Supreme Court Reinstates Employee Who Could Not Have Known of NCR Filed Against Him

A Division Bench held that termination for suppressing criminal antecedents fails when the employee had no means of knowing the case existed.

The Supreme Court has set aside the termination of a technician employed by the Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (FACT), holding that an employee cannot be found guilty of suppressing a criminal antecedent he had no knowledge of. A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih, deciding the appeal on 11 August 2026, directed reinstatement with all consequential benefits and 50% backwages. The judgment clarifies that termination on the ground of suppression requires a two-stage enquiry, and the mere existence of a criminal antecedent cannot mechanically result in dismissal. Both prongs of that enquiry were found to have failed in this case.

From Appointment to Termination: How the Dispute Arose

Shatrughn Yadav was appointed as a Technician (Process) by FACT on 5 May 2021 on consolidated pay for an initial tenure of two years. At the time of joining, he submitted an attestation form declaring that no criminal case was pending against him.

Six months after appointment, FACT wrote to the District Magistrate for verification of the appellant's criminal antecedents. By a letter dated 22 March 2022, the District Magistrate disclosed that a Non-Cognizable Report (NCR) dated 3 April 2019 had been registered against the appellant under Sections 323 and 504 of the IPC. FACT issued a show cause notice on 30 April 2022, asking Yadav to explain why his services should not be terminated for furnishing false information.

Yadav replied that he had acted in a bona fide manner. He said he had never received any summons, had never been called to the police station, and had never been arrested in connection with the NCR. He attached a character certificate dated 9 July 2020, issued by the Superintendent of Police, District Maharajganj, which stated there was no adverse entry against him as per the police station, local intelligence unit, and the District Crime Records Bureau. Importantly, that certificate post-dated the NCR by over a year.

In June 2023, Yadav filed a further representation enclosing a final report showing that police had found no evidence against him and had deleted his name from the array of accused. FACT was not satisfied. After a few further opportunities, it issued a termination letter on 5 August 2023.

High Court Dismisses Challenge; Supreme Court Grants Leave

Yadav challenged the termination before the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Writ Petition No. 37484 of 2023. The Single Judge declined to interfere, holding that the claim of being unaware of the NCR involved a disputed question of fact requiring proof. The Division Bench of the High Court, in Writ Appeal No. 414 of 2025, concurred and dismissed the appeal by order dated 4 July 2025.

Before the Supreme Court, counsel for Yadav relied on Ravindra Kumar v. State of UP, (2024) INSC 131, and Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, arguing that the relevant question is not whether there was non-disclosure simpliciter but whether there was deliberate suppression or supply of false information. Each case must be examined on its own merits, and termination cannot be an automatic consequence.

Counsel for FACT supported the impugned judgment, contending that the offer of appointment was conditional on clearance of antecedents, that the appellant was aware of the NCR since his parents were also charged, and that subsequent discharge from the NCR did not cure the falsity of the original declaration. FACT also argued that Yadav should have availed of the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that disputed questions of fact were not amenable to writ jurisdiction.

Writ Jurisdiction: No Bar From Alternative Remedy

The Court dealt with FACT's jurisdictional objection at the outset. It held that the existence of an alternative remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 does not operate as an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction, particularly where the challenge is to the legality of the termination order itself. The objection was rejected.

The Two-Pronged Test: What Avtar Singh and Its Progeny Require

The Court summarised the law from Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471, a three-Judge Bench decision that remains the governing framework on suppression of criminal antecedents in verification forms. The key propositions extracted by the Court are that information must be true and complete, that the employer must take notice of special circumstances, that the nature of the offence and the post both matter, and — critically — that before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, “knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”

The Court also referred to Ravindra Kumar v. State of UP, (2024) INSC 131, where relief was granted because no criminal case was pending on the date of application and the selection had been mechanically treated as irregular without considering the candidate's suitability. A similar approach was taken in Umesh Chandra Yadav v. Inspector General and Chief Security Commissioner, Railway Protection Force, (2022) 14 SCC 244, where discharge as a juvenile did not amount to suppression of material information, and where the Court reiterated that termination must not be done arbitrarily.

Drawing these threads together, the Court articulated a two-pronged enquiry that must precede any termination on the ground of suppression. The first prong is factual: did the candidate actually suppress or furnish false information, having regard to the extent of his knowledge at the relevant time and the circumstances in which the declaration was made? The second prong requires the authorities to apply their mind to the type of suppression, the nature of the allegations, the role and gravity of the offence, the nature of the post and its duties, and the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings. Only where both stages are completed can a termination order be sustained in law.

Applying the Test: Knowledge Was Absent, Enquiry Was Missing

On the first prong, the Court found that Yadav's consistent case — that he had no knowledge of the NCR — was backed by documentary evidence. The character certificate of 9 July 2020 from the Senior Superintendent of Police, Maharajganj, recorded no adverse entries against him, and that certificate was issued after the NCR was registered on 3 April 2019. A subsequent certificate from the Sub-Inspector of Police, Nichlaul, Maharajganj, dated 9 August 2023, confirmed that Yadav was initially arrayed in the NCR but his name was later removed after investigation as no evidence was found, and that he was neither called to the police station nor arrested.

The Court addressed FACT's argument that Yadav must have known about the NCR because his parents were also named in it. It rejected this, holding that no material was placed on record to show that the parents had in fact informed Yadav of the registration, or that he was otherwise put to notice. In the absence of such evidence, the submission remained “a matter of surmise” that could not displace the documentary record.

The Court then stated the principle in direct terms: knowledge of a fact is a necessary pre-requisite for its non-disclosure. The concept of suppression presupposes awareness of that which is suppressed. One cannot be held to have concealed something that was never within one's knowledge. At the same time, the Court was careful to add that a bare plea of ignorance, without cogent and reliable documentary support, will not suffice. The onus is on the candidate to substantiate the claim of bona fide ignorance before the employer. In Yadav's case, that burden had been discharged.

On the second prong, the Court found that the authorities had not undertaken any meaningful enquiry at all. They had proceeded on the presumption that the existence of the criminal antecedent automatically rendered Yadav ineligible. There were no specific findings on the nature of the offence, its impact on the nature of the post held by Yadav as a Technician (Process), or the significance of his subsequent discharge. The termination failed on this ground independently of the first.

Outcome

The Court answered the central issue in the negative and held that the termination was not permissible in law. It set aside the termination order and directed reinstatement forthwith with all consequential benefits. Backwages were restricted to 50% and directed to be paid within eight weeks of the date of judgment. In the event of default, interest at 6% per annum would be payable from the date the amount fell due until actual disbursal. The appeal was allowed in those terms. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.