section 498A, the only real distinction being a ceremony or a court process. Drawing on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India and Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M., it treated the right to choose one’s partner as intrinsic to autonomy and dignity.
Alert to recognised misuse of Section 498A, the Court limited its ruling. Protection extends only to relationships in the nature of marriage where an intent to marry is established as an intrinsic part. The initial burden of proving that intent lies on the female live-in partner seeking protection. The Court directed strict application of the safeguards in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, and said no person accused in such a case should be arrested without preliminary enquiries.
Order
The Court held that Section 498A applies to live-in relationships qualifying as relationships in the nature of marriage between two consenting adults, with intent to marry established as an intrinsic part. The extended interpretation was confined to Section 498A alone and does not affect any other provision.
On the facts, the Court found the allegations — suppression of a prior marriage, harassment for dowry, and physical injury causing burns to respondent no. 2’s leg — prima facie disclosed a cognizable offence. It held this was not a fit case for quashing and left the Trial Court free to proceed in accordance with law. The appeals were disposed of on these terms.