A ₹22.6 crore claim settled at ₹1.34 lakh, and the Revenue's appeal against it died on a clock it started 35 days late

Justices S.V.N. Bhatti and N.V. Anjaria held that “receipt of such order” in Section 62 of the IBC cannot mean the day a litigant chooses to collect a certified copy, and dismissed the appeal 16 days beyond the Court's power to condone.

The Central Excise department had filed a proof of claim for ₹22,60,32,948 in the insolvency of a glass container manufacturer. The resolution plan approved by the National Company Law Tribunal at Hyderabad on 13 August 2021 allotted it ₹1,34,657. Its appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal failed. Its appeal to the Supreme Court has now been dismissed without the merits being looked at, because it was filed on the 111th day after the order it challenged.

The question the Court decided is one that recurs in every statutory appeal with a short limitation period: when a provision says the clock starts on “receipt” of the order, does it start when the order is pronounced, or when the appellant actually picks up a certified copy? The answer is the former.

How the claim shrank

The corporate debtor, M/s Samyu Glass Private Limited, manufactured high-quality glass containers and was registered as an Export Oriented Unit. Between 2013 and 2017 the Central Excise and Service Tax Department initiated multiple excise recovery proceedings against it; the company stopped manufacturing around November or December 2016 and challenged the demands before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal. Andhra Bank, now Union Bank of India, moved a Section 7 petition, the Adjudicating Authority admitted it, and a corporate insolvency resolution process began.

When the Department convened a Joint Pricing Committee meeting on 4 November 2019 to fix a reserve price for auctioning attached machinery, the Resolution Professional told it a moratorium prohibited third-party authorities from disposing of the corporate debtor's assets. On 27 November 2019 the Deputy Commissioner of Central Tax submitted the proof of claim for ₹22.60 crore. The corporate debtor, through the Resolution Professional, approached the Department under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, presenting a scheme for ₹4,32,80,741 in settlement of the excise arrears. The resolution plan as approved provided ₹1,34,657 towards excise arrears.

The Revenue challenged the plan before the NCLAT, Chennai. By order dated 2 August 2023 the Appellate Tribunal confirmed it. The civil appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code followed on 21 November 2023, and the second respondent raised a preliminary objection on limitation. The Court heard Mr Saurav Roy for the appellant and Mr Ritin Rai, senior counsel, for the second respondent on that objection alone.

The two readings

For the respondent, the arithmetic was simple. Limitation, including the condonable period, began on 3 August 2023 and ended on 1 October 2023, the sixtieth day. The appeal came on the 111th day. Even on the alternative reading, the appellant applied for a copy on 6 September 2023 and received the certified copy on 11 October 2023; excluding that period, the appeal ought to have been filed by 5 November 2023. On either count it was barred, and until an appeal is presented within limitation the Court should not examine the merits.

For the appellant, the key was the word “notwithstanding” in Section 61 and the phrase “within forty-five days from the date of receipt of such order” in Section 62(1), read with Sections 421 and 423 of the Companies Act, 2013. Section 61 speaks of “the date the order is made available”; Section 62 speaks of “the receipt of the order”. The decisive starting point, on that juxtaposition, was receipt — 11 October 2023 — making the filing on 21 November 2023 the forty-first day and well within time.

Three decisions already in the field

The Court held the point was no longer res integra. Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products establishes that the law of limitation rests on the maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt — the law assists those who are vigilant about their rights, not those who sleep on them — and that a discretionary window beyond the prescribed period, during which delay may be condoned on sufficient cause, is not part of the prescribed period.

V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power was paraphrased rather than extracted. The IBC is an exhaustive, self-contained code whose provisions prevail by virtue of the non-obstante clause in Section 238; while Section 238-A applies the Limitation Act “as far as may be”, that is subject to Section 29(2) of that Act, and where a special statute provides a distinct period of limitation that period governs to the exclusion of general provisions. Section 61(1) itself opens with a non-obstante clause, so the appellate mechanisms under the Companies Act cannot control or relax the IBC's architecture. Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules requires every appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order, and Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act excludes the time requisite for obtaining a copy — but the Explanation makes clear that time taken by the tribunal to prepare the order before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded, and if a party fails to apply within the limitation period no time can be excluded at all. Applying for a certified copy is not a mere procedural formality; it reflects the aggrieved party's due diligence. Section 61(2) prescribes 30 days extendable by a maximum of 15 on sufficient cause, and no more; courts have no power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or inherent powers to condone beyond the outer limit in a special statute, because the Code weaves speed and strict timelines into its foundation to preserve asset value, maximise recovery and protect economic health.

CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers is closer still: under Section 62 the absolute outer limit is 60 days, that is 45 days plus 15 on sufficient cause, beyond which the Court loses jurisdiction to condone; the right to appeal is permanently extinguished once that window and the 28-day window under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 for curing defects lapse; and the Rules, being subordinate legislation, cannot override the Code's express provisions by granting an extended window for re-filing.

Why “receipt” cannot mean collection

The Court drew a clear distinction between exclusion of time under Section 12 of the Limitation Act and condonation of delay under Section 62(2). Section 62 gives an initial 45 days from receipt, extendable by a discretionary 15, creating an absolute ceiling of 60.

The phrase “from the date of receipt of the order” cannot be read as the date on which a party chooses to apply for and collect a certified copy. If the limitation clock remained suspended until physical collection at the litigant's leisure, the limitation period would become fluctuating and indefinite, and Section 12(2) would be rendered wholly redundant — there would be no reason for Parliament to make the exclusion of “time requisite for obtaining a copy” applicable through Section 238-A if limitation did not already commence on pronouncement.

The precedents reinforce that distinction rather than cutting against it. In Sagufa Ahmed limitation under Section 421(3) of the Companies Act ran from receipt of the judgment because Section 420(3) read with Rule 50 of the NCLT Rules created a statutory right to receive a free certified copy. Under the IBC there is no such right: for an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 62, obtaining and filing the certified copy is governed by Order XIX Rule 3(2)(i) read with Rule 40 of the Supreme Court Rules, which impose an affirmative obligation on the appellant to apply for and produce the copy. A litigant cannot claim to await a copy and thereby keep limitation suspended.

There was also a rule of the appellate tribunal's own. Rule 91 of the NCLAT Rules, 2016 requires the Appellate Tribunal to pronounce its order as far as possible immediately after hearing; where orders are reserved, the date of pronouncement is notified in the cause list, which is valid notice; and — the emphasised limb — “Reading of the operative portion of the order in the open court shall be deemed to be pronouncement of the order.” On a bare reading of a rule mandating pronouncement in open court, the Court held, knowledge and limitation commence on the day the rule is complied with. Limitation under Section 62 therefore starts on the date the NCLAT pronounces the order. Only the “time requisite” — the period between filing the application for a copy and the date the copy is ready — is excluded; any period of inaction before the application must be deducted from the statutory limitation.

The arithmetic

The Court then set out the dates. The NCLAT pronounced on 2 August 2023. The appellant applied for a certified copy on 6 September 2023, the thirty-fifth day — and those 35 days of inaction count directly against the initial 45-day window. The application remained with the Registry until delivery on 11 October 2023, 35 days, and that period is “time requisite” and is excluded. On receipt the clock resumed with 10 days left of the statutory window, expiring on 21 October 2023, plus a further 15 discretionary days expiring on 5 November 2023. The appellant filed on 21 November 2023, consuming another 41 days after receipt.

Summing the actionable periods — 35 days before applying and 41 after receiving — gives 76 days against an absolute statutory ceiling of 60. Even after excluding the time taken to prepare the certified copy, the appeal was filed 16 days beyond the outer limit of the Court's jurisdiction to condone delay.

Accepting the appellant's construction, the Court added, would nullify both the limitation period and the condonable period and make the right of appeal subject to an indefinite and fluctuating period of limitation. The preliminary objection was sustained and the civil appeal dismissed as barred by limitation, with no order as to costs.