Supreme Court Reduces Life Imprisonment to 20 Years in POCSO Case, Upholds Conviction
A Division Bench of Justices Prashant Kumar Mishra and Shree Chandrashekhar maintained the conviction but trimmed the sentence, citing the appellant's age and clean record.
The Supreme Court on 21 July 2026 upheld the conviction of Suptan Marak for penetrative sexual assault on a 12-year-old girl with a partial mental disability, an offence established concurrently by the Trial Court and the High Court of Tripura. However, the Court partly allowed the criminal appeal by reducing the sentence from life imprisonment — meaning imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life — to rigorous imprisonment of twenty years under Section 4(2) of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. The Court found the maximum sentence disproportionate given the appellant's age of approximately 33 years at the time of the offence and the absence of any prior criminal record or adverse jail conduct.
How the Case Reached the Supreme Court
The Trial Court convicted Marak under Section 342 and Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, by its judgment and sentence dated 13 December 2022. The High Court of Tripura at Agartala affirmed that conviction and sentence in Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 2023, by its order dated 16 July 2024.
Marak then filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. Leave was granted and the matter was heard as a criminal appeal. The Division Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar took up the matter on 21 July 2026.
Evidence the Court Found Unshakeable
Counsel for the appellant challenged the conviction partly on the ground that DNA profiling of blood stains found on the victim's clothing did not conclusively match the appellant's blood. The Court rejected that argument.
The Court noted that the victim, a 12-year-old girl described as partially and mentally disabled, had supported the prosecution's version. Her account was corroborated by her mother (PW-2) and her younger sister (PW-4). Dr. Helina Debbarma (PW-14), who examined the victim, found her condition precarious — she complained of pain in the vulva with excessive bleeding and repeated vomiting, was unable to move, and her hymen was freshly torn.
The Court held that the victim's oral testimony, standing unshaken and corroborated by two witnesses and a medical examination, “cannot be disbelieved only on this ground.” Conviction under Section 4 of the POCSO Act was maintained.
The Sentencing Dispute: Sub-Section (2) of Section 4
A separate and more technical contest arose on sentence. The appellant's counsel argued that neither the Trial Court nor the High Court had specifically referred to Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act in their sentencing orders. Because life imprisonment is the maximum sentence only under Section 4(2), the argument ran, non-mentioning of that sub-section vitiated the sentencing and rendered the maximum punishment unsustainable. Counsel also submitted that, at 33 years of age with no criminal antecedents, the appellant had real prospects of reformation, making imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life disproportionate.
The State opposed leniency, arguing that concurrent findings of guilt by two courts warranted no reduction.
The Court's Reading of Section 4
The Court did not accept the technical invalidity argument. It held that any reference to Section 4 of the POCSO Act necessarily attracts its sub-sections depending on the facts. Crucially, once the victim's age is established as below sixteen years, Section 4(2) is the only provision under which conviction and sentence can follow. Non-mentioning of a particular sub-section in the sentencing order does not, the Court said, render that order illegal or vitiated.
In short, the legal label attached to the sub-section was implicit in the finding on the victim's age. The formal omission had no substantive consequence on the validity of the conviction.
Why the Maximum Sentence Was Reduced
Having disposed of the technical challenge, the Court turned to whether the maximum sentence was appropriate on the facts. Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act prescribes a range: the minimum sentence is rigorous imprisonment of twenty years and the maximum is imprisonment for the remainder of the convict's natural life.
The Court weighed three factors in the appellant's favour: his age of approximately 33 years at the time of the offence; the absence of prior criminal antecedents; and the absence of any material showing that his conduct in custody had been poor. Against these, it set the gravity of the offence — penetrative sexual assault on a young, mentally disabled child.
Balancing those considerations, the Court held that the sentence at the top of the statutory range was not warranted. It directed that the sentence be reduced to the minimum end of the range prescribed under Section 4(2): rigorous imprisonment for twenty years.
Order
The Supreme Court allowed the criminal appeal in part. The conviction of Suptan Marak for offences under Section 342 and Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and under Section 4(2) of the POCSO Act, was maintained in full. The sentence of life imprisonment — imprisonment for the remainder of the natural life — was modified to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of.