Allahabad HC Upholds Voidance of Tribal Land Sales After Petitioner Fails to Prove Continuing Bhuiyan Identity

The Allahabad High Court dismissed three writ petitions, holding that a woman born in the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe had failed to establish continuing tribal identity at the time of agricultural land purchases in Sonbhadra, rendering the transfers void under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950.

Justice Arun Kumar, sitting singly at the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dismissed three connected writ petitions filed by Nanhki @ Naimunnisha of Village Korchi, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra. The petitioner had challenged separate orders dated 22 January 2026 passed by the Deputy Collector, Duddhi, which declared her purchases of agricultural land at Village Bagharu void under Section 157-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, and directed vesting of the land in the State Government. The court found that the petitioner had not produced convincing material to show she retained the customs, community life, and tribal acceptance of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe on the dates the sale deeds were executed, notwithstanding her birth in that community.

Three Sale Deeds, One Revenue Authority, One Legal Conclusion

Each of the three writ petitions targeted a distinct order of the Deputy Collector, Duddhi, each in turn declaring a separate registered sale deed void. Writ-C No. 17043 of 2026 concerned a sale deed dated 25 July 2017, executed by one Bajrangi in favour of the petitioner, relating to 0.0150 hectare of land in Plot No. 4123, Village Bagharu, Tehsil Duddhi, District Sonbhadra.

Writ-C No. 17171 of 2026 challenged the voidance of a sale deed dated 4 November 2011, executed by Ramswarath, covering 0.3905 hectare across Plot Nos. 3267Ka, 3268, 3264Ka, 3266, 3314KaM and 3291M in the same village. The third petition, Writ-C No. 17214 of 2026, concerned a sale deed dated 26 November 2018, executed by Sitakunwar, for 0.0084 hectare in Plot No. 3144Ka.

The proceedings before the Deputy Collector were initiated under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Notice was issued to the petitioner on 12 December 2025, and she filed a reply on 7 January 2026. The Deputy Collector passed all three impugned orders on 22 January 2026, within a fortnight.

The petitioner's case before the revenue authority rested on her claim to be a member of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe by birth, being the daughter of Mahaveer. She relied on a Scheduled Tribe certificate issued by the Tehsildar, Duddhi, and contended that her vendors — Bajrangi, Ramswarath, and Sitakunwar — each belonged to the Gour Scheduled Tribe. The caste particulars of both parties were, she argued, disclosed in the registered sale deeds themselves. Revenue entries had been made in her favour after registration, and the sale deeds had gone unchallenged before any court for close to nine years.

The Preliminary Objection: Alternative Statutory Remedy

Before reaching the merits, the court had to address the State's threshold contention. Senior Counsel and Additional Advocate General Sri Anoop Trivedi argued that the writ petitions were not maintainable because the impugned orders were revisable under Section 210 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 before the Board of Revenue. He relied on Paltoo Ram Yadav v. State of U.P. & Others, Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:166655, in support.

The court rejected this objection. It acknowledged the general principle that extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is ordinarily exercised with self-restraint where an efficacious statutory remedy exists. It held, however, that the rule is one of discretion, not an absolute bar. The controversy here was not confined to re-appreciation of evidence. It involved questions about which statutory regime governed transfers completed before the substantive provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 commenced on 11 February 2016, and what legal test determines whether a person admittedly born in a Scheduled Tribe continued to possess that status on the dates of the transactions. The court also referred to the coordinate bench decision in Qamar Abbas v. Additional Commissioner, 2024 (1) ADJ 640, noting that the existence of a statutory remedy does not result in mechanical rejection of a writ petition in every case.

The Central Legal Question: Continuity of Tribal Identity After Conversion

The State's case on merits was that the petitioner, originally known as Nanhki, married one Sirajuddin according to Islamic rites, thereafter adopted the name Naimunnisha, lived with him for several decades, and bore two children bearing Muslim names — Ejajuddin and a daughter, Haseena Bano. The family register recorded her religion as Muslim. Inquiry reports dated 19 November 2025, 18 December 2025, and 19 January 2026, along with statements and identity documents, were placed before the Deputy Collector.

The petitioner did not dispute the marriage as such, but argued that marriage to a person of another religion cannot by itself extinguish Scheduled Tribe status acquired by birth. She relied on Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika v. State of Gujarat, 2012 (3) SCC 400, for the proposition that status acquired by birth is not ordinarily displaced merely by marriage. She also pressed upon the absence of any provision in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 analogous to paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, which excludes Scheduled Caste status on a change of religion.

The court accepted this submission to a limited extent. Citing State of Kerala v. Chandramohanan, 2004 (3) SCC 429, it affirmed that there is no broad proposition of law that a person ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe merely by reason of change of religion. The question of whether, notwithstanding conversion, a person continues to remain a member of the tribe is essentially a question of fact, to be determined with reference to tribal traits, customs, traditions, and continuing connection with the tribal community.

The court also drew on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Chinthada Anand v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, 2026 (3) Supreme 514, which the State had relied upon. That decision held that once a person belonging to a Scheduled Tribe converts to another religion, if it is proved that the person has completely renounced the customs, rituals, and other traits of the tribe and assimilated into the converted religion, <“a reasonable inference can be drawn that such a person shall not be considered a part of the tribe.”

The court found Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika distinguishable on its facts. That case concerned the tribal status of a child born from an inter-community marriage, not the continuing status of an adult who lived for several decades under circumstances inconsistent with tribal identity. The governing principles for the present controversy were those in Chandramohanan and Chinthada Anand.

Absence of Evidence of Continuing Tribal Life

The court's conclusion on merits rested not on any single document or the bare fact of the marriage, but on the cumulative weight of circumstances and — equally — on what the petitioner failed to produce. The court found that she had not satisfactorily established continuity of her connection with the Bhuiyan community by placing credible material before the authority or before the High Court showing that she continued to follow the customs and traditions of the Bhuiyan Scheduled Tribe, participate in its community life, and be recognised and accepted by that community.

The petitioner's principal response was a denial of conversion and an assertion that she continued to belong to the Bhuiyan tribe. The court treated that assertion as unsupported by sufficient substantive material demonstrating actual continuance of tribal customs, social relations, or community recognition. When the respondents had placed specific material pointing to a prolonged adoption of a different religious and social identity — the name change, the marriage, the children's names, the family register entry — a bare assertion in the pleadings was held insufficient.

On the Scheduled Tribe certificate, the court was careful to acknowledge its relevance as evidence of the certification made by the Tehsildar at the relevant time. It did not treat the certificate as worthless. However, the court noted that the respondents specifically alleged the petitioner had relied upon her parentage and tribal origin to obtain the certificate without disclosing her long-standing marriage with Sirajuddin, her subsequent name, and her religious and social circumstances. The court found no satisfactory explanation for the alleged non-disclosure on the record before it. The certificate therefore could not be treated as conclusive against an examination of whether the petitioner continued to possess the requisite statutory status on the dates of the transactions.

Which Statute Governed the Transfers

A distinct question arose from the fact that all three sale deeds predated 11 February 2016, the date on which the substantive provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 commenced. The earliest deed was executed on 4 November 2011; the latest on 26 November 2018. While the Deputy Collector had framed the proceedings under Sections 104 and 105 of the Code, the court held that the validity of transfers completed before commencement of the relevant provisions could not be determined by retrospectively applying those provisions.

The court therefore examined the transactions with reference to Section 157-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, which restricted transfer by a bhumidhar or asami belonging to a Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who did not belong to a Scheduled Tribe. A transfer in contravention attracted consequences under Sections 166 and 167 of that Act. The repeal of the 1950 Act, the court held, did not affect the previous operation of the enactment or anything duly done or suffered thereunder.

Critically, Section 157-B also prohibited transfer in favour of a non-tribal purchaser. Even if the vendors themselves belonged to the Scheduled Tribe, the statutory bar operated on the acquisition side as well. Once the petitioner was found not to have established the requisite tribal status on each date of purchase, the fact that the transferors were tribal members could not by itself save the transactions.

On the legal consequences of a prohibited transfer, the court relied on Additional Commissioner, Revenue v. Akhlaq Hussain and another, 2020 (4) SCC 507, where the Supreme Court held that a transfer made in breach of the statutory prohibition is void and that registration of the document, payment of stamp duty, or the form of the transaction cannot validate a transaction prohibited by law. The court applied the same reasoning to reject the petitioner's plea that nine years of unchallenged registration, revenue mutation, and possession created a valid title.

Delay in Initiating Proceedings

The petitioner pressed the point that the proceedings were initiated only in 2025 for sale deeds executed between 2011 and 2018 — a gap of seven to fourteen years. The court declined to invalidate the proceedings on this ground. The respondents had explained that the material circumstances concerning the petitioner's marriage, subsequent name, and religious and social identity came to light only subsequently, prompting the inquiry. More fundamentally, the court held that once a transfer is void by reason of contravention of a protective statutory prohibition, mere lapse of time, revenue mutation, or continued possession cannot confer validity on that transfer. The principle in Akhlaq Hussain does not permit a prohibited transaction to acquire validity by passage of time.

On the natural justice ground, the court found no interference warranted. The petitioner had been issued notice on 12 December 2025 and had submitted a detailed reply on 7 January 2026. Her Scheduled Tribe certificate, sale deeds, and revenue records were all before the authority. The court held that the authority's adverse conclusion did not amount to a denial of opportunity; the grievance was, in substance, against appreciation of evidence.

Outcome

All three writ petitions were dismissed. The impugned orders dated 22 January 2026 passed by the Deputy Collector, Duddhi, District Sonbhadra were affirmed. Any interim order operating in favour of the petitioner was vacated. The competent authority was declared at liberty to give effect to the impugned orders in accordance with law. No order as to costs was made.

The court clarified that although the Deputy Collector had referred to proceedings under Sections 104 and 105 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, the legality of the underlying transfers had been examined with reference to Section 157-B read with Sections 166 and 167 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, being the statutory regime applicable on the respective dates of transfer. To the extent the impugned orders gave effect to the same statutory prohibition and consequences, no interference was warranted.