Voter Cannot Demand Rotation of SC/ST Reserved Constituencies; Allahabad HC Upholds Section 9(1)(c) of Delimitation Act 2002
The Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench dismissed a writ petition challenging the reservation of Kadipur Assembly Constituency for Scheduled Castes, holding that Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act 2002 is constitutionally valid and that courts cannot direct Parliament to introduce rotational reservation for SC/ST assembly seats.
A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court's Lucknow Bench, comprising Justice Alok Mathur and Justice Amitabh Kumar Rai, dismissed a writ petition filed by Jagdish Singh, a voter and self-described social worker from Kadipur Assembly Constituency (No. 191), District Sultanpur, Uttar Pradesh. Singh challenged the reservation of his constituency for Scheduled Castes under a notification dated 18 December 2006 and sought a declaration that Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 is ultra vires the Constitution. He also sought a direction compelling the Election Commission to declare the seat a general constituency. The bench, in a judgment delivered by Justice Amitabh Kumar Rai on 22 June 2026, found the provision constitutionally sound and held that issuing directions to Parliament to introduce rotation of reserved seats falls outside the court's power under Article 226.
The Dispute Before the High Court
Jagdish Singh, a resident of Village Gajendrapur, Tehsil Kadipur, District Sultanpur, complained that since the creation of the Kadipur Assembly Constituency, the seat had remained reserved for Scheduled Castes for almost six decades. Because of this reservation, he argued, he was prevented from voting for a general category candidate, as Section 5(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 restricts voting in reserved constituencies.
He characterised this as a “caste-bonded vote” — a compulsion to vote only for Scheduled Caste candidates for generations — which he said was discriminatory compared to voters in general constituencies and violated Articles 14, 15, and 19 of the Constitution.
His core legal challenge was directed at Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002. That provision directs the Delimitation Commission, when reserving seats for Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, to locate such reserved constituencies as far as practicable in those areas where the proportion of SC/ST population to the total population is comparatively large. Singh argued that this mechanism, by always fixing reserved seats in high-SC/ST-population areas without rotation, created a permanent stagnation of reservation in particular constituencies.
He contrasted this with Panchayat and Municipal elections, where Articles 243D and 243T of the Constitution expressly provide for rotation of reserved seats. He also pointed to the National Commission for Review of the Working of the Constitution (chaired by Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah), whose report of 31 March 2002 recommended rotation of SC/ST reserved seats in Parliament and State Legislatures to reflect plural composition of society.
Singh further highlighted that during the Constituent Assembly debates, a proposed amendment — Amendment No. 22 — which would have confined reserved constituencies to areas where SC/ST population was comparatively more numerous, was negatived. He argued this showed it was never the framers' intention to mandate such geographic concentration of reserved seats.
He had also appeared before the Delimitation Commission on 9 September 2006 and requested adoption of the rotational principle, without success.
The Maintainability Question Under Article 329
Before the bench could reach the merits, senior advocate O.P. Srivastava, appearing for the Election Commission of India, raised a threshold objection. He relied on Article 329(a) of the Constitution, which bars courts from calling into question any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies. He submitted that orders of the Delimitation Commission, once published in the Gazette of India, have the force of law under the Act, 2002, and cited Meghraj Kothari v. Delimitation Commission, AIR 1967 SC 669, in support.
The Election Commission also argued that the writ petition suffered from delay and laches, having been filed after the Delimitation Commission's order was published in the Gazette of India in 2008, and that no objection had been raised before the Commission during its proceedings. The Commission further submitted that introducing rotational reservation is a policy matter for which a writ of mandamus does not lie, particularly since the Constitution itself does not provide for rotation in assembly and parliamentary seats.
Petitioner's counsel countered by relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 7930 of 2024, decided on 23 July 2024, which held that Article 329 does not completely debar citizens from approaching courts where interpretation of constitutional provisions is required, or where a case of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power is made out.
The bench accepted the petitioner's position on maintainability. Since the challenge was directed at the constitutional validity of Section 9(1)(c) of the Act, 2002 — not merely at a delimitation order — the bar under Article 329 did not apply to preclude the petition at the threshold. The bench reproduced paragraphs 5 to 9 of Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod at length, noting that the Supreme Court had clarified that Meghraj Kothari was concerned with preventing indefinite delays in the election process, not with imposing a blanket prohibition on judicial review of delimitation exercises.
Whether Section 9(1)(c) Violates Articles 14, 15, 19, 330, or 332
The bench identified two questions for determination: first, whether Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 is ultra vires the Constitution for failing to provide rotation of reserved seats; and second, whether this court could, under Article 226, direct insertion of a rotational mechanism into the Act.
On the constitutional challenge, the bench examined the scheme of Articles 330 and 332. Article 330 provides for reservation of seats for SC/ST in the House of the People, and Article 332 does so for State Legislative Assemblies. Both mandate reservation in proportion to SC/ST population but, the bench found, neither provides any methodology for identifying which specific constituencies should be reserved. The Constitution expressly provides for rotation only in Panchayat elections under Article 243D and in Municipal elections under Article 243T. No equivalent provision exists for Parliament or State Legislatures.
Section 9(1)(c) of the Act, 2002 fills that methodological gap by directing the Delimitation Commission to reserve seats in areas with comparatively large SC/ST populations. The bench held there is no constitutional bar under Articles 330 or 332 against Parliament enacting such a provision. Parliament acted in exercise of its exclusive legislative domain under Article 327 read with Entry 72 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. Since Articles 330 and 332 leave the methodology open, the provision in Section 9(1)(c) does not conflict with any constitutional mandate.
On the voter's argument that he was being compelled into conditional voting in violation of Articles 14 and 19, the bench held that the right to vote does not entitle a voter to dictate the category of candidates in his constituency. The constitutional right to vote under Articles 325 and 326 operates subject to laws made by Parliament under Article 327. The bench relied on the Supreme Court's analysis in Rajbala v. State of Haryana, (2016) 2 SCC 445, which held that every citizen has a constitutional right to vote and contest elections subject to constitutional restrictions, and that the scheme of Articles 330 and 332 must be read in harmony with those electoral rights — not as overridden by them. A voter in a reserved constituency cannot legitimately complain that his rights are hampered simply because the seat is reserved.
On the question of whether the prolonged reservation of a single constituency for six decades renders Section 9(1)(c) arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional under Article 14, the bench applied the principle laid down in Rajbala and affirmed in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1: a statute cannot be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is “arbitrary” alone. Following State of A.P. v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709, the bench reiterated that Indian courts may strike down legislation only on two grounds — lack of legislative competence, or violation of a Fundamental Right or other constitutional provision. There is no third ground of pure arbitrariness.
The bench found that Section 9(1)(c) does not fail on either of those two grounds. Parliament had the competence to enact it. It does not violate any provision of Part III of the Constitution or any other constitutional provision. The bench also noted that where SC/ST populations are comparatively larger, SC/ST candidates may in fact be able to secure election without reservation, making the question of rotation a matter of legislative policy rather than constitutional compulsion.
Whether a Court Can Direct Parliament to Introduce Rotational Reservation
The bench then addressed the petitioner's ancillary prayer for a writ of mandamus directing amendment of the Delimitation Act, 2002 to insert a rotational mechanism for reserved constituencies. This was firmly rejected.
The bench drew on a line of Supreme Court decisions holding that courts cannot direct a legislature to enact a law in a particular manner. It cited Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323, for the proposition that courts have no power to add words to a statute or recast legislation to fill perceived deficiencies. It referred to Suresh Seth v. Indore Municipal Corporation, (2005) 13 SCC 287, which held that Parliament and State Legislatures exercise sovereign power to enact laws and no external authority can direct them to legislate in a particular form. Manoj Sharma v. State, (2008) 16 SCC 1, and State of U.P. v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd., (2011) 13 SCC 77, were cited for the principle of separation of powers and the constraint of judicial restraint in encroaching into the legislative domain.
The bench observed that the question of introducing rotation of reserved seats for Assembly and Parliamentary constituencies, along the lines of Articles 243D and 243T for Panchayats and Municipalities, is entirely a matter for Parliament to decide. It expressly noted that the goals of social and political justice “can only be achieved by rotation of seats enabling the SC/ST candidates to get elected even from those seats where their population is comparatively much low” — but that it is for Parliament to act on that observation through legislation, not for the court to compel it.
Outcome
The Division Bench dismissed Writ - C No. 6153 of 2011 on 22 June 2026. The court declined to declare Section 9(1)(c) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 ultra vires. It declined to issue any direction to the Election Commission to treat Kadipur Assembly Constituency (191), District Sultanpur as a general constituency. The petition challenging the Delimitation Commission's notification dated 18 December 2006 was also dismissed. No order as to costs was made.