Allahabad HC Acquits Five in Dowry Death Case, Finds Dying Declaration Unreliable and Prosecution Case Perverse

The court discarded the sole dying declaration as sweeping, internally contradicted, and stripped of medical support, then drew an adverse inference for suppression of a second declaration.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court comprising Justice Ajay Bhanot and Justice Divesh Chandra Samant on 3 July 2026 set aside the conviction of five family members who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for the dowry death of Zubia, a 22-year-old woman who died on 7 March 2017 from burn injuries. The trial court at Shahjahanpur had found all five guilty under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC in Sessions Trial No. 419 of 2019. On appeal, the High Court found the conviction rested entirely on a dying declaration that it found unreliable on multiple grounds, concluded that the trial court's judgment was perverse, and honourably acquitted all five accused persons.

The Incident and the Prosecution Case

According to the FIR registered on 20 February 2017 at Police Station Sadar Bazar, Shahjahanpur as Case Crime No. 1060 of 2017, Zubia had been married to Khalid for about four years under Muslim rites. Her husband and in-laws had reportedly demanded Rs. 1 lakh and a motorcycle. When her family could not meet those demands, the deceased was allegedly subjected to constant harassment and threats that she would be murdered and Khalid would remarry.

On 19 February 2017, the FIR alleged, Zubia's brother-in-law Rashid flung her to the ground, her sisters-in-law Mahnaz and Shehnaz pinned her hands down, and her husband Khalid poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The accused persons then locked the door and left. After some time, the FIR stated, they rushed her to District Hospital, Shahjahanpur, apparently to create an alibi. The victim was later shifted to Civil Hospital, Lucknow, where she died at 6:45 am on 7 March 2017. The postmortem recorded septicaemia due to antemortem burn injuries as the cause of death.

A chargesheet was filed on 23 July 2017 under Section 498-A and Section 304-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The trial court took cognizance on 22 October 2019, framed charges on 18 November 2019, and ultimately convicted all five accused under Section 302/149 IPC, imposing life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 each, with three months' simple imprisonment in default.

The five appellants before the High Court were Khalid (husband), Rashid (brother-in-law), Mahnaz (sister-in-law), Jayara @ Shayara Bano (mother-in-law), and Shabnam (sister-in-law).

Why the Case Turned Entirely on the Dying Declaration

The prosecution examined twelve witnesses. The first informant Shama Parveen (PW-1, mother of the deceased), Manzoor (PW-2, father), Shaanu (PW-3, sister), and Israr @ Nanhe (PW-5, maternal uncle) were all declared hostile after repudiating the prosecution case in the witness box. Yameen (PW-4, brother-in-law) also refuted the prosecution during cross-examination. In effect, every witness of fact who had personal knowledge of the deceased and her household turned against the prosecution narrative.

The only incriminating evidence that remained was a dying declaration recorded on 19 February 2017 at 12:20 PM by PW-6 Sanjay Kumar, then posted as Naib Tehsildar, Sadar, Shahjahanpur. Dr. Anurag Parashar (PW-7) had certified the deceased as fit to give her statement. In that declaration, Zubia named her husband Khalid, brother-in-law Rashid, mother-in-law Saayra, and sisters-in-law Shabnam and Mahnaz as having poured kerosene on her and set her alight. The prosecution's entire case thus rested on this single document.

How the Bench Reasoned Against the Dying Declaration

Justice Ajay Bhanot, writing for the Bench, surveyed the settled law on dying declarations, including the Constitution Bench decision in Laxman v State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 and the Supreme Court's more recent approval of those principles in Irfan @ Naka v State of Uttar Pradesh (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1060). The Bench acknowledged the juristic basis for accepting dying declarations — that the expectation of imminent death silences motives to lie — but emphasised that strong cautions must govern their appraisal.

The Bench identified several interconnected failures in the prosecution's evidence.

Medical condition left vague. No bed-head ticket, medical case sheet, or treatment records from District Hospital, Shahjahanpur were produced. The doctors who treated the deceased at that hospital were not examined. The documents relating to her transfer to Civil Hospital, Lucknow and the treatment records there were also absent. Critically, even the postmortem report did not record the percentage of burn injuries. Without this material, the court found it impossible to determine whether the injuries were fatal enough to foreclose survival and thereby induce a genuine expectation of imminent death — the foundational prerequisite for treating the statement as a dying declaration at all.

Sweeping implication without specific roles. In the declaration, the deceased attributed the act collectively to all five accused without assigning particular roles to each. The court found this generalised implication unsafe for the purpose of conviction and observed that the declaration appeared more aimed at visiting retribution on the husband's entire family than at stating the truth.

Implausible denial of knowledge. The deceased stated in the declaration that she did not know who had brought her to the hospital. The FIR itself, PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 had all consistently stated that it was Khalid and his family who rushed her to hospital. PW-7 had testified she was fully conscious. The court found this denial “lacks credibility” in the circumstances.

Motive added as an afterthought. The deceased initially said in the declaration that she was unaware of the motive. She then added that the accused persons used to harass her. The court characterised this as a qualification inserted to salvage a failing prosecution case, and held the motive depicted in the declaration to be weak, vague and not worthy of credence.

Contradiction between FIR and declaration. The FIR, lodged by Zubia's mother who had spoken to her daughter before its registration, did not name the mother-in-law Shayara or sister-in-law Shabnam. Both appeared for the first time in the dying declaration. The court held that the first informant could not have missed this fact, and that the mother-in-law's nomination was evidently an afterthought.

Inconsistency in the recording of the declaration. PW-6 stated under cross-examination that he had asked all persons to leave the room before recording the declaration. This conflicted with the testimony of PW-7, who claimed to have been present and observed the deceased as conscious throughout. The court treated PW-7's presence and testimony as doubtful in light of this inconsistency.

Suppression of the second dying declaration. PW-8, the first Investigating Officer, deposed that he had recorded a second statement of the deceased on 4 March 2017. The prosecution never produced this document before the trial court and offered no cogent reason for its absence. The Bench drew an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, holding that the suppressed declaration would have been adverse to the prosecution.

The Bench further noted that PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-5 had all testified that the deceased was of extreme temperamental behaviour and prone to suicidal tendencies. The postmortem report showed no antemortem injuries from forceful assault or resistance beyond the burns themselves. Taken together, the court held that the evidence did not rule out suicide or death from an accident arising from the deceased's own behaviour. It also observed that the FIR itself had acknowledged deterioration in the victim's condition due to financial inability to access quality medical care, meaning that death from septicaemia due to inadequate treatment could not be excluded.

The court concluded that the dying declaration was

Alternative Charges Under Section 304-B and 498-A IPC

The State had alternatively argued that even if the appellants were acquitted under Section 302, they remained liable under Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The Bench rejected this contention. All prosecution witnesses had refuted the case of dowry demands set out in the FIR. The deceased herself had not asserted in her dying declaration that any specific dowry demand was made on her or that she was tortured specifically for dowry. With no proof of demand or harassment immediately preceding death, the foundational facts required to raise the statutory presumption of dowry death under Section 304-B were absent. The charge under Section 304-B and Section 498-A IPC read with the Dowry Prohibition Act therefore also failed.

Outcome

The Division Bench set aside the judgment dated 6 September 2021 in Sessions Trial No. 419 of 2019 in its entirety. Mahnaz, Jayara @ Shayara Bano, Rashid, Khalid and Shabnam were honourably acquitted of all charges. Their bail bonds and sureties were discharged. All four criminal appeals were allowed. The court directed that a Hindi translation of the judgment be served on each appellant through the Secretary, District Legal Services Authority.