Allahabad HC Dismisses Dalmandi Tenants' Plea Against Varanasi Road-Widening, Holds Places of Worship Act Does Not Bar Acquisition

Six Dalmandi shopkeeper-tenants sought to block road-widening under the Kashi Vishwanath Corridor project and protect six pre-1947 mosques; the Division Bench found they lacked standing on both counts.

A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, comprising Justice J.J. Munir and Justice Arun Kumar, on 2 July 2026 dismissed a writ petition filed by six tenants and shopkeepers of Dalmandi Market, Varanasi, who sought to prevent their forcible dispossession in connection with a government-funded road-widening project linked to the Kashi Vishwanath Dham Corridor. The bench, in a judgment authored by Justice J.J. Munir, held that tenants possess no right to resist acquisition of the landlord's property under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. It further ruled that the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 does not curtail the State's power of eminent domain and cannot shield any place of worship from acquisition for a secular public purpose.

The Dispute Before the High Court

The six petitioners — tenants of shops bearing numbers CK43/168-169, CK68/1, CK69/32, CK43/147, CK68/36 and CK43/181 at Dalmandi Market/Street, Varanasi — said their families had conducted business in those premises for generations. The State Government issued Government Orders dated 31 March 2025 and 30 July 2025, allocating a budget of ₹21,588.24 lakhs for the widening and beautification of Dalmandi Street to ease the movement of pilgrims, devotees and tourists visiting the Kashi Vishwanath Dham.

Dalmandi Market occupies a 650-metre stretch housing 187 buildings and more than 1,000 shops. The petitioners described it as a centuries-old dense commercial area. The Kashi Vishwanath Temple, they pointed out, lies about 800 metres to the west through Chowk, while Sonar Gali — a street with only about 30 residential buildings — sits a mere 100 metres from the temple. They argued that Sonar Gali would serve as a far less disruptive alternative route.

According to the petition, the respondent authorities, their workmen and the Police began threatening shopkeepers and residents of Dalmandi after the Government Orders were issued. The petitioners alleged that 29 buildings were demolished between 9 February 2026 and the date of filing, purportedly acting on a representation dated 29 January 2026 by one Dr. Sanjay Singh Gautam to the Nagar Ayukt, Nagar Nigam, Varanasi, about dilapidated structures. The petitioners alleged this representation was manufactured to provide cover for demolitions that were in reality part of the road-widening drive. A Social Impact Study Report prepared by ENV DAS India (Pvt.) Ltd., Lucknow, placed before the court confirmed that the shopkeepers in Dalmandi are predominantly Muslim tenants who would lose their livelihoods if dispossessed.

In addition to protecting their own shops, the petitioners sought a direction to the respondents not to demolish six mosques in the Dalmandi area — Anjuman Intezamia Masjid, Masjid Rangile Shah, Masjid Ali Raza Khan, Masjid Karimullah Baig, Masjid Nisaran and Masjid Sangamarmar — all said to predate 15 August 1947. An RTI response from the PWD, Varanasi, indicated that the six mosques were proposed to be acquired and taken over. The petitioners said this violated the Act of 1991 and Sections 51 and 91 of the Waqf Act, 1995.

They alleged violation of fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21, 19(1)(a) and 300(a) of the Constitution and also sought a mandamus to develop an alternative street closer to the Kashi Vishwanath Dham instead of widening Dalmandi.

The State's Response

Mr. Mahesh Chandra Chaturvedi, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State, raised a threshold objection: no prior written demand for justice had been made by the petitioners to any of the respondent authorities before filing the writ petition. He relied on a consistent line of Supreme Court authority, including Saraswati Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India, Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise and Kamini Kumar Das v. State of West Bengal, for the proposition that absence of a prior formal demand renders a mandamus petition fundamentally defective.

On the substance, the Additional Advocate General submitted that an RTI reply dated 3 June 2025 from the Executive Engineer, Provincial Division, PWD, Varanasi, showed that land and buildings required for road widening would be taken either through voluntary sale deeds on the basis of mutual agreement under Government Order dated 19 March 2015, or through acquisition under the Act of 2013 with full statutory compensation and rehabilitation entitlements. He stated that a notification under Section 11 of the Act of 2013 had already been issued after completing necessary formalities.

On the mosques, the Additional Advocate General argued that neither the Act of 1991 nor the Waqf Act, 1995 prohibits land acquisition for a public purpose under the Act of 2013. He submitted that the Act of 1991 is directed solely at preventing conversion of a place of worship from one religious denomination to another, not at limiting the State's sovereign power of acquisition. He relied on the Allahabad High Court's decision in Church of North India Trust Association v. Union of India and others.

As regards the Nagar Nigam and VDA actions, the State submitted that their powers derive from The Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1959 and The Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 respectively, and are taken on independent considerations under those statutes.

The Bench's Reasoning on Tenancy Rights

The bench accepted that the petitioners are tenants, not owners. Rent slips, lease agreements and electricity bills were produced; three of the agreements were unregistered notarial affidavits. The court noted that Syed Rashid Ali, the first petitioner, last paid rent covering August to December 2004, while petitioner Mohammad Dilshad's lease dated 20 January 2023 showed a monthly rent of ₹2,200. The landlords — none of whom had challenged the road-widening project — remained absent from the proceedings.

The bench drew a direct consequence from that absence. Under the Act of 2013, it is the title-holder who has the locus to object, negotiate a sale deed or contest acquisition. Once the owner's rights vest in the State by transfer or acquisition, land vests free from all encumbrances. The court acknowledged a narrow scenario — where a voluntary sale deed is executed by the owner, the tenant might become the State's tenant — but held that in an outright acquisition, tenants have hardly any rights to question the process. No case of a demolition notice from the Nagar Nigam or proceedings under Section 27 of the Act of 1973 by the VDA had been specifically pleaded or shown against the petitioners' own shops, making the relief sought against those bodies beside the point.

The Bench's Reasoning on the Places of Worship Act, 1991

The court turned to the central statutory question: whether Section 4(1) of the Act of 1991, which declares that the religious character of any place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 shall continue unchanged, bars the State from acquiring a mosque for a secular public purpose.

The bench held that Sections 3 and 4 must be read harmoniously. Section 3 prohibits any person from converting a place of worship of one religious denomination into a place of worship of another denomination or a different sect of the same denomination. Section 4(1), read in isolation, might suggest that the religious character of a pre-1947 place of worship is immutable in every sense. The bench rejected that reading as a misconstruction.

When Section 4(1) is read together with Section 3, the court held, the prohibition is targeted: it prevents a place of worship from being converted from one religion to another — a temple cannot become a mosque, and a mosque cannot become a temple. The Act of 1991 does not touch the State's power as the owner paramount of all lands in India to acquire property for a public purpose, subject always to the owner's right to just compensation. “The purport of the Act of 1991 is not to place beyond the pale of authority of the State's right” to exercise eminent domain, the bench observed.

The bench drew support from the Constitution Bench ruling in Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui and others v. Union of India and others (1994) 6 SCC 360, which held that a mosque does not enjoy any special immunity from State acquisition that is unavailable to places of worship of other religions. Acquisition of a religious place is permissible in unusual and extraordinary situations for a larger national purpose, subject to the condition that it does not extinguish the right to practise the religion where that right is integrally tied to a specific place.

The bench also relied on the Bombay High Court's decision in Yusuf Ajij Shaikh and others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer No. 2, Pune and others (1994 SCC OnLine Bom 246), where P.S. Patankar J. had rejected the argument that the Act of 1991 bars acquisition of a mosque or dargah under the Land Acquisition Act. The Bombay High Court had reasoned that Section 3 targets persons who convert places of worship of one community into those of another, with punishment prescribed under Section 6 for such conversion; it does not and cannot abrogate the statutory machinery for land acquisition.

On the Waqf Act, 1995, the bench noted that the second proviso to Section 51(1A), as amended by Act No. 14 of 2025, expressly saves acquisitions of Waqf property for a public purpose under the Act of 2013, provided the acquisition is made in consultation with the Waqf Board. The third proviso stipulates that such acquisition shall not be in contravention of the Act of 1991. Since the bench had already concluded that the Act of 1991 does not bar acquisition for a secular public purpose, this proviso added nothing to the petitioners' case.

On the Petitioners' Locus Regarding the Mosques

The bench was reluctant to rule on the mosque question at all. The six mosques are admittedly registered Waqf properties, each with its own Mutawalli. The U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow, had itself written to the Executive Engineer, PWD, Varanasi on 23 April 2026, confirming the six mosques' Waqf numbers and stating that any acquisition must follow Sections 51 and 91 of the Waqf Act, 1995. The bench observed that the Mutawalli and the Waqf Board hold pre-eminent locus to protect Waqf property, not individual Muslim worshippers. Adjudicating on the mosque issue on the petitioners' application could prejudice the Board and Mutawalli, who had not been heard on the merits.

Nevertheless, because counsel pressed the point with emphasis, the bench addressed it — expressly without prejudice to the rights of the State, the Waqf Board and the Mutawalli to assert their respective positions in appropriate proceedings if and when the occasion arises.

Outcome

The Division Bench dismissed Writ-C No. 16649 of 2026 in its entirety. There was no order as to costs. The bench certified the order as speaking and reportable.