Sanction for Prosecution Cannot Be Revived on Same Material After Competent Authority Refuses It, Supreme Court Holds

A bench of Justices J. B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran dismissed Rajasthan’s SLP, holding that political pressure vitiated the revival of a corruption prosecution sanction against a doctor.

The Supreme Court has dismissed a special leave petition filed by the State of Rajasthan challenging a High Court order that quashed a sanction for prosecution granted under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A division bench of Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran found that the sanction was revived without any fresh material, at the apparent behest of the Chief Minister’s office, after the competent authority had twice declined to grant it. The Court imposed costs of Rs 50,000 each before the High Court and the Supreme Court on the State, payable within two months. The decision reaffirms that a mere change of opinion on identical material cannot justify reconsideration of a refused sanction, and that political direction in such decisions is constitutionally impermissible.

How the Corruption Allegation Arose

The respondent, Dev Kant Meena, is a doctor who faced a trap operation by the Anti-Corruption Bureau. A complaint was made at the ACB, Jaipur alleging that he had demanded Rs 5,000 to Rs 6,000 for knee surgery on a complainant’s relative. Three payments were alleged: Rs 1,000 on 24 March 2017, Rs 2,000 on 25 March 2017, and Rs 3,000 on 27 March 2017. A further Rs 500 was also alleged to have been received. On 29 March 2017, after the surgery had been completed the previous day, Rs 2,000 was said to have been recovered from inside a locked drawer at the doctor’s official residence when the trap was sprung.

A challan was submitted in Case No. 04/2019 before the Court of the Special Judge, ACD, Ajmer. The question of sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act was placed before the Department of Personnel, Government of Rajasthan.

The Sanctioning Process and Two Refusals

The Joint Secretary, Department of Personnel examined the matter and on 14 March 2018 recommended against sanction. His assessment found that the telephone conversation transcript of 29 March 2017 did not unequivocally establish that a bribe was received. The transcript of 27 March 2017 showed only that the doctor had quoted the cost of steel plates to be implanted, in response to a specific query, and had noted that the patient was ineligible under an existing beneficial scheme. The earlier alleged payments had no independent corroboration beyond the complainant’s assertions.

The recovery itself was treated as suspicious. The drawer from which the money was recovered was locked; the doctor said the key was lost, and the lock was broken open. The handwash test turned light pink, which the Joint Secretary attributed to the complainant having handed over an X-ray film and shaken hands with the doctor in gratitude. There was also a news report congratulating members of a political party for having “trapped” the petitioner, and persons visible in video footage were seen claiming to have trapped another doctor as well, described as a publicity exercise. Critically, the surgery had already been completed on 28 March 2017, making the supposed receipt of a bribe on 29 March 2017 highly suspicious. The patient and his relatives had not themselves complained, and the complainant’s claimed relationship to the patient was unsubstantiated.

The Principal Secretary, Department of Personnel approved this recommendation. The Chief Secretary of Rajasthan, after perusing the files, declined the sanction.

Intervention from the Chief Minister’s Office

The Joint Secretary to the Chief Minister then intervened on 24 May 2018, referring the matter back for reconsideration. The premise for reconsideration was that the money recovered from the table drawer “clearly proved” acceptance of bribe, confirmed by the handwash. No new material was placed before the Department of Personnel.

The Department reconsidered and again reached the same conclusion: no explicit demand had been established, and the recovery from the locked drawer raised suspicion rather than confirming guilt. The handwash was again found irrelevant given the X-ray handover and the handshake. The Secretary opined there was no ground to grant sanction, further noting that foul play during the trap could not be ruled out.

On reference to the Chief Secretary, a discussion was held. The Chief Secretary acknowledged that “some aspects raise suspicion” while “some other aspects point a finger at the petitioner”, and then opined that approval of sanction “may be considered.” The Court described this as “a dilemma arising on pressure exerted, obviously.” Based on this, sanction was eventually granted.

What the Court Held on Section 19

The bench opened its analysis with a pointed observation: the decision-making process under Section 19 of the PC Act cannot resemble the dilemma in Hamlet’s Soliloquy. Ambivalence in the sanctioning process, the Court held, gives rise to a presumption that extraneous considerations weighed in the decision.

The Court set out the applicable legal standard: when administrative authorities themselves express doubt and suspicion about the demand, the trap and the recovery, there is no question of sanction being granted. Even if the standard for granting sanction is not proof beyond reasonable doubt, it must at least reach a possibility that guilt can be established beyond reasonable doubt at trial. That threshold was not met here. On the facts, the Court went further, observing that even on a preponderance of possibilities, a case of victimisation arose.

Drawing on Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 622, the Court quoted the principle that sanction is “a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a shield for the guilty.” It cautioned that the sanctioning authority must not act under any pressure or external force.

Precedent on Review of Sanction Decisions

The bench examined three prior decisions on the permissibility of revisiting a refusal of sanction.

In State of H.P. v. Nishant Sareen (2010) 14 SCC 527, this Court had held that Section 19 of the PC Act and Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not make any express provision for review or reconsideration once sanction power has been exercised. In that case, the Principal Secretary (Health) had refused sanction on clear findings that the complaint was frivolous and the officer was known for impartiality. A later review on the basis of a Vigilance Department opinion was set aside as motivated and lacking fresh material, amounting to non-application of mind.

In Gopikant Choudhary v. State of Bihar (2000) 9 SCC 53, the Minister concerned had refused sanction. After the public servant retired, the Chief Minister took up the matter and granted sanction. The Court set aside that grant, finding neither application of mind nor any new material.

In State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti (2009) 17 SCC 92, the Court acknowledged that since Section 19 confers no express power of review, the paramount consideration is application of mind to the materials, not merely the prior decision. It held that reviewing a refusal on the very same material is impermissible. A mere change of opinion on identical material cannot ground a review. However, a caveat was recorded: if the investigating agency collects fresh material not available earlier, a review of the refusal may be possible, provided there is proper application of mind to those fresh materials.

Applying these precedents, the bench found that the intervention of the Joint Secretary to the CM introduced no fresh material. The Department of Personnel, on a full reassessment, had again recommended against sanction. The eventual grant came only because the Chief Minister’s office improperly weighed in.

Deprecation of Political Interference

The Court was direct in its disapproval. It observed that the doctor had been dragged unnecessarily to the High Court by a review prompted by the CM’s office. The Court said the State should at least have accepted the High Court’s finding, given that the High Court had already interfered with what it called a “patently illegal and blatantly tainted order of sanction.” Pursuing the matter to the Supreme Court after that finding compounded the harm.

The bench said it found absolutely no reason to interfere with the High Court’s order. It deprecated instances of interference leading to unnecessary harassment of public officers discharging public duties, noting that preventing such harassment is precisely the object of Section 19 of the PC Act.

Order

The Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2951 of 2026 was dismissed. The State of Rajasthan was directed to pay costs quantified at Rs 50,000 each before the High Court and before the Supreme Court, totalling Rs 1,00,000. The costs are to be paid within two months from 23 July 2026. In the event of non-payment, the respondent is entitled to move the Supreme Court by way of a Miscellaneous Application in the disposed-of SLP bringing the failure to notice. All pending applications were also disposed of.