Allahabad HC Lucknow Bench: Writ Against Bar Association's One-Year Debarment Order Not Maintainable Under Article 226

The Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench dismissed a writ challenging a district Bar Association's debarment order, holding that internal membership disputes are purely private and do not attract Article 226 jurisdiction.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court at Lucknow, comprising Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, dismissed a writ petition filed by an advocate against a press release issued by the Central Bar Association, Tehsil Gola Gokaran Nath, District Lakhimpur Kheri, debarring him from its membership for one year. Deciding Writ-C No. 7701 of 2026 on 9 September 2026, the bench held that a Bar Association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 performs no public function when it resolves internal membership or debarment disputes, and such a dispute does not attract the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner was directed to pursue his remedy before a civil court, the Registrar of Societies, or any authority designated under the Association's bye-laws.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The petitioner, Lal Bihari Verma, is a practising advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh since 1989 (Enrolment No. 02520/1989). He had served as ex-president of the Central Bar Association and was appointed its Chief Election Officer for elections held on 20 January 2026.

After conducting the elections, the petitioner lodged complaints against the newly elected office-bearers alleging illegal activities. The Association responded by issuing a press release dated 12 June 2026, debarring him from membership for one year. The petitioner characterised the debarment as retaliatory and arbitrary, claiming it caused irreparable injury to his reputation.

He filed a writ petition under Article 226 seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the press release. Though the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Bar Council of India, and the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh were arrayed as respondents nos. 1, 2, and 3, the bench observed at the outset that the entire grievance was directed exclusively against the Bar Association, which was Respondent No. 4, and that no independent inaction or relief was attributed to the other three respondents.

The Threshold Question: Maintainability Against a Bar Association

Counsel for the respondents opposed the writ at the threshold. They argued that the Bar Association is a purely private body, that the dispute concerns internal membership, and that the petitioner had an equally efficacious alternative remedy. They further contended that the dispute turned on contested facts of membership that could not be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction.

The bench identified the central question as whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable against a Bar Association in respect of a dispute relating to its internal membership or debarment. The court declined to enter the merits at all and confined itself entirely to this preliminary issue.

The Function Test and the Line of Supreme Court Authority

The bench began with the settled principle that amenability to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 does not turn on whether a body is formally public or private. What matters is the “function test”: whether the impugned action involves the discharge of a public duty or public function, or is a private affair.

The court drew on three Supreme Court decisions. In Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, (2003) 10 SCC 733, the Supreme Court held that a private company carrying on banking business does not become amenable to writ jurisdiction merely because it is regulated by statute, unless it is entrusted with a public duty. The court quoted the Supreme Court's conclusion that “merely regulatory provisions to ensure such activity carried on by private bodies work within a discipline” do not confer that status.

In G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, (2003) 4 SCC 225, the Supreme Court held that mere registration or regulation is insufficient; the character of the specific function under challenge must be examined. The Court had stated that the inter se relationship between an employee and the institute was “purely contractual in nature” and that no writ lies to quash an order terminating a contract of service.

Most recently, in S. Shobha v. Muthoot Finance Ltd., (2025) 11 SCC 335, the Supreme Court restated that a private entity whose obligations are confined to its own account holders or members, without binding effect on the public at large, falls outside the scope of Article 226.

The bench also considered the function test's outer limits. It acknowledged that in Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar, (2015) 3 SCC 251, and Zee Telefilms v. Union of India, (2005) 4 SCC 649, the Supreme Court had extended writ jurisdiction to bodies exercising a de facto public monopoly over an entire national activity. The bench was careful to distinguish those cases: they proceeded on special facts involving bodies with monopoly control over national-level activities, and had no application to a district-level voluntary Bar Association whose functions are confined to the welfare and internal regulation of its own enrolled members.

Bar Association as a Private Body: Delhi HC and the Supreme Court's Refusal to Interfere

The bench found direct precedent in Sangita Rai v. New Delhi Bar Association, 2026 SCC OnLine Del 243, a recent Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court. That case concerned a dispute over possession and use of a lawyers' chamber at a district court in Delhi. The Delhi Division Bench dismissed the writ on maintainability, holding that a Bar Association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is a private body of lawyers and does not perform public functions.

The Delhi High Court had categorically found that a Bar Association is “in fact, a purely private entity” and cannot be termed the State or its instrumentality or agency under Article 12 of the Constitution. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus could not issue against it.

Critically, the Allahabad bench noted that the Supreme Court had upheld this Delhi High Court judgment by order dated 1 June 2026, passed in SLP(Civil) No. 18940/2026, refusing to interfere and dismissing the special leave petition.

Applying the Function Test to a Membership Debarment Dispute

The bench applied these principles to the facts. The Central Bar Association, Tehsil Gola Gokaran Nath, is admittedly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The dispute is a membership dispute: the Association, acting under its own rules, issued a press release debarring the petitioner from membership for one year.

The court accepted that the legal profession as a whole possesses a public character. It declined, however, to extend that characterisation to the internal governance of a voluntary Bar Association. The inter se relationship between such an association and its members is essentially contractual and regulatory under its own bye-laws. A debarment from membership is not the discharge of any public function; it produces no binding effect on the public at large.

The bench went further to address the Uttar Pradesh statutory context. By virtue of amendments made to the Societies Registration Act by the Uttar Pradesh legislature, Sections 21 to 33 have been inserted into the Act, establishing a summary adjudication procedure before the Registrar of Societies, Chit & Funds. The court noted that this forum is specifically designed to resolve disputes affecting the affairs of a registered society, and that the petitioner could avail himself of it.

The court also rejected the attempt to cure the maintainability defect by impleading the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Bar Council of India, and the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh as respondents. No inaction or independent relief was attributed to any of them. The core grievance remained the press release of Respondent No. 4 alone.

Order

The Division Bench held that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Any dispute relating to membership of a Bar Association is private in nature and does not carry a public character. The writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable.

The bench simultaneously granted liberty to the petitioner to pursue alternative remedies: filing a civil suit before a court of competent jurisdiction, approaching the Registrar of Societies, or approaching any authority specifically designated under the bye-laws of the Association.

In the event the petitioner files such an application within one week, the concerned authority is directed to decide the membership dispute application within four weeks of the date of the application, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and all stakeholders, in accordance with law.