Supreme Court strikes down two UP pension Validation Acts as a new label on an old exclusion
Justices Dipankar Datta and Satish Chandra Sharma held the 2021 and 2025 Acts never removed the defect found in Prem Singh, and ordered pension claims of work-charged employees decided within six months.
In 2019 the Supreme Court told Uttar Pradesh to count work-charged service when it pays pension. The State then tried an Ordinance, an Act in 2021, a second Ordinance in 2025 and a second Act. On 18 November the court held that each of them changed the wording but kept the exclusion.
Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma declared the Uttar Pradesh Qualifying Service for Pension and Validation Act, 2021, and the Uttar Pradesh Entitlement to Pension and Validation Act, 2025, ultra vires the Constitution. The judgment, written by Justice Datta, is marked reportable.
Prem Singh and what followed
The batch turns on one question. Can service an employee rendered in a work-charged establishment, and in some cases as a temporary, daily-wage or muster-roll worker, be counted as qualifying service for pension after he is regularised?
Rule 3(8) of the Uttar Pradesh Retirement Benefits Rules, 1961, and Regulation 370 of the Civil Service Regulations excluded it. The Allahabad High Court dismissed a challenge on 3 February 2017, saying the provisions could not be struck down on arbitrariness alone.
On 2 September 2019, in Prem Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, a three-Judge Bench read down Rule 3(8). It held that service in the work-charged establishment is qualifying service, limited arrears to three years before the date of the order, and ordered payment within three months.
The State’s review petition was dismissed on 13 February 2020 and its curative petition was withdrawn. The employees pointed out that an office memorandum of 20 November 2019 had directed compliance and that pensions were released to a number of them.
Two Ordinances, two Acts
The State then promulgated an Ordinance, retrospective from 1961. An Act replaced it and came into force on 5 March 2021.
While this batch was being heard, the State promulgated another Ordinance in 2025. That became the 2025 Act, Uttar Pradesh Act No. 5 of 2026, again retrospective from 1 April 1961.
The 2025 Act brought in the term “substantive appointee”. It prescribed who is entitled to pension by reference to it, and validated actions and government orders notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or authority.
Who the petitioners are
Most petitioners are employees or retirees of the Public Works, Ground Water and Irrigation departments, engaged between the late 1970s and mid-1980s in work-charged establishments. The lead petition records engagements between 1978 and 1986. They were regularised at different times.
The court sorted the cases into three groups. Group I is 12 petitions by employees and associations challenging the Ordinance and the Validation Acts. Group II is five petitions by individuals whose claims the High Court had rejected, and Group III is seven State appeals against High Court judgments favouring employees.
What the employees argued
The employees said their service was never ephemeral or casual. The State had used it for decades and then regularised them, and could not now erase it for pension. Prem Singh, they argued, was a constitutional ruling on discrimination and not a favour to its litigants.
Equals cannot be treated unequally because only some went to court, they said, citing Arvind Kumar Srivastava. The 2021 Act, they argued, only restores the exclusion in different words.
They added that pension had become a vested right for people who had already served and often retired. They also said the State promulgated the 2025 Ordinance in a clandestine manner mid-hearing, though the court records that they pressed little on the 2025 Act itself.
Counsel for impleaded retired Public Works Department personnel traced decades of State orders absorbing work-charged staff and preserving seniority from initial appointment. They relied on Habib Khan, Prem Ram, Chandra Prakash Pandey and Jaggo.
The State’s case through the Attorney General
Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India, appeared for the State. Pension, he said, is a creature of statutory rules, and a work-charged establishment is legally and fiscally distinct from a regular one. Regularisation ordinarily operates prospectively.
He argued that Prem Singh wrongly equated work-charged and regular service, and that the Note to Rule 3(8) only protected continuity for an employee who was otherwise in a pensionable establishment.
The Acts, he said, met the three tests in Prithvi Cotton Mills: competence, removal of the defect, and conformity with Part III. He added that Prem Singh deserved reconsideration by a larger Bench, as one decided per incuriam.
Retrospectivity, he submitted, is intrinsic to validating legislation, and the Acts operate on the wider class and not on the parties to Prem Singh. He also voiced an apprehension that the claims could cost the State thousands of crores of rupees.
The questions the bench framed
The court framed four questions of law. The first three concerned whether the legislature could retrospectively alter the position after Prem Singh, whether the Acts changed the legal substratum or annulled a binding judgment, and whether they met the settled tests for validating laws.
The fourth went to the heart of the dispute:
“Whether on regularisation of the service of an employee and integrating him into the mainstream of public service, the birthmark of his initial appointment stands obliterated?” (para 38)
A judgment is not changed by changing words
The court began by recording that neither side doubted the legislature’s power to regulate service conditions or to legislate retrospectively. The controversy, it said, was a sequence: a rule excluded, the court intervened, the legislature responded, and the question is whether that response altered the law or only its vocabulary.
Reading Prem Singh, it said the earlier ruling had not created a pension right in disregard of the statute. It had read down Rule 3(8) because the exclusion could not constitutionally survive. The Acts must be measured against that defect and not against a proposition the ruling never laid down.
The bench then surveyed Prithvi Cotton Mills, Janapada Sabha, Madan Mohan Pathak, Delhi Cloth and General Mills and Indian Aluminium, and found no conflict among them.
The legislature may change the law so that the foundation of a judgment goes. It may not merely declare the judgment ineffective.
Competence, the court said, is the threshold and removal of the defect is the substance. What matters is not the label “Validation Act” but what the enactment actually changes.
What the 2021 and 2025 Acts did
The 2021 Act redefined qualifying service as service rendered by an officer appointed to a temporary or permanent post in accordance with the service rules. It deemed past actions under Rule 3(8) valid from 1 April 1961, notwithstanding any judgment.
The 2025 Act denied pension to anyone who is not a substantive appointee and who is or was a subscriber to a Contributory Provident Fund or Employees’ Provident Fund. Section 4 validated past denials to that class, again from 1961.
The court held that Section 3 of the 2025 Act substitutes “substantive appointee” for the old test and so reproduces the same exclusion in a new statutory dress. The earlier attempt excluded service by the nature of the establishment. This one excluded it by the nature of the appointment.
The legislature, the bench said, had not shown why service actually rendered, accepted by the State and followed by regularisation, should be denied for pension alone. Sections 3 and 4 together change the statutory label but not the vice.
The bench quoted Dr B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly on how the Constitution can be perverted by changing the form of administration. Repeated re-enactment of struck-down provisions, it said, showed the form of administration being calibrated against the spirit of the Constitution.
A mandamus that had become final
The State had said the Acts operate in rem on a larger class, not on the parties to Prem Singh. The court called this mistaking the reach of the relief for the reach of the constitutional vice. The principle in that ruling was not confined to its cause title.
Relying on Madan Mohan Pathak, a seven-Judge Bench decision, it said a mandamus that has attained finality is a specific command to a named party. A validating law, which operates on the general law, cannot reopen what the court settled between parties unless it removes the basis of the judgment.
Retrospectivity, the court said, is a feature of legislation and not a cure for legislative annulment of a judicially crystallised right. It held that the Acts, in extinguishing the effect of the final adjudication in Prem Singh without removing its basis, were constitutionally infirm.
Article 14 on its own footing
Independently, the court tested the Acts against Part III, the third limb of Indian Aluminium. The State may distinguish between modes of appointment and kinds of establishment, it accepted, and Article 14 does not demand equal treatment for every temporary, work-charged and regular appointment.
But the classification here was used to deny pension to people whom the State later regularised. The court asked whether a distinction between a permanent and a work-charged establishment has a rational nexus to pension entitlement where the earlier service was real, continuous and accepted.
It found none. The description of the establishment may be relevant but cannot settle the question. The combination in Section 3 of non-substantive appointment and fund membership was not shown to bear a rational relation to the denial of pension.
Section 4, it added, cannot make denials valid by a deeming fiction when the classification itself offends Article 14. A validating provision cannot do indirectly what the Constitution forbids directly, and the Acts fell afoul of Article 14.
Regularisation erases the birthmark
On the substantive question, the court drew on Shailendra Singh v. Union of India, a three-Judge Bench ruling on High Court Judges from the district judiciary and the Bar, and on the later reference concerning High Court judges’ pension refixation.
Those cases concerned judges, a different constitutional setting. The bench said it could not brush aside the wider principle for that reason alone, though its application depends on the scheme governing regularisation.
It stated three limbs. Regularisation confers a substantive status and the employee enters the regular stream.
Second, it erases the birthmark, and the appointment becomes regular. Third, denying retiral benefits by reviving the birthmark through a retrospective law is impermissible.
“the employer cannot thereafter seek to deny retiral benefits by resurrecting the obliterated birthmark” (para 94)
Such an attempt, the court said, creates a class within a class and deprives a regular employee of a vested right. Pension is not a bounty but a facet of Article 21, so classification on a vanished birthmark is arbitrary and discriminatory.
Parks and the plea of cost
The Attorney General had raised, in passing, the cost of settling the claims. The court called the submission entirely unpersuasive and took judicial notice that the State had recently committed thousands of crores to building and beautifying parks and public spaces.
It did not question those choices, it said, but the State could not place such spending above its legal obligations. Fiscal considerations may inform how compliance happens. They cannot be a ground for postponing it indefinitely.
“the bogey of financial constraints of the State should never be raised” (para 98)
Associations as petitioners
The lead petition was filed by an association, and the names of all its members were not disclosed in the writ petition. The court set out the law. An association may sue for its own rights, or for its members if authorised under its bye-laws, but registration alone gives no independent right.
Prospectively, it said, High Courts should insist on a list of all members on the roll when an association files such a petition, subject to their own rules. The courts could check whether they remain members when the decision is pronounced, and leave later joiners to be decided case by case.
For this batch, the directions operate in rem. Every employee within the judgment benefits, whether or not he is a member of the association.
Arrears capped at three years
Prem Singh had limited monetary benefits to three years before the writ petition. The court said consistency required the same here, in line with Shiv Dass and Tarsem Singh.
A coordinate Bench had recently decided Maya Banerjee, after this judgment was reserved. It declined to follow Tarsem Singh and followed Mastan Bee, a widow’s family pension case.
The bench found those two decisions distinguishable. They turned on their own facts, in a family pension setting viewed through Article 15(3). The court added that non-consideration of an earlier decision does not alone justify not following it, and that per incuriam is not made out that way.
The only course left, it concluded, was to follow Shiv Dass, Tarsem Singh and Prem Singh, the last a three-Judge Bench that binds it.
Order
The 2021 and 2025 Acts are declared ultra vires. Claims of eligible work-charged employees are to be considered in light of Prem Singh. Every retired government employee within the judgment may apply to the competent authority with full particulars of service.
The authority must decide each claim within six months of receipt and extend benefits where due. Pension is to be calculated for each employee, including those who died after Prem Singh, with monetary benefits limited to three years before the writ petition in that case.
That limit does not apply to heirs of an employee who retired and died before Prem Singh was delivered. They must produce unimpeachable proof. A claim that seems unacceptable needs a hearing and a reasoned order before rejection.
On each favourable decision, the authority must give the employee a chart of all payments and the head under which each was made. No interest is imposed for the period when the State relied on its laws, but late payment will attract simple interest at 9 per cent a year.
The High Court judgments challenged in the employees’ civil appeals are set aside. The writ petitions and civil appeals in Groups I and II are allowed, and the State’s Group III appeals are dismissed.
Contempt petitions
Eight sets of contempt petitions alleged non-compliance with Prem Singh. On 7 December 2023 the State said it was ready to comply, and on 23 January 2024 it said pension payment orders had been issued. The court found that the office reports did not prove every amount reached every petitioner.
It therefore made no finding of wilful disobedience. The State has one further and final opportunity to pay the amounts due, with arrears, within six months, failing which it bears simple interest at 9 per cent a year.
No contempt petition remains pending. Any failure to comply will be viewed extremely seriously and may constitute aggravated contempt. All questions about later non-compliance are left open.