Threat to Upload Bathing Video Imputes Unchastity, Sustains Section 506 Conviction Even Without Video Recovery

A Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and N. Kotiswar Singh upholds criminal intimidation conviction, redefining unchastity through dignity and privacy, while reducing sentence to time served.

The Supreme Court has dismissed a criminal appeal by Vijayakumar, a Tamil Nadu police constable, who challenged his conviction under Part II of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code for threatening to upload a secretly recorded bathing video of the prosecutrix on Facebook. The Court, in a judgment authored by Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh and concurred in by Justice Sanjay Karol, held that the threat to publish such a video constitutes criminal intimidation by imputing unchastity, even where the mobile phone and the video itself were never recovered during investigation. 

The Court also held that acquittal on related charges of rape and voyeurism does not automatically extinguish a separately proved charge of criminal intimidation. Sentence was reduced to the period of custody already undergone, given the facts of the case and the passage of time since the 2015 incident.

How the Case Reached the Supreme Court

The prosecutrix lodged a complaint on 10 August 2015 before the All Women Police Station, Gingee, alleging that Vijayakumar had established a sexual relationship with her on a false promise of marriage and had secretly recorded her while she was bathing. She alleged he later threatened to upload the video on social media if she insisted on formalising their relationship or married someone else.

The two had known each other since 2013. The prosecutrix, a Christian, had told the appellant that their religious difference was a barrier to marriage. Despite this, she alleged, the appellant repeatedly expressed love, helped her with personal matters, and eventually had sexual intercourse with her. After he joined the police and left for training, the relationship continued. When her family began looking for a marriage alliance, the appellant came to her on 8 April 2015 and warned her that he would release the bathing video if she married anyone else.

The Sessions Judge, Magalir Neethi Mandram (Fast Track Mahila Court), Villupuram, acquitted the appellant of charges under Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC, finding the sexual relationship consensual and the voyeurism charge unproved for want of the video. However, the Trial Court convicted him under Part II of Section 506 IPC, sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 3,000. The High Court of Judicature at Madras confirmed this conviction and sentence on 28 February 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2017. Vijayakumar then approached the Supreme Court.

The Appellant's Arguments

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant pressed two main contentions. First, he argued that since the charges under Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC were all held not proved, the conviction under Part II of Section 506 IPC could not stand in isolation because all the alleged incidents were inter-related. Second, he contended that the mobile phone and the video were never recovered, and in the absence of this material evidence, the prosecution could not have proved the existence of any threat to upload a video.

He also urged that the complaint was filed out of spite after the relationship ended when he declined to marry the prosecutrix.

Each Charge Must Be Examined Independently

The Court rejected the first argument at the threshold. It affirmed that even where multiple offences arise from a series of transactions involving the same parties, each charge must be examined separately. The ingredients of different offences are not identical, and acquittal on one charge does not invariably lead to acquittal on another.

The Court drew a specific distinction between the charges. Offences under Sections 376 and 493 IPC turn on whether sexual acts were consensual. Criminal intimidation under Section 506, read with Section 503, involves a different question entirely: whether a threat was made with intent to cause alarm. The Court observed that even within a consensual relationship, it would be very difficult to contemplate that a woman would consent to or condone her partner releasing images of a private act in the public domain, violating her privacy and dignity.

Since neither the prosecutrix nor the State had appealed the acquittals under Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC, the correctness of those findings was not before the Court. The only question was whether the charge under Section 506 IPC had been proved.

Redefining “Unchastity” Through Dignity and Autonomy

The Court devoted substantial analysis to what it means to “impute unchastity” within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC. It traced the older colonial-era approach, under which unchastity was tied narrowly to a woman's sexual conduct and moral virtue, and contrasted it with the constitutional evolution since.

Drawing on the Constitution Bench decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 39, the Court noted that anachronistic conceptions of chastity and honour had long deprived women of the constitutional guarantees of dignity and privacy. It also drew on Pawan Kumar v. State of H.P., (2017) 7 SCC 780, for the proposition that a woman has an absolute right to reject, and that male chauvinism has no room in a civilised society.

The Court then drew on the nine-judge bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India to hold that privacy of the body entitles an individual to the integrity of the physical aspects of personhood, and that control over dissemination of personal information is part of the dignity guaranteed under Article 21.

From these threads, the Court arrived at a reformulated understanding: chastity is not to be seen purely from the moral perspective of virtue. It must be seen from the prism of dignity and autonomy of the individual woman to decide her sexual preferences, and her right to control information about her sexual life. Any unwarranted interference with that sexual autonomy — including threatening to publish private images, can be said to impute unchastity, insofar as it prevents the woman from controlling choices she makes about her sexual life.

Applying this to the facts, the Court held that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when disrobing in a bathroom. Any publication of images taken there would violate privacy and dignity and sully her chastity. The threat to upload such a video on Facebook, therefore, amounted to imputing unchastity to the prosecutrix by publication, regardless of the nature of their prior relationship.

Non-Recovery of the Video Was Not Fatal

On the second argument, the Court held that recovery of an article of crime is not a sine qua non for conviction. Law does not mandate it, though production of the material would strengthen the prosecution case. The Court cited Goverdhan v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378, for the settled position that non-recovery of the weapon of crime is not fatal if there are direct reliable witnesses.

The Court then examined whether the testimonial evidence on record was credible enough to infer the existence of the video and the threat, even without the mobile phone.

The prosecutrix (PW-1) gave direct oral testimony about the recording and the threat. Her elder sister Edwinrani (PW-5) testified that the prosecutrix had narrated to her the recording of the video and the threat to expose it. Her younger sister Pushpadhanaeldamary (PW-10) deposed that the prosecutrix told her the appellant had secretly recorded her bathing and threatened to publish it on Facebook; PW-10 also stated she had heard the recorded conversation between the appellant and PW-1 on PW-1's mobile phone. The prosecutrix's sister-in-law Suguna (PW-7) testified to having heard the prosecutrix speaking nervously on the phone, saying words to the effect of “no such thing is there, do not release it on Facebook.”

The Panchayat President of the village (PW-3) testified that on 20 July 2015, the prosecutrix and her family members approached him about the appellant's conduct, and he took them to the appellant's house where the appellant's parents said they would speak to their son.

Several local witnesses turned hostile, but the Court noted that the corroborating witnesses, PW-5, PW-7, and PW-10 were family members with no reason to be inimical to the accused, and their testimony was natural and contextual.

Section 106 of the Evidence Act and Especial Knowledge

The Court addressed the evidentiary difficulty that arises when alleged incidents occur entirely within a private relationship. It held that Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, which places the burden of proving facts especially within a person's knowledge upon that person, is not confined to acts happening within a physical space. It extends to interpersonal relationships forming an intangible private space. Incidents within that space are known only to those involved.

In the present case, only the appellant and the prosecutrix were privy to their conversations and transactions. Whether what the appellant said to the prosecutrix was true, and whether the prosecutrix was telling a lie, only the appellant could explain. He was in a position to deny the allegation or provide an explanation, but chose not to do so in a manner that could rebut the prosecution's case.

The Court was careful to note that Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden of proof. It relied on Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer, (1956) 1 SCC 337, for the settled position that Section 106 is designed to meet exceptional cases where it would be disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts pre-eminently within the accused's knowledge.

Credibility of the Prosecutrix's Evidence

The Court applied the framework from Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 AIR(SC) 614, which classifies oral testimony as wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or neither. It held that the prosecutrix's evidence fell in the third category, requiring corroboration in material particulars.

The Court also rejected the argument that because the Trial Court and High Court did not accept the prosecutrix's evidence on the rape charge, her evidence had to be discarded entirely. It relied on Sohrab v. State of M.P., (1972) 3 SCC 751, for the position that the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule in Indian law. Evidence unreliable in one respect is not necessarily false in all other respects.

The Court found that the prosecutrix's testimony on the threat was corroborated by PW-5, PW-7, and PW-10 in material particulars. The relationship itself, lasting about two years, not a fleeting acquaintance provided the backdrop. The prosecutrix had broached the subject with her sisters before lodging the complaint and remained steadfast in her accusation. The Court was satisfied that the evidence passed the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Lapse by the Investigating Officer

While upholding the conviction, the Court expressed disappointment at the failure of the Investigating Officer to even attempt recovery of the mobile phone and video. The Court observed that in cases involving digital evidence, it is the onerous responsibility of the Investigating Officer to recover such evidence. The failure to do so may be attributable to incompetency or lack of expertise, and the Court directed that this lapse be brought to the notice of competent authorities to ensure Investigating Officers do not repeat such failures.

Concurrent Findings and Scope of Interference

The Court also noted that it was dealing with concurrent findings of fact and law by both the Trial Court and the High Court. Citing Mekala Sivaiah v. State of A.P., (2022) 8 SCC 253, it held that this Court does not reappreciate evidence to examine whether concurrent findings are correct, and will interfere only where there is manifest illegality or grave miscarriage of justice by misreading or ignoring material evidence. No such infirmity was found in the present case.

Outcome

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction of Vijayakumar under Part II of Section 506 IPC. However, considering the peculiar facts of the case and that the incident occurred in 2015, the Court reduced the sentence to the period of custody already undergone by the appellant. The impugned judgment and order of the Madras High Court dated 28 February 2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2017 was confirmed with this modification. Since the appellant had been released on bail during the pendency of the appeal, the bail bond and surety were discharged.