Allahabad HC Upholds Life Term for Husband in Kerosene Burning Death, Acquits Father-in-Law of Cruelty Charge

The court confirmed murder conviction of Suhail on his wife's dying declaration alone, while finding no sustainable evidence of cruelty against his father Tufail, who lived separately.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Vinai Kumar Dwivedi (who delivered the judgment), has dismissed the criminal appeal of Suhail and confirmed his life imprisonment for the murder of his wife Sanno under Section 302 IPC. In a companion appeal, the court allowed the appeal of his father Tufail and acquitted him of the charge under Section 498A IPC, finding that the evidence did not sustainably implicate him. The two appeals arose from a conviction order dated 14 January 2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.-II, Fatehpur, in Session Trial No. 119 of 2018. The incident — in which Sanno suffered burns to nearly 95 percent of her body — took place on the night of 16 November 2017 at Sultanpur Ghosh, District Fatehpur. She died at Hallett Hospital, Kanpur on 30 November 2017.

The Incident and the Case Registered

The first information report was lodged by Anarunnisha (PW-1), the mother of the deceased, on 20 November 2017 at Police Station Sultanpur Ghosh, District Fatehpur. In her written report, Exhibit Ka-1, she alleged that on 16 November 2017 at about 9:00 PM, Sanno's husband Suhail and her in-laws — including Tufail (father-in-law), Imran, Afsar, Jeena, Arbeena, and Rabiya — poured kerosene oil on Sanno's body while she was sleeping and set her ablaze. The informant cited two motives: that Sanno had not conceived a child after marriage, and that the demand for a four-wheeler vehicle had not been met.

A case was registered as Case Crime No. 235 of 2017 under Sections 498A and 307 IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Inspector Radheyshyam Dwivedi (PW-8) took up the investigation. He inspected the site, recorded the informant's statement, prepared a site plan, and collected burnt clothes and ashes. The victim was first taken to District Hospital, Fatehpur, and later referred to Hallett Hospital, Kanpur, where she died on 30 November 2017. After her death, Section 304B IPC was added and investigation was handed over to Circle Officer Shripal Yadav (PW-7).

On completing the investigation, the charge-sheet was submitted only against Suhail and Tufail. The investigating officer found the allegations against the other named accused — Imran, Afsar, Jeena, Arbeena, and Rabiya — to be false, and they were exonerated. The postmortem conducted by Dr. Sarvajeet Singh (PW-9) found superficial to deep thermal burn injuries covering about 95 percent of the body, with the cause of death recorded as septicaemia due to ante mortem burn injuries.

Charges, Trial, and the Trial Court's Verdict

The trial court framed charges against both accused under Sections 498A and 304B IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. An alternative charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was also framed. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses — Anarunnisha (PW-1) through Dr. Atul Kumar Srivastava (PW-12) — along with documentary evidence marked as Exhibits Ka-1 to Ka-13. The accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and denied all charges. Their defence was that a kerosene oil lamp placed above the clay stove accidentally fell, igniting the hut and Sanno's clothes while she was cooking. Suhail also claimed he tried to extinguish the fire and sustained burns himself. The defence adduced one witness, Kallu (DW-1).

After trial, the Sessions Court found Suhail guilty under Section 302 IPC and Section 498A IPC, acquitting him under Section 304B IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Tufail was found guilty only under Section 498A IPC and was acquitted under Section 302, Section 304B IPC, and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Suhail was sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000 (and six months' additional imprisonment in default) under Section 302 IPC, and three years' imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 3,000 (and three months' additional imprisonment in default) under Section 498A IPC. Tufail was sentenced to two years' imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2,000 (and two months' additional imprisonment in default) under Section 498A IPC. All sentences were directed to run concurrently.

The Dying Declaration and the Legal Challenge to It

With all four eyewitnesses of fact — Babu @ Bablu (PW-2), Suman @ Suggan (PW-3), Pannabano (PW-4), and Mohd. Husain (PW-5) — turning hostile, and PW-1 resiling from her examination-in-chief during cross-examination, the dying declaration, Exhibit Ka-13, became the centrepiece of the prosecution case.

The dying declaration was recorded on 17 November 2017 at 12:20 AM at District Hospital, Fatehpur by Dr. Santraj Singh, Naib Tehsildar, Sadar, Fatehpur (PW-11), acting on the direction of the S.D.M., Sadar, Fatehpur. Before recording commenced, the Medical Officer, Dr. Atul Kumar Srivastava (PW-12), certified at 12:15 AM that the patient was conscious and able to speak. After recording, a second certificate was endorsed at 12:52 AM on the back of the dying declaration confirming that the patient was conscious, able to speak, well oriented, and mentally sound during the statement. Sanno's right thumb impression and the Naib Tehsildar's signature were also recorded on the document.

In her dying declaration, Sanno stated that at about 8:00 PM on 16 November 2017, her husband Suhail suddenly started beating and abusing her, poured kerosene oil on her body, and set her on fire. She identified two reasons behind the act: that she had been unable to conceive a child after three years of marriage, and that she had discovered her husband's illicit relationship with her sister-in-law Rabiya, having seen them together in a compromising situation about two years before the incident. She named no one else as a perpetrator.

The appellants challenged the dying declaration on several grounds. They contended that at 95 percent burn injury, Sanno was not physically capable of making a statement; that the postmortem report recorded congestion of the brain, lungs, spleen, liver, and kidneys; that PW-1 was present at the time and could have tutored Sanno; and that the doctor's certificate did not specifically certify fitness of mind, only consciousness.

The Division Bench addressed each of these contentions in detail. On the question of PW-1's presence, both PW-11 and PW-12 testified that no family member of Sanno was present in the ward at the time of recording — only the two of them were there. The court found this eliminated any possibility of tutoring or prompting.

On the postmortem findings, the bench drew a careful distinction: the internal organ congestion documented in the postmortem report, Exhibit Ka-7, was recorded after Sanno's death on 30 November 2017, not at the time of the dying declaration on 17 November 2017. On that night, she was fully conscious and able to respond correctly to questions put to her by PW-11, as the evidence of both prosecution witnesses established.

The Legal Position on Dying Declarations

The bench examined the five-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710, which arose on facts the court found similar in one material respect: in that case too, the doctor's certificate stated only that the patient was conscious, without specifically certifying fitness of mind. The Supreme Court in Laxman held that a doctor's endorsement regarding mental fitness is not a rule of law or a mandatory requirement but merely a rule of prudence, and that the ultimate test is whether the dying declaration is truthful, voluntary, and free from tutoring, prompting, or other suspicious circumstances. Where a Magistrate has satisfied himself by questioning the declarant and found her fit to make a statement, the declaration can be acted upon even without a specific medical certification of mental fitness.

The court also relied on the three-Judge Bench ruling in Koli Chunilal Savji and another v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 9 SCC 562, which held that a dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate, who is a disinterested and responsible officer, need not be doubted merely because a doctor was not examined. The bench noted that Laxman had overruled Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1999) 7 SCC 695 as no longer good law on this point.

The Division Bench also applied Krishna Kumar @ Pamma v. State of Haryana, (1998) 8 SCC 586, which held that the accused's conduct immediately after the incident — specifically, fleeing the scene rather than taking the victim to hospital — is a material circumstance that belies an accidental death defence. The appellants' counsel had relied on a separate set of case laws, including Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, 1957 LawSuit (SC) 93; Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., 1973 LawSuit (SC) 355; Paniben v. State of Gujarat, 1992 LawSuit (SC) 228; and more recent decisions including Phulel Singh v. State of Haryana, 2023 LawSuit (SC) 951. The bench considered these but found the facts of those cases distinguishable from the present case.

Suhail's Flight from the Scene as Corroborating Conduct

The bench gave independent weight to Suhail's conduct after the incident. Suhail fled the place of occurrence. He neither took his severely burnt wife to hospital nor gave any information to the police about the so-called accidental fire. The paternal family of Sanno, who lived in the same village, heard the commotion, reached the spot, and arranged her admission to the hospital. The written report was lodged only on 20 November 2017 — four days after the incident — because the family was engaged in attempting to save Sanno's life. The bench found this delay fully explained and drew no adverse inference from it.

The court applied the reasoning from Krishna Kumar @ Pamma directly: if Suhail's account of an accidental kerosene lamp fall were true, the natural conduct of a husband would have been to take his wife for treatment and inform the police. His absence from the scene and silence towards the police corroborated the dying declaration and confirmed a homicidal death.

Why Tufail's Conviction Was Set Aside

The acquittal of Tufail rested on a specific factual finding drawn from the site plan, Exhibit Ka-5, and the testimony of the investigating officer. The site plan showed two distinct houses: Tufail's house was on the eastern side of the road and Suhail's hut, where the incident occurred, was separately located in a south-western direction near jungle and bushes. Suhail and Sanno were living in this separate hut, away from Tufail and the rest of the family.

Critically, the dying declaration itself named only Suhail as the person who poured kerosene oil and set Sanno ablaze. Tufail found no mention in the dying declaration as having participated in the act of torturing or killing Sanno. The bench concluded that Tufail's involvement in cruelty under Section 498A IPC was not established by cogent evidence, and that his conviction was not sustainable. The court accordingly allowed Criminal Appeal No. 1007 of 2020 and set aside his conviction and sentence entirely.

Order

Criminal Appeal No. 1007 of 2020 filed by Tufail is allowed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 14 January 2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge/F.T.C.-II, Fatehpur in Session Trial No. 119 of 2018 under Section 498A IPC is set aside. Tufail is acquitted of the charge. He was on bail; he is not required to surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled and sureties discharged.

Criminal Appeal No. 1401 of 2020 filed by Suhail is dismissed. The conviction and sentence under Sections 302 and 498A IPC, including life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000 under Section 302 IPC, are affirmed. Suhail is in jail and shall remain so to serve out the sentence. A copy of the judgment is to be transmitted to the trial court along with the trial court records forthwith.