Supreme Court quashes perjury complaint, distinguishes 'wrong statement' from 'false statement'

A Bench of Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and Atul S. Chandurkar held that a prima facie finding of “wrong statements” cannot sustain a Section 340 complaint for perjury.

The Supreme Court has set aside an order directing a perjury complaint against a litigant and his counsel, holding that a trial court cannot invoke Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure merely on a finding that “wrong statements” were made in pleadings. Deciding Prabhakar Yeshwant Masram and Another v Sou Tula Namdeorao Jaipurkar and Another, a Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar found that a “wrong statement” and a “false statement” carry different legal thresholds under Sections 193, 199 and 200 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court also held that the court concerned had not recorded any opinion that an inquiry was expedient in the interest of justice, as Section 340(1) requires. The appeal was allowed and the application under Section 340 was dismissed.

How the dispute reached the Court

The origin lay in a civil suit filed by the plaintiffs (the respondents here) against the predecessors-in-title of the first appellant, seeking to restrain obstruction to enjoyment of their property. On 3 April 2001, the trial court granted a temporary injunction. The first appellant later purchased the suit property and got himself impleaded as a defendant on 16 January 2003.

During the appeal against the injunction, the plaintiffs moved an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, alleging breach of the injunction. By an order dated 13 October 2003, the trial court directed the defendant to restore the earlier position and issued a show cause notice. The defendant filed a miscellaneous appeal and a stay application. On 17 January 2004, the appellate court stayed the 13 October 2003 order.

The plaintiffs contended that the defendant had made incorrect statements in that miscellaneous appeal and stay application, and that these had led to the stay. They filed a criminal contempt petition before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court against the defendant, his counsel (the second appellant), and the appellate judge who passed the stay order.

By order dated 12 October 2004, the High Court declined to proceed with contempt but gave the plaintiffs liberty to move under Section 340. The plaintiffs then filed a Section 340 application. On 19 January 2006, the appellate court found a prima facie case that “wrong statements” had been made and directed a complaint under Sections 193, 199 and 200. The appellants' appeal under Section 341 was dismissed by the High Court on 14 August 2012, bringing them to the Supreme Court.

Why 'wrong' does not equal 'false'

The Court framed the issue narrowly: whether a prima facie finding of “wrong statements” could support a direction to file a complaint for perjury offences. It held it could not.

Section 199 punishes a false statement in a declaration receivable as evidence, and Section 193 punishes giving false evidence. What is required at the stage of directing a complaint, the Court said, is a prima facie case of a “false statement” or “false evidence”. The order of 19 January 2006 recorded only that “wrong statements” had been made.

The Court drew a clear line between the two. A “false statement” denotes a deliberate intention, being “a wrongful or erroneous statement made intentionally to gain an undue advantage.” A wrong statement of fact may not carry that character. Since the trial court's basic premise rested on “wrong statements”, it did not meet the necessary threshold.

The missing finding on expediency

The Court held the order defective on a second count. Section 340(1) requires the court to form an opinion that an inquiry is expedient in the interest of justice before directing one. The trial court recorded no such satisfaction.

Relying on the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah, the Court noted that a complaint is not mandatory and follows only where the interest of justice requires it, judged by the effect on the administration of justice. It also cited Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, that prosecution should follow only in “glaring cases of deliberate falsehood where conviction is highly likely”.

The High Court's overreach

The Court found the High Court had improved on the original order in an appeal filed by the appellants. The court of first instance had found only “wrong statements”, yet the High Court recorded that the appellants had filed a false affidavit and made a finding on expediency that was absent below.

Because the plaintiffs had not challenged the original order, the appellants could not be placed in a worse position through their own appeal. Such a course, the Court held, is not permissible in law.

The Court also weighed a correction application. On 20 September 2004, well before the Section 340 application of 27 April 2005, the defendant's counsel had moved under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Section 151 to correct typing mistakes, explaining that the word “not” had been omitted and “dismissed” typed in place of “disposed of”. Counsel tendered an apology for the errors. The Court found the mistakes typographical, with an explanation duly furnished, and not of a grave nature amounting to false statements.

Citing the three-Judge Bench in James Kunjwal v State of Uttarakhand, the Court reiterated that proceedings should follow only where there is deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance, distinct evidence and not mere suspicion. It also recalled the Constitution Bench view that a Section 340 direction should normally await conclusion of the substantive proceedings, so that they are not diverted or delayed.

Order

The Court quashed the order dated 19 January 2006 passed by the 7th Additional District Judge, Nagpur in M.C.A. No. 28 of 2004, and the judgment dated 14 August 2012 of the Single Judge of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 125 of 2006. The plaintiffs' application under Section 340 stood dismissed and the Criminal Appeal was allowed. The judgment was authored by Justice Atul S. Chandurkar. The respondents, despite service, did not oppose the appeal.