A Section 92 suit gets no interim protection before leave, but a court may grant leave without notice when it is urgent

Justices Manoj Misra and Manmohan resolved a conflict among six High Courts, holding a civil court cannot pass preservatory orders while a leave application under Section 92 is pending.

A suit about the mismanagement of a public charitable trust cannot be filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure without the court's leave. The question that divided the High Courts for eighty years was what the court may do in the gap: between the day the plaint and the leave application are filed and the day leave is granted, can the court step in to protect the trust property? On 18 September 2026 the Supreme Court answered no — and then closed the practical gap from the other end, by holding that where the facts are urgent, the court may grant leave itself without first issuing notice.

Six High Courts, two answers

The divergence was long-standing and squarely set out in the judgment. Allahabad, in Muhammad Ali Khan vs. Ahmad Ali Khan in 1945 and again in Sri Vir Digambar Jain Dharmashala vs. Pramod Kumar Jain in 2008, Bombay in Bai Sakri vs. Bai Dhani in 1947, Kerala in Sulaiman vs. Chunakara S.M. Jama Ath in 1982, and Madras in N. Anandan vs. Ayyanna Gounder in 1993 and R. Shanmugam vs. M. Ganesa Mudaliar in 2009, had all recognised a protective jurisdiction pending the grant of leave.

Orissa, in Kintali China Jaganadham vs. K. Laxmi Naidu in 1987, and Karnataka, in a 2022 decision concerning a temple, took the opposite view and held that the jurisdiction stands excluded.

A trust at Mandya, and an ad hoc committee

The appeal arose from the Karnataka line. On 2 May 2025 the Principal District and Sessions Judge at Mandya had, under Order XL Rule 1(a) of the Code, constituted an ad hoc committee made up of the existing trustees to manage the day-to-day affairs of People's Education Trust pending further directions. By its judgment of 25 June 2025 the Karnataka High Court set that order aside, reaffirming its earlier view that a suit under Section 92 remains stillborn in the absence of leave, and that the court is denuded of jurisdiction to pass interlocutory orders while leave is pending.

The argument from Section 141

For the appellants, senior counsel argued that once a court is seized of an application under Section 92 it cannot be relegated to the position of a mute spectator. The power to appoint a receiver, it was said, comes from Section 94 read with Order XL Rule 1, and beyond that from the court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 151. The bridge was Section 141, under which the procedure provided in the Code for suits is to be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction — so an application for leave, being a civil proceeding, attracts the Code mutatis mutandis.

The Court did not accept that the bridge carries the weight placed on it. Its answer to the substantial question of law is that a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92 together with an application seeking leave to institute the suit is not empowered to pass protective or preservatory interim orders pending disposal of the leave application.

Shield and sword

Having closed that door, the Bench was alive to what the closure costs. Circumstances can arise that need urgent interim measures, including ex parte temporary injunctions, in suits under Section 92, precisely in order to safeguard the property of public charities. The statutory framework gives such institutions what the judgment calls a protective shield against vexatious litigation; Section 92 also has to work as a remedial sword in the hands of those complaining of mismanagement.

The Court reconciled the two by moving the point of entry rather than widening the powers before it. Where the facts disclose compelling urgency, the issuance of notice before the grant of leave is not indispensable. Leave may be granted ex parte, with utmost care, caution and circumspection, and with prima facie cogent reasons recorded in writing. Once leave is granted, the court has its ordinary powers, going beyond the mere appointment of a receiver.

Why granting leave without notice does not prejudice the defendant

The support for that route came from R.M. Narayana Chettiar. At the stage of considering leave the court neither adjudicates the merits of the controversy nor confers substantive rights on the parties. Keeping with the object and language of Section 92, notice to proposed defendants ought ordinarily to precede the grant of leave, save where that is impracticable. A suit instituted pursuant to leave granted without notice is not for that reason bad in law or non-maintainable. The defendants retain the right to apply for revocation of the leave, and that application has to be decided on merits and in accordance with law.

The Court also disposed of one authority the appellants relied on, pointing out that it dealt exclusively with a private trust, a waqf alal-aulad, to which Section 92 has no application at all.

Order

The Court held that a civil court seized of a plaint under Section 92 of the Code, along with an application for leave to institute the suit, is not empowered to pass protective or preservatory interim orders pending disposal of that application, but that for compelling reasons to be recorded in writing, including where the facts disclose the necessity of urgent relief, notice prior to the grant of leave may be dispensed with. With that clarification the appeals were dismissed, and pending applications disposed of.